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1.  INTRODUCTION 
SAMIR AMGHAR, AMEL BOUBEKEUR AND 
MICHAEL EMERSON  
The 15 million Muslims now living in the European Union, representing 
3% of the total population, constitute the largest minority religion in the 
region and also the biggest Islamic diaspora in the world.1 Seven countries 
stand out for the size of their Muslim populations – France, Germany, 
Belgium, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Greece and Bulgaria – 
where they account for between 3% and 13% of the total populations.2 In 
the three Nordic EU member states (Denmark, Finland and Sweden), 
around 1% of the population is Muslim. To the south, Italy and Spain have 
been prime destinations for new flows of immigration since the 1990s and 
have the same proportion of Muslims. And certain countries in the Balkans 
(Albania, Bosnia, Macedonia...) have long-established if not predominant 
Muslim populations, which are the legacy of an Islamisation process that 
began in the 15th century with the expansion of the Ottoman Empire.  
In Western Europe, the presence of Islam is mainly the consequence 
of significant migratory flows in the 1960s from countries of former colonial 
empires (the Maghreb, sub-Saharan Africa and the Indian sub-continent), 
but also from Turkey. The arrival of Muslims was the result of organised 
immigration between the countries of origin and European countries in 
                                                           
1 These figures are a rough estimate, referring to all Muslim cultures; they are not 
intended to represent religious practice. 
2 In some European capitals, like Brussels, the proportion of Muslims can reach 
17%. See C. Torrekens (2006), ”La gestion locale de l’Islam dans l’espace public 
bruxellois”, Les cahiers de la sécurité, No. 62, 3rd trimester, pp. 139-160 (available at 
http://www.inhes.interieur.gouv.fr/fichiers/RECH_62CSIinternet.pdf).  2 | BOUBEKEUR, EMERSON & AMGHAR 
 
order to meet the needs of the latter for manual labour.3 At the end of the 
1960s, this immigration was still widely perceived as temporary. Hanging 
onto the myth of ‘the return’, the Turkish, Maghreb or Pakistani immigrant 
intended to stay in Europe only for the duration of his work contract, and 
then return home. For this reason, government authorities in the host 
countries never devised public policies on Islamic issues or their Muslim 
communities in a structured or nationwide manner.  
From the mid-1980s onwards, however, the Muslim populations 
progressively gave up the idea of returning home and decided to stay in 
Europe permanently. Gradually, there was a settling on the part of the 
worker who, having brought his family over from the country of origin, no 
longer considered himself as a traveller in transit. The signs of this putting 
down roots became more visible as workers’ children were sent to 
European schools, and places of worship appeared. While practically non-
existent in Europe in the 1970s, the number of mosques multiplied rapidly, 
reaching over 6,000 by the end of the 1990s, and this under the impetus of 
the first generation of Muslims.4 Closely linked to their countries of origin, 
this first generation of immigrants developed a community-minded sense 
of religion, based on the organisation of worship in their countries of 
origin. The new mosques of Europe remained tied to these countries 
(notably Algeria, Morocco and Turkey), which financed them and sent their 
own imams to manage them.  
Despite the fact that the first generations were still linked to their 
countries of origin, there was nonetheless a profound Europeanisation of 
Islam already taking place, largely due to the younger generations born 
and educated in Europe. Although they were practising Muslims and came 
from a Muslim culture, members of this new generation severed their 
identification of Islam with their parents’ country of origin, and 
increasingly thought of themselves as French, British, German or Belgian. 
This re-conceptualisation of Islam coincided with the emergence of claims 
to equality of treatment with their fellow citizens of European origin. 
                                                           
3Agreements of this type were signed, for example, by France with Algeria (in 
1968), Morocco and Tunisia (in 1963) and by Belgium with Turkey (in 1961), 
Morocco (in 1963) and Tunisia (in 1965). 
4 Jocelyne Cesari, Sakina Bargach and Damian Moore (2002), «L’islamismation de 
l’espace public français: vers la fin des conflits», Les Cahiers du Cemoti, No. 33. INTRODUCTION| 3 
Struggles against all forms of racial or religious discrimination took shape 
within the framework of a ‘citizenisation’ of the Muslim population. For 
example, as early as 1983, a huge march was organised in Paris by SOS 
Racism, bringing together nearly 1 million people, mainly from Muslim 
immigrant communities. They advocated taking part in the political, 
economic and social life of the host country, by voting and other means. 
This discourse was also taken up by Islamic religious organisations which, 
while calling for European Muslims to strengthen their ties with Islam, also 
invited them to consider themselves as full citizens. Muslim associations 
encouraged young Muslims to vote and become integrated in the local 
culture.5 These demands, based on a European and Islamic citizenship, 
obliged European policy-makers to no longer consider Islam as a migratory 
phenomenon, but as an integral and lasting part of the political, social and 
economic landscape in Europe.  
This tendency towards thinking of Islam as fitting into an 
endogenous integration process, however, began to be undermined and 
contradicted by the growing tensions linked to what we might call an 
‘Islam in crisis’, highlighted dramatically by the rise in radical Islam, the 
headscarf controversy and the terrorist acts from 11 September 2001 in 
New York and Washington to Madrid in 2004 and London in 2005. From 
the migratory context of the 1970s, policies based on the presence of 
Muslims have now come to be focused on problems of security and the 
fight against terrorism. Other conspicuous affairs linked to Islam (e.g. 
Salman Rushdie’s publication of the Satanic Verses in 1989 or the Danish 
caricatures of the Prophet in 2006, not to mention the inflammatory 
declarations of various imams) have also, since the 1990s, fed a political 
perception of an ‘Islam in crisis’, despite its being far-removed from the 
daily preoccupations of most of the Muslim populations at the grass-roots 
European level.6 
                                                           
5 Samir Amghar (2006), «Les trois âges du discours des frères musulmans en 
Europe», Samir Amghar (dir.), Islamismes d’Occident: perspectives et enjeux, Lignes 
de Repères. 
6 Amel Boubekeur and Samir Amghar (2007), “The role of Islam in Europe: 
Multiples Crises?”, in Michael Emerson (ed.), Readings in European Security, Vol. 4, 
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At the outset we highlight two key points of focus, which both 
concern the search for political solutions to the ‘Islam in crisis’ in today’s 
Europe.  
The first brings an essentialist and culturalist approach to the crises 
linked to Islam, both as regards the problem and the solution. According to 
this view, because the tensions have arisen within an Islamic frame of 
reference, the solution has necessarily to be found within the Islamic 
religion. Thus, if Islamic terrorists are the cause of attacks in Europe, it is 
because the religious texts that are supposed to inspire them give explicit 
incitement to violence. From this viewpoint, one may oppose an external 
Islam supposedly ill-fitted to European values with a democratic Islam that 
is European. The solution offered by policy-makers then tends towards 
European religion-building: whereby a moderate and controllable Islam is 
promoted in order to combat jihadism. But this solution often proves 
ineffective. The problem is that this construction of a peaceful Islam is often 
artificial. It misjudges the attitudes of the local populations, for example in 
cases that seek to draw upon foreign models of Islam.7 By placing the 
supposedly problematic nature of Islam at the heart of the matter, it 
underestimates the strength of the political and social reasons that are the 
origin of the riots or jihadist violence, even when these may be undertaken 
in the name of Islam. In this case the solution should be found within the 
political sphere, for example by offering means of political participation in 
their European home countries, and not simply in the religious field via 
interfaith and intercultural dialogue and the training of peaceful imams.  
The second factor regarding European public policy towards Islam is 
the level of policy-making – at the local, national or European level. When 
questions of relations between Islam and the West arise, the solution and 
the framework of analysis tend to favour the national scale and local 
dimensions, which are undeniably important, but may neglect the 
European dimension. European values, identities, political and religious 
means of communication among Muslims living in Europe are a living 
reality. This was abundantly illustrated by the various responses European 
                                                           
7 For example, the UK requested the assistance of Malaysia in the fight against 
terrorism. In France, Nicolas Sarkozy, then Minister of the Interior, asked Egyptian 
theologians for a fatwa forbidding young French Muslim girls from wearing their 
veils at school.  INTRODUCTION| 5 
Muslims gave to the cartoons of the Prophet Mohammad that appeared in 
a Danish newspaper. Indeed, while some Arab states saw the cartoons 
affair as a clash of civilisations and a means to put political pressure on the 
European Union,8 European Muslims tended to demand respect for their 
identity and equality as European citizens. In Belgium, France, the UK and 
many other countries, demonstrations were organised in protest against the 
publication of the cartoons but very few people attended them. Calls to 
boycott Danish products pronounced by some preachers and imams were 
rarely successful among European Muslim communities. The sense of 
belonging to Europe and having a European identity is therefore highly 
important to Muslims and should not be underestimated.  Furthermore, it 
is already apparent that the specific features of the national organisational 
models of Muslim communities in Europe are tending to become blurred. 
For example both the assimilationist and integrationist models of the 
French and the multi-cultural models of the British and Dutch are in the 
process of being re-thought in light of the place these societies wish to give 
to their Muslim communities. These models are now being re-shaped by 
the ‘Islam in crisis’, which is being experienced across the whole of Europe, 
pushing public authorities to move towards common approaches in search 
of solutions.  
The movement of Muslims, of their ideas and activities from one 
European country to another, is a considerable phenomenon in itself. The 
political concerns of Muslims, their media and associations are becoming 
more and more European. Islamic actors may think of themselves in their 
respective national contexts, but are increasingly fitting into a European 
logic. Tariq Ramadan, preacher and intellectual of Swiss nationality and 
highly regarded by young francophone European Muslims, is the perfect 
example of this phenomenon. Born in Switzerland, he spent a long time in 
France and Belgium, and then became a political advisor on terrorism to 
former British Prime Minister Tony Blair. Another example is the French 
Muslim Brotherhood, organises a huge demonstration every year in Paris 
attracting Muslims from all over Europe. The European branch of the 
Muslim Brotherhood, the Federation of Islamic Organisations in Europe 
(FOIE), has moved its European headquarters from Markfield in the UK to 
Brussels, seat of numerous European institutions, and other Muslim 
                                                           
8 It was especially the case of Syria, organising violent demonstrations against EU 
embassies and trying to negociate EU’s demands on Lebanon. See Olivier Roy (8 
February 2006), “Geopolitique de l’indignation” in Le Monde. 6 | BOUBEKEUR, EMERSON & AMGHAR 
 
structures are already organised at the European level. Similarly, the 
European Council of Fatwa and Research, in Dublin, brings together 
theologians from all over Europe in order to define religious norms in the 
European context.  
It is evident from exchanges between European Islamic actors and 
policy-makers themselves that Europe is increasingly the forum of choice 
for devising norms and principles regarding Islam, starting with existing 
European legislation against discrimination in the labour market, and 
progressing on from there. European Islam is already a reality for Muslims. 
How can the EU institutions and its member states catch up with this 
political reality? Beyond domestic European affairs, there are also questions 
o f  h o w  i s s u e s  r e l a t i n g  t o  E u r o p e ’ s  Muslim communities factor into the 
foreign policies of the European Union, primarily in its relations with the 
Muslim states of the Mediterranean basin. These merit consideration in 
positive and participatory terms, rather than simply in the context of the 
West’s latest preoccupation with security, immigration and the fight 
against terrorism. Europe’s new generation of Muslims can also become a 
valuable human resource in the Union’s foreign policy endeavours to come 
to terms with the challenges of globalised Islam.  
*    *   * 
These are some of the themes that inform the chapters of this book. 
More precisely we have structured the contributions in three parts: 
Ideologies and Movements, Status and Discrimination and 
Institutionalisation. In what follows we give a succinct guide to their 
contents. 
Part A on Ideologies and Movements contains contributions by Amel 
Boubekeur, Samir Amghar and Olivier Roy.  
Amel Boubekeur surveys the landscape of political Islam in 
contemporary Europe, defining such movements as those that have 
recourse to Islam as the first justification of their actions. The plurality and 
diversity of such movements are stressed first of all, even when focusing on 
those that seek to work peacefully, to the exclusion of violent jihadism. 
Political Islam in Europe initially had strong links to activists who came to 
live in Europe in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s in exile from repressive 
regimes at home, and who saw Europe as a safe haven from which to 
continue to work towards the establishment of Islamic regimes in their INTRODUCTION| 7 
home countries. From the 1990s onwards, however, as the immigrant 
communities became permanent residents and had families that grew up as 
young Europeans, the focus turned more towards representing European 
Muslims in the political systems of their new home countries. This was 
especially true of the groups linked to the Muslim Brotherhood organised 
under the Union of Islamic Organisation of Europe (UIOE) or the Turkish 
Milli Görüs, which have become more like political lobbies. By contrast, 
Sufist movements are still strongly linked to their countries of origin, 
especially those organised since 2000 around the multinational association 
known as Participation and Muslim Spirituality (PSM), which attracts 
Moroccan communities; similarly the Ahbash movement of Lebanese 
origin also attracts followers from different backgrounds. While Sufism is 
usually seen as the antithesis of political Islam, in pursuit of a peaceful and 
non-politicised religiosity, the PSM and Ahbash have adopted an 
increasingly political role in Europe and act as an alternative to the UIOE, 
which they view as collaborating too closely with government processes. A 
third category consists of movements that are driven by a more predicative 
and missionary logic, notably the Tabligh and Salafist movements, which 
reject the idea of trying to work within the framework of European political 
structures.  
The Salafist movements are dealt with in more detail by Samir 
Amghar. Since the beginning of the 1980s Salafist movements have 
emerged as a main instrument of radicalisation in Muslim communities, 
mainly among the younger people of immigrant families. Its current 
success is partly explained by disappointment with the perceived failure of 
the re-Islamisation efforts of movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood, 
advocating instead a more literal koranic tradition, driven by the desire to 
return to the golden age of Islam. Amghar identifies three tendencies 
within the Salafist family, the first being revolutionary and jihadist, the 
second pursuing only objectives of predication and conversion, the third 
advocating political activism to establish the Islamic state and society. 
Salafists are not numerous, yet their influence is pervasive, dominating the 
doctrines heard in many mosques.  
Olivier Roy goes further into Islamic radicalisation, drawing a 
portrait of typical West European terrorists, most of whom have adopted 
some sort of Salafism. The majority of them are second-generation Muslims 
from immigrant families, but there are also a significant number of 
converts. They are typically Western educated, often with European 
citizenship, and the recipient of a ‘normal’ Western upbringing, but are 
quite varied in ethnic terms. There is no clear sociological profile. The 8 | BOUBEKEUR, EMERSON & AMGHAR 
 
psychological dimension is more prevalent than a clear-cut social or 
economic dimension – with an overriding concern for self-image. This 
radicalisation sees a blending of Islamic discourse with the radicalism of 
the ultra-leftist movements in the third world of the 1970s. Roy calls them 
“not the militant vanguard of the Muslim community”, but rather “a lost 
generation, unmoored from traditional societies and cultures, frustrated by 
a Western society that does not meet their expectations”. 
Roy goes on to outline what should be done to overcome the current 
crisis. The objective should be to isolate the Islamic radicals with the aid of 
the large majority of the Muslim population. The challenge is to make room 
for Islam as a “mere” religion of Europe among all the others, rather than 
attempting to sponsor a “good and moderate Islam”. Opening up huge 
themes to discussion, he argues that both the multi-culturalist and 
integrationist approaches towards the new Muslim communities have 
failed, and that it would be sounder to encourage the disconnection 
between religion and culture.  
In Part B, Imane Karich and Tufyal Choudhury describe the socio-
economic status of Muslims, albeit having to rely on largely inadequate 
statistical data, in part due to the fact that most countries do not collect data 
on the basis of religion and the distinction between citizens and non-
citizens has become increasingly meaningless. Both authors nonetheless 
find widespread evidence of disadvantaged economic status, in terms of 
higher unemployment, lower qualities of employment, low income levels, 
poorer housing and health. But the picture is not uniformly negative. 
Karich reminds us of Max Weber’s thesis that the link between faith and 
economic development can be positive, engendering qualities of 
motivation, ethics and trust. The authors also draw attention to the 
dynamic development of Muslim niche markets, such as for halal meats and 
for ethnic market entrepreneurship more generally. They also note 
evidence of upward social mobility and professional achievement of the 
second and third generations of immigrant families. Educational 
performance among Muslims is showing significant improvements and UK 
Muslims now participate in post-compulsory education at a higher 
percentage level than the national average.  
Choudhury discusses the nature of discrimination in the labour 
market and in other spheres. He notes that the Muslims encounter 
discrimination of multiple types, including race, ethnicity and gender as 
well as religion, with imprecise boundaries between these different features INTRODUCTION| 9 
in public perceptions. Turning to policies to counter discrimination, 
Choudhury devotes attention to the significance of European Community 
law, with two directives adopted in 2000, the ‘Race Directive’ covering 
discrimination on grounds of racial or ethnic origin, and the ‘Framework 
Directive’ prohibiting discrimination in the labour market on grounds of 
religion, belief, disability, age or sexual orientation. The weakness of the 
Framework Directive is its limitation to the labour market, compared to the 
Race Directive which goes more widely into gender equality, education, 
housing and the actions of public officials (notably police and immigration 
staff). In his view, the scope of the Framework Directive could therefore be 
widened. Further, the EU is deliberating on a new Framework Directive on 
Racism and Xenophobia, which would make public incitement to violence 
or hatred for racist or xenophobic purposes a criminal offence.  
Isabelle Rigoni examines the treatment of Muslim-related issues by 
the media. The European significance of this subject has been amply 
demonstrated by the Danish cartoon affair, which resonated throughout 
Europe and the Muslim world. The media bear a heavy responsibility in 
their representation of minority groups, for they profoundly influence the 
public’s perceptions and stereotypes of such groups, and may be a 
principal agent behind the evident rise of Islamophobia. It is essential for 
policy measures in the field of integration and the fight against 
discrimination to include the media as one of the key groups of actors, and 
in particular the ethnic media. Rigoni favours actions at both the national 
and European level to promote a better representation of ‘visible 
minorities’, citing examples from France, Germany and the UK.  
Valerie Amiraux focuses on the headscarf issue, with the increasing 
trend towards banning the headscarf in public spaces, such as state schools 
and public sector employment. What do headscarves stand for? Amiraux 
looks at three elements in the debate: religion, gender and national identity. 
In other words, she asks: what is religion, and what is politics? The 
headscarf controversy in Europe tends to mix gender, race and religious 
issues, triggering a double discrimination on grounds of gender and 
race/religion. Amiraux identifies two main positions in EU member states 
towards the headscarf: first an accommodating position, dominant in the 
1980s, but declining since the 1990s, and second the positive desire to ban 
the headscarf in certain public spaces. In her conclusions, she notes that 
various constitutional court decisions make it seemingly impossible to take 
a final decision on the basis of abstract reasoning. As a provisional solution 
she advocates less politicisation and more recourse to the courts of law by 
individuals to seek redress for specific complaints.  10 | BOUBEKEUR, EMERSON & AMGHAR 
 
These contributions all flow into the chapter by Chris Allen on 
Islamophobia, for which he uses the definition coined in the UK 
Runnymede report: “a shorthand way of referring to dread or hatred of 
Islam, – and, therefore, to fear or dislike of all or most Muslims”. While a 
more precise and official definition has proved elusive, Allen affirms that 
this “certain identifiable phenomenon” now impacts on everyday life and 
has spread as a conceptual and social construct; whereas only five years 
ago it was an unknown term. He discusses the consequences of “it” for the 
erosion of multi-culturalism, the hardening of anti-terrorist, security and 
immigration laws, rising physical abuses and attacks, and looks into the 
role of political parties and the media in deepening and exploiting the 
phenomenon. While the phenomenon has grown, so also do we see 
informed efforts now emerging to counter Islamophobia, mainly at local 
and non-governmental levels. Although these efforts are so far limited, the 
issue itself has been transformed in importance and urgency across Europe. 
Finally, in Part C, Sara Silvestri and Bernard Godard address issues 
surrounding the institutionalisation of Europe’s Muslims and their 
representation in political life. Silvestri observes that the increasingly 
assertive Islam as a transnational presence in the European public sphere is 
developing in a rather disorganised and fractured way, not least because 
Islam has no hierarchical structure between the believer and his/her God. 
European governments are tending to push for an ‘artificial’ creation of 
Muslim councils, against a background of competing Muslim bodies – 
organisations sponsored by governments and diplomatic missions of 
Muslim states, notably Saudi Arabia, Algeria, Morocco and Turkey, 
through to Islamist movements of the diasporas, and less formal local 
groupings. Silvestri argues that the idea of systematising Muslim 
participation along corporatist lines should be viewed with caution, to say 
the least. Political participation in Western democracies can take place at 
the level of the individual and all manner of groups as well as political 
parties. Muslims should be treated as ordinary individuals, and not be 
isolated as a special socio-political category.  
Bernard Godard, drawing on his extensive experiences in the 
processes of official relations between government and representatives of 
Islam, notes that European countries are tending to converge in their 
approaches to the question of granting official recognition of Islam, 
whereas initially the national contexts were highly divergent. However, the 
general pattern becomes one of establishing consultative councils, INTRODUCTION| 11 
notwithstanding the difficult issues of designating the representative 
organisations or individuals, and their often questionable legitimacy at the 
level of different Islamic factions and movements. Godard also considers 
the issue at the European level. While the EU has no competence for 
‘religion’, he suggests the creation of a steering group at the European level 
to study the scope for concerted policies towards the Muslim community.  
*    *   * 
Works on Islam in Europe often read like a juxtaposition of national 
case studies covering the history and perhaps the sociology of immigrant 
groups in the countries considered. Although the sociology of Islam is well-
developed in certain European countries such as Germany, France and the 
UK, it is only in its infancy as a discipline at the European level. The 
common objective of the chapters in this work has therefore been to supply 
policy-makers in the member states and EU institutions with an inventory 
of the main issues concerning the presence of Islam at European level. This 
is about measuring progress so far registered, but also about revealing the 
weaknesses and contradictions in initiatives undertaken in Europe in the 
institutional recognition of Islam. The purpose of this research is to find 
keys to help unlock what is a complex cultural and political challenge. 
Although the manifestations of political Islam in Europe are diverse, 
it has common features in its sources, structures and practices. The 
European roots of Islamic political violence are a fact. The perpetrators of 
recent acts of political violence became radicalised in Europe, and not in 
Muslim countries as had been the case in the 1990s. Their acts can be 
viewed as directed towards the polity of Europe as a whole, even if some 
acts, such as the Madrid and London bombings, have had dramatic impacts 
on the national scene.   
Also, the question of political radicalisation must be differentiated 
from the question of religious radicalisation. The attempts to build a ‘good 
Islam’, aimed at replacing an Islam opposed to European values, are failing 
and should be abandoned. Policy-makers should not impose their top-
down political choices on Muslims concerning the place of Islam in Europe. 
It will be useless to dictate to them the terms of the debate concerning 
political Islam and its radicalisation in terms of binary positions (with us or 
against us), but rather they should be encouraged to express themselves 
politically with a greater plurality of views, in accordance with the political 
diversity generally seen in Europe. In order to take the issue of political 
Islam out of the hands of Islamic political militants, Muslims should be 
encouraged to engage vigorously in a democratic way with the major 12 | BOUBEKEUR, EMERSON & AMGHAR 
 
debates in society, and at the same time maybe to ‘de-Islamise’ their 
political participation.  
The visibility of Muslim communities remains problematic in Europe. 
Since 11 September 2001, in particular, we have witnessed an 
intensification of the negative portrayal of Muslims in the media. As 
already mentioned, the media have a major role to play in the construction 
of a European discourse where Islam and Muslims have a place of 
legitimacy. Often tainted by Islamophobia, the discourse of mainstream 
media about Muslims should work towards a better representation of the 
daily realities of Muslim communities and of Muslims themselves, notably 
in their link to the question of national and European citizenship. The 
ethnic and religious-inspired media should also be encouraged by policy-
makers to increase their participation in the major debates of society.  
This visibility could draw attention to the success stories of Muslim 
communities, which often go unrecognised. Investment by private Muslim 
entrepreneurs should be supported, for example, by encouraging self-
employment and by promoting access to bank services that conform to the 
expectations of Muslim populations.  
Muslim communities are also mobilising to face the challenges of 
redefining their European identity. They are emancipating themselves 
more and more from the question of a purely religious representation, and 
are investing in the processes of political representation. The initiatives of 
state-sponsored institutional Islam should therefore take account of this 
dichotomy between the representation of faith and the question of political 
representation, which should not be ‘Islamised’.  
Muslim communities are today subjected to exacerbated forms of 
discrimination, one of the most widespread being Islamophobia. In light of 
the multiplication of Islamophobic incidents and tendencies in recent years, 
a genuine reaction on the part of public bodies in response to Islamophobia 
is now urgent. The multi-dimensional nature (gender, race, religion…) of 
the discrimination against Muslims (and in particular against veiled 
Muslims) today calls for the accumulation of more adequate data on the 
disadvantages they face in the fields of work, housing and education.  
More broadly, the time has come for a new European political and 
social discourse in relation to its Muslim communities. At the European 
level this should blend elements of normative doctrine with specific 
instruments of action, and provide a coherent overall framework for the 
work of governments and civil society, both at national and local levels.   
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2.  POLITICAL ISLAM IN EUROPE 
AMEL BOUBEKEUR 
Introduction 
Europe is currently home to an extremely diverse landscape of political 
Islamic1 movements. This diversity is even greater than in most Muslim 
countries, where ideological Islamic expression is often limited by the 
official ideology of the state. In Europe, these movements are often 
mobilised in defence of European Muslim interests; they work for the 
recognition of Islam or as its spokesperson in dealing with European states 
or with the majority of Muslims who are not concerned with political Islam. 
These movements have been present in Europe for a long while now 
(between 20 and 40 years for most of them) but their daily realities are still 
not well known to European policy-makers, neither at the European, 
national nor local level.  
These movements only become really visible when different conflicts2 
emerge in the public sphere. During the various headscarf debates, the 
                                                           
1 Political Islam denotes the recourse to Islam as the first justification of one’s 
political action, notably where demands are made vis-à-vis political authorities or 
in the methods of mobilisation and engagement proposed to Muslim communities. 
More specifically, these are descended from the Islamist movements of the Muslim 
w o r l d .  T h e y  r e p r e s e n t  o n l y  a  m i n o r i t y  o f  p e o p l e  w i t h i n  E u r o p e ’ s  M u s l i m  
minorities. However, their political reach and capacity to focus debates around the 
place of Islam in Europe often surpass the immediate circles of militants that 
compose them. In order not to repeat the same term, we will use ‘Islamism’ in this 
text synonymously with Political Islam.  
2 A m e l  B o u b e k e u r  a n d  S a m i r  A m g h a r  ( 2 0 0 6 ) ,  “ T h e  r o l e  o f  I s l a m  i n  E u r o p e :  
Multiple Crises?”, in Islam and Tolerance in Wider Europe, Open Society Institute, 
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questions concerning individual freedom (such as the crisis over the 
Salman Rushdie affair, the Danish caricatures of Mohammad, or questions 
of religious education) and the reaction of European Muslims to 
international events (such as terrorist attacks in Europe, the war in Iraq or 
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict), the mobilisation of political Islam has been 
perceived as fundamentally confrontational both in the media and in 
institutional discourse. But what about at the grass-roots level? In the 
context of secular states suspicious of religious engagements in the public 
sphere, Muslims who are engaged in the defence and the representation of 
the ‘Islamic’ issue in Europe are often accused of duplicity in their 
relationship to democracy and European citizenship. Today the framework 
and inspiration for the claims of these Islamist movements have much 
evolved.3 They now tend to use forms of secular political opposition in the 
political European tradition. The political Islamic actors mobilised around 
the interests of political Islam in Europe are very diverse, however, and do 
not use the same methods to challenge the discourses and public policies 
that shape the lives of Muslims.  
Today this political and publicly militant Islam only represents a 
minority of Muslims in Europe, but its capacity for mobilisation and the 
diffusion of discourse in defence of Islam often goes well beyond the circle 
of its regular militants. It is also this Islam that most attracts European 
policy-makers’ attention the when dealing with questions of radicalisation, 
institutionalisation of Islam, juridical adaptation of Islamic codes and the 
defence of citizenship rights for Muslim minorities. 
This presentation of the European landscape of political Islam does 
not aim to be exhaustive. We will concentrate on those movements that are 
the most active in the political sphere and whose political evolution is the 
most significant, such as the Islamists in exile from the Muslim world, the 
UIOE (Union of Islamic Organisations of Europe), the Muslim 
Brotherhood, the Milli Görüs and political Sufism such as the Participation 
and Muslim Spirituality movement or the Ahbash. Finally, we will also 
look at missionary and predicative movements such as the Tabligh and 
Salafism. We will thus not be looking at jihadist movements or at Shi’ism, 
nor will we deal with the cultural and ethnic management of certain 
Turkish, North African, Arab or Indo-Pakistani Islamic movements. 
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2.1  Islamism, a polemical concept 
Islamism is not a homogenous phenomenon, its actors are different 
depending on location and historical era, and the methods of action that 
they propose also evolve over time. Thus it has moved on from the early 
20th century goal of inventing for the Muslim world a modernity 
autonomous from that of the West, or from wanting to put in place an 
Islamic state among the militants of the Arab world in the 1970s. More 
recently it has promoted the leadership of a competitive Islam, especially 
through the market.4 However, it is possible to distinguish certain common 
origins and traits within political Islam. 
Historically, Islamism was born in the Arab world towards the end of 
the 19th century. Above all it aimed to reclaim the ‘authentic’ Islam of the 
golden age of the Prophet. Seeking to distinguish themselves clearly from 
‘classical’ Muslims belonging to traditional societies, for whom Islam is 
lived passively, the promoters of this new current actively defended the 
precedence of Islamic principles for the whole political and social system. 
Islamism thus aimed to allow committed Muslims to reposition themselves 
vis-à-vis the West, in the wake of the abolition of the caliphate and the 
collapse of the Ottoman Empire in 1924. Islamism sought to present itself as 
an alternative to new ideologies such as communism and Arab 
nationalism.5 For these committed Muslims, it was also a case of halting the 
intellectual decline of Muslims, seen as incapable of responding to the 
challenges of ‘modernity’.6 The political identity of Islamism during the 20th 
century aimed to renew the living environment of Muslims in order to 
respond to the situation of domination, and even Westernisation of Muslim 
                                                           
4 Amel Boubekeur (2005), “Cool and Competitive: Muslim Culture in the West”, 
ISIM Review, No. 16, autumn. 
5 Laurens (1993), L'Orient arabe: arabisme et islamisme de 1798 à 1945, A. Colin. 
6 S e e  t h e  w o r k s  o f  v a r i o u s  I s l a m i s t  t h i n k e r s  s u c h  a s  M a w d o u d i ,  S a y y i d  Q o t b ,  
Muhammad Abduh or Rashid Rida. See also Albert Hourani (1962), Arabic Thought 
in the Liberal Age, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Nikki Keddie (1968), An Islamic 
Response to Imperialism, Political and Religious Writings of Sayyid Jamal al-Din `Al-
Afghani, University of California Press. Malcolm H. Kerr (1966), Islamic Reform: The 
Political and Legal Theories of Muhammad `Abduh and Rashid Rida, University of 
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populations.7 They also sought to reorganise family structures that had 
been altered by colonisation and to respond to questions of modernisation 
and progress. The means they used were those of political and social 
activism, in order to impose new ‘Islamic’ norms that focused on, among 
other things, questions of identity, the relationship to Western modernity, 
the place of women, the relation between religion and the state and the 
questioning of Western imperialism in its political, economic and 
intellectual varieties.  
Today the concept of Islamism has polemical connotations. It belongs 
to the language of Western political science, but it is also used in different 
ways by public opinion, notably in the media. Islamists themselves do not 
use the term but rather refer to themselves as islamî which means ‘religious’ 
or ‘Islamic’. We use the term here to refer to non-violent activism, both in 
Muslim and Western states, founded on a particular vision of politics, with 
a precise political project (not a messianic utopia), organised as a social 
movement or a political party, with specifically political activities and 
demands (demonstrations, participation in elections...) and acting within 
the framework of the state or in dialogue with it. 
2.2  The initial role of Islamist militants in Europe 
Political Islam in Europe was initially strongly linked to Islamists living in 
exile on the continent. Certain Islamist militants from the Muslim world 
“went West”,8 above all those from the network of the Muslim 
Brotherhood. Under pressure from secular and authoritarian Arab regimes 
(Syria, Iraq and Egypt, but also Tunisia, Morocco and Algeria), numerous 
militants and leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood9 f l e d  t o E u r op e  i n  t h e  
1960s, 1970s and 1980s to escape the political repression they were subject 
to in their own countries. Saïd Ramadan, one of the leaders of the Muslim 
                                                           
7 John Esposito (1983), Voices of Resurgent Islam, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
8 Olivier Roy (2002), L’islam mondialisé¸ Paris, Le Seuil. 
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created in Egypt in the 1930s and which, opposing the secular state, recommended 
the establishment of an Islamic state. This association spread rapidly in the rest of 
the Arab world, then to Europe in the 1970s. On the history of this movement, see 
Richard Mitchell (1993), The Society of the Muslim Brothers, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press; and Olivier Carré and Gérard Michaud (Michel Seurat) (1983), 
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Brotherhood (son-in-law of Hassan el Banna, the founder of the Muslim 
Brotherhood, and father of Tariq Ramadan, a Swiss intellectual and Muslim 
activist), fled Egypt in the 1960s, moving to Geneva to pursue his political 
activism. Issam al-Attar, the spiritual guide of the Syrian Muslim 
Brotherhood, also fled the pressure of President Hafez al-Assad’s regime 
and settled in Aachen in Germany.  
Upon their arrival in Europe the exiled leaders of the Muslim 
Brotherhood met with the engagement of certain Islamic students who 
were also from Muslim countries and had come to pursue their university 
studies on the continent. In France, students and Islamic refugees came 
together within the Islamic Student Association of France (Association des 
étudiants Islamiques de France – AEIF), which was created in 1963. During 
this period, numerous people gravitated towards this organisation and 
were later to occupy important positions in the Islamist movements 
contesting power within their own countries. Among the future Islamist 
leaders who were educated in Europe are Rachid Ghannouchi, currently 
living in the UK, who founded the future Tunisian Islamist party, Islamic 
Tendency Movement (Mouvement de la Tendance Islamique – MTI) at the 
end of the 1970s, Hassan al-Tourabi, the great sage of the Islamist military 
regime in Sudan between 1989 and 1999, and Ali Shari’ati, one of the 
masterminds of the Iranian Revolution of 1979. The AEIF did not simply 
operate as a militant Islamic political party, but also as an elite circle of 
intellectuals, publishing an academic journal and organising conferences 
and think tanks on the subject of the decline of intellectual Muslims in the 
world, in the wake of colonisation and the immigration processes that 
followed. In fact, meeting European Muslim immigrants with low levels of 
education who had come to Europe to work was quite a shock for these 
Islamist elites from the Arab world. The Islamist sphere of influence was 
thus not homogenous but was dominated by the drive to return to ‘pure’ 
cultural practices (i.e. in opposition to the more cultural form of Islam 
practised by the immigrants), as well as by the desire to see Muslims once 
again active on the global intellectual and political stage. 
During the 1970s the Islamist influence in Europe grew and 
developed in response to the policies of the repressive authoritarian POLITICAL ISLAM | 19 
regimes in Muslim countries,10 and the arrival of contingents of students 
who had come to Europe to study further and who were sympathetic to the 
theses of political Islam. These two social groups (political refugees and 
students) together made up the heart of Islamism in Europe and were 
behind the creation of European branches of some Islamist parties from the 
Muslim world.  
At the beginning of the 1970s, the decision of the Turkish 
Constitutional Council to outlaw the Rafah, an Islamist political party 
directed by Necmettin Erbakan, encouraged a number of its members to 
create Millî Görüs, meaning ‘national vision’ in Turkish. This organisation 
was initially based in Germany and France, but it soon spread to the whole 
of Europe via the Turkish diaspora. At the end of the 1960s, numerous 
militants of the Pakistani Islamist organisation founded by Abu lala 
Mawdudi, Jama’at islami, set up a branch in the UK.  
Ten years later, a group of Tunisian students among which Ahmed 
Jaballah, current director of the European Institute of Human Sciences (in 
Paris and Chateau Chinon) in charge of training imams, were given the 
mission of founding a branch of Rachi Ghannouchi’s Mouvement de la 
Tendance Islamique in France.  
The overthrow of the electoral process in Algeria in 1991 which 
prevented the Islamic Salvation Front (Front Islamic du Salut – FIS) 
directed by Abassi Madani and Ali Belhadj from gaining power, led many 
of its leaders, militants and sympathisers to leave Algeria for Europe 
(Switzerland, Belgium, Germany and notably France). Once there, certain 
members of the FIS created the Algerian Fraternity of France (Fraternité 
Algérienne de France – FAF) in 1990. Directed by Algerian students, this 
organisation aimed to represent the FIS in France. At the same time, a 
certain number of FIS directors decided to organise, from September 1993, 
a Foreign Executive Committee of the FIS (Conseil Executif du FIS à 
l’étranger – CEFE). The members of the CEFE aimed to constitute an exiled 
Islamist opposition and to establish the movement in most European 
countries.11 
                                                           
10 Bassma Kodmani-Darwish and May Chartouni-Dubarry (eds) (1997), Les Etats 
arabes face à la contestation islamiste, Armand Colin. 
11 In its chain of command, the management of the CEFE consists of a political 
office directed by Rabah Kébir in Germany and vice-directorships in London,  the 
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At the beginning of the 1980s, the use of the European political sphere 
was purely instrumental. The aim was to use this region of the world as a 
political tribune to challenge the Turkish and Arab regimes that the 
Islamists considered to be dictatorships. The different militants thought of 
their presence in Europe as the means of conceiving ‘in safety’ a way of 
reforming the authoritarian regimes of the Arab world – hypothesising that 
they would eventually return to these countries, once the regimes in 
question had been overthrown. These movements were thus used as the 
reserve base of multinational Islamist opposition. Europe seemed to them 
to be a politically free land, where militants could be trained, in 
anticipation of the liberalisation of the political situation in their countries 
so that Islamic states could be constructed there. To their opposition of the 
authoritarian regimes in the Arab world was added a critique of Europe 
denouncing the political, cultural and ethical imperialism of the West that 
Muslim societies were supposed to submit to. On one hand, the reading of 
Islam by these exiled movements was founded on the re-Islamisation of the 
social practices of immigrants who were seen to be perverted by Western 
societies (with regards to the loss of the Arabic language, religious practices 
and the difficult transmission of this identity to children born in Europe). 
On the other hand, it was founded on the politicisation of religion, 
presented as an all-encompassing system capable of resolving the political, 
social and economic problems of Muslims. 
Nevertheless, the influence of Islamist discourse on immigrant 
populations remained marginal and only reached certain segments of the 
Muslim community (overseas students and Islamist refugees). This general 
indifference is explained by the fact that the immigrants were still closely 
linked to the consulates of their country of origin, which were concerned 
with religious matters12 (construction of mosques, organisation of classes in 
religion or in the Arabic language). Moreover, these immigrants considered 
their presence in Europe as temporary, only just tolerated by the authorities 
                                                                                                                                                    
US and Switzerland, held by Abdallah Anas, Anouar Haddam and Mourad Dhina, 
respectively. 
12 The Kingdom of Morocco has a network of Mosques in France, Belgium, the 
Netherlands, Italy and Spain. The Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs also controls 
a number of places of worship in France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Austria and 
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who were not favourable towards political actions that might disturb the 
public order. In addition, the aspirations of the Islamists regarding the 
politicisation of religion found no favour with immigrants whose daily 
cultural practices were much more pragmatic. The instances of political 
protest regarding Islam among immigrants were therefore sporadic, 
limited for example to the demands of Muslim workers in certain European 
factories for the provision of a place of prayer in their workplace. 
Confronted with this lack of success, many of those who defended 
the establishment of Islamic states in the Muslim world changed their 
argument at the beginning of the 1990s. From this point on, these 
organisations no longer considered Europe as the reserve base for the 
Islamism of Muslim countries, preparing their return to the Arab, Pakistani 
or Turkish political stage. They now saw themselves as structures that 
represented the interests of Muslim immigrants and their children in 
Europe, having themselves definitively renounced the objective of 
returning to their home countries. 
2.3  Movements linked to the Muslim Brotherhood 
From the 1990s onwards Islamic militants abandoned the theme of the 
establishment of an Islamic state that resembled the Islamism of the early 
days and founded their claims on the representation of European Muslims. 
This second current of militant Islam accentuated the importance of 
political and social activism in their host countries, as a way of defending 
and representing European Muslims. In this perspective, former Islamist 
actors joined in the general phenomenon of re-islamisation with the 
emerging generations of young Muslims born in Europe, particularly 
students who were in a position to reach the middle classes.13 In order to 
claim rights for European Muslims, the privileged vectors were to be the 
associative system and the political party. Within these associations new 
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appropriation of an Islamic heritage. It uses the tools of Islamism to provide 
Muslim youth born in Europe with a feeling of religious commitment. Re-
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Islamic militants would create specific groups for youth, students, women, 
theological training and humanitarian work. 
Although these structures were heavily inspired by the experiences of 
opposition and protest in the Arab world, the discourses had to be adapted 
to the very different political sensitivities of European-born Muslims. This 
movement militates for an integration of Muslims into the social and 
political landscape, for example by calling on Muslims to enrol and to vote. 
In this way, the organisations that belong to this tendency try to set up an 
‘Islamic citizenship’, proposing themselves as privileged interlocutors to 
the public authorities, at local and national levels, on issues as diverse as 
religion, racism and problems of delinquency in difficult suburbs.14 In 
wanting to define the contours of European Islam, these organisations also 
offer young Muslims a model of integration inspired by the British 
multicultural model: to be both European and Muslim at the same time – 
without that implying assimilation to the dominant secular ideology. 
The Union of Islamic Organisations of Europe (UIOE) is a militant 
supranational structure founded in 1997 by a group of political refugees 
and Islamist students from North Africa and the Middle East. It is directed 
by Chakib ben Makhlouf, an activist of Moroccan origin who recently 
succeeded Ahmed al-Rawi, a British citizen of Iraqi origin. Linked to the 
international organisation of the Muslim Brotherhood, the UIOE regroups 
close to 500 associations throughout Europe. It is active in the UK via the 
Muslim Association of Britain (MAB), in Switzerland via the Ligue des 
musulmans de Suisse (LMS), in Germany via the Islamische Gemeinschaft 
in Deutschland (IGD), and finally in Belgium via the Ligue interculturelle 
islamique de Belgique (LIIB). Of the 500 European associations federated 
with the UIOE, nearly 250 of them are present on French territory and are 
controlled by the Union of Islamic Organisations of France (UIOF), the 
French branch of the UIOE. The UIOF was created in 1983 by the Iraqi 
Mahmoud Zuhaïr and the Tunisian Abdallah Benmansour, and became the 
welcoming organisation of Islamist militants from the Arab world. The 
UIOF was initially strongly characterised by its Islamist parentage and was 
not very interested in political action in its host country. Towards the end 
                                                           
14 Swiss intellectual Tariq Ramadan was one of the promoters of this ‘Islamic 
citizenship’. This discourse principally had an effect on francophone Europe: 
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of the 1980s, the organisation changed its orientation and became 
persuaded of the relevance and the necessity of basing its action in France. 
In fact, in a context of rising Islamism (especially in Algeria with the FIS), 
the UIOF aimed to negotiate its entry onto the French political scene as an 
important protest movement, weighing in heavily with regards to the place 
of Islamism on the international political chessboard. The Union thus sided 
with the high school students expelled from school in 1989 for refusing to 
remove their headscarves, organising demonstrations and monopolising 
media attention on this issue. Along the same lines, it also tried to have the 
French publication of Salman Rushdie’s Satanic Verses banned. Every year 
the UIOF organises a huge assembly at Le Bourget in Paris, offering a four-
day conference on the place of Islam in Europe, focused on the 
compatibility of religious practices with European social and political 
reality. This assembly is the largest reunion of Islamic associations at 
European level, with over 80,000 Muslims participating in past years. They 
attend conferences and request fatwas (religious decrees) from a number of 
sages, as well buy Islamic books and clothing.  
The UIOE also possesses one of the first European university 
institutes with the responsibility of training imams and religious leaders: 
the European Institute of Human Sciences (EIHS), based in Paris. This 
institute regroups 300 Muslim students from all over Europe. The UIOE 
has also founded the European Council for Fatwa and Research (ECFR), 
based in Dublin. The Council brings together Muslim theologians living in 
Europe15 and aims to define an Islamic practice that takes into account the 
reality of Europe in responding with fatwas to questions posed to them by 
Muslims.16 
As the heirs of Islamism, this part of the Muslim Brotherhood 
movement has nonetheless evolved, especially with the emergence of 
young Europe-born Muslims in its ranks. The different national federations 
that are members of the UIOE have engaged to differing extents, and with 
varying degrees of success, in the representative councils for Muslims in 
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European countries. Thus the French federation (UIOF) participated in the 
process of the institutionalisation of Islam in France and won a large 
number of seats in the elections of the French Council of the Muslim 
Religion (Conseil Français du culte musulman – CFCM)17 in 2003 and 2005. 
Via the CFCM the current leadership of the UIOF has developed a 
negotiating strategy with the French political authorities in order to defend 
the interests of French Muslims, thus breaking with the political culture of 
the previous leadership, which preferred confrontation to cooperation. 
Today the UIOE generally, and the UIOF in France and the LIIB in 
Belgium in particular, are no longer the confrontational actors they were in 
the 1990s. Their methods of intervention on the question of Islam have 
become more consensual, and more routine, which has enabled them to 
present themselves as socially acceptable interlocutors to the political 
authorities. 
However, even though the UIOE remains a dominant actor in the 
landscape of political Islam, it is currently suffering from an increasing lack 
of legitimacy among young Muslims because it downplays conflictual 
questions, which is a consequence of its ‘clientelist’ relationship with 
governments. Thus the position of the UIOF on the French law concerning 
religious symbols in 2003 was very reticent, although a part of the UIOF 
criticised this position. The fatwa against urban violence that was issued by 
the UIOF, at the request of the Minister of the Interior during the 
November 2005 riots, thus castigating the rioters on the basis of their 
supposed affiliation with Islam, contributed still more to the deepening of 
the rupture between the Muslim Brotherhood and their base. 
The second major international organisation to structure the 
landscape of associations that militate for the defence and integration of 
Muslims in Europe is the Turkish Milli Görüs (MG), founded in Germany 
in 1973 with its headquarters in Cologne. Whereas the UIOE regroups Arab 
and converted Muslim populations from around Europe, the MG is 
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essentially frequented by European members of the Turkish diaspora and 
their children.18  
The MG was first founded in Turkey in 1969 by Necmettin Erbakan, 
who would later found and lead the Turkish Islamist party. In the same 
mould as the associations founded by exiled Islamists and inspired by the 
Muslim Brotherhood, the MG was implanted into Europe by militants of 
the Erbakan party who had fled Turkey for Switzerland and Germany in 
1972, following the decision of the Constitutional Council to prohibit the 
Islamist group in 1971.19 The MG has many branches throughout Europe, 
particularly where there are large Turkish communities (Belgium, France, 
the Netherlands, Germany, Denmark, Switzerland, Austria...). Bringing 
together nearly 30 associations in as many European countries, the 
organisation has a large network of mosques with nearly 511 places of 
worship, 2,137 youth, women’s and student groups, 17,841 directors and 
over 252,000 members – which makes it without a doubt the biggest 
Muslim organisation in Europe.  
Following the example of the UIOE, the MG provides a framework 
for the Turkish population of Europe via the organisation of religious and 
social activities. Contrary to the UIOE, however, its objective is not to gain 
religious leadership over all European Muslims, but rather to offer political 
and religious representation for the European Turkish community of nearly 
4 million people. The MG is thus in competition with the Dyanet, which is 
the representative of the official Islam of the Turkish Minister for Religious 
Affairs and is responsible for dealing with the religious affairs of the 
Turkish community in Europe (appointing imams, setting up koranic 
schools...). However, the MG maintains a good relationship with the 
Muslim Brotherhood (UIOE), which sometimes leads them to organise 
common events, such as the shared electoral lists UIOF/MG during the 
elections of the CFCM in France. 
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Originally the MG was very influenced by its Islamist and nationalist 
heritage and it emphasised objectives based on political and social issues 
specific to Turkey and its community in Europe. However, in the middle of 
the 1990s the organisation was obliged to reposition itself in order to appeal 
to the European-born younger generations of Turkish origin. Taking its 
inspiration from the UIOE, the MG developed a discourse on the necessity 
for the Muslim populations of integrating into European society. Their 
means of action for enlarging their influence in Europe, previously only 
oriented towards political militancy, were also modernised. In fact, the MG 
now possesses Islamic banks, clothing brands, radio stations and 
magazines throughout Europe. In order to demonstrate their openness, the 
head of the Dutch branch of the MG even went so far as to the lengths of 
organise a football game between young militants and members of the gay 
community, which provoked strong opposition within the traditionalist 
Turkish community. 
It should also be noted that in 2000 a schism occurred between the 
French branch of the ‘young MG’ and their parent organisation, as the 
former decided to place emphasis on the ‘Europeanisation’ of their political 
identity. The new organisation has a network that covers all of Europe, is 
called the Cojep League of Popular Education (Ligue cojépienne 
d’éducation populaire – LICEP).20 It is behind the creation of a network of 
young Turkish businessmen in Europe and is also active in public debates 
and lobbying concerning Turkey’s accession to the EU. 
2.4  Political Sufism 
Sufism in Europe is usually seen as the antithesis of political Islam and 
linked to a peaceful, tolerant, non-politicised and almost folkloric type of 
religiosity. Sufism has always played an important role in politics, 
however, especially during the colonisation processes in the Middle East 
and Africa. Indeed, its political activities, networks and demands have 
always been implemented through the powerful structures of Sufi 
brotherhoods.  
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For around 15 years now, and since the decline of the traditional 
hegemony of the major Islamist movements (like the Muslim Brotherhood), 
the political role of Sufism has become more and more important in the 
landscape of political Islam in Europe. These movements could also be 
called neo-Sufism.21 
In their relations to European public actors, these neo-Sufis 
movements have the advantage of being less stigmatised and their 
visibility or commitment to public life appears to be less problematic. 
However, as with the other movements and tendencies linked to political 
Islam, Sufi actors are claiming specific rights, and have their well-identified 
‘project’ of society as well as their enemies. 
 The association Participation and Muslim Spirituality (Participation 
et Spiritualité Musulmane – PSM), established in 2000, is characterised by 
the originality of its doctrinal heritage. Although its methods of 
mobilisation are inspired by political Islam, it claims Sufism as an 
orientation. The PSM is the European emanation of an unofficial Moroccan 
movement of both Sufi and Islamist tendency: the Al‘Adl wa-Ihsan party, 
founded by Abdessalam Yassine in 1987. The PSM was initiated by 
Moroccan students who were pursuing further study in Europe at the 
beginning of the 1990s, and experienced a certain development during the 
years 2000; it is today one of the most active European associations of 
political Islam. It is active in countries with a large Moroccan immigrant 
population (France, Belgium, Spain, Italy, the Netherlands, but also in 
North America). Much more discreet in its activities than the associations 
previously mentioned, the PSM principally recruits among the emerging 
re-Islamised middle class, who are disappointed by the overly bureaucratic 
discourses of the older associations like the UIOE. It is an attractive 
movement because its method of militancy is quite unique in Europe. It 
functions like a refuge for its members. It does not ask them to commit to 
an exclusive militant membership, but encourages them to take on political 
roles at the local level and to invest themselves in associations that defend 
citizens’ rights. Nor does it require its members to make specific reference 
to the movement in the public sphere. In France, the PSM was actively 
involved in protesting against the law pertaining to religious symbols at 
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school, through the ‘One School for All’ action, which became a protest 
movement that united both Muslim and secular associations.  
The spiritual side of the movement is another reason for its success, 
through the organisation of evening prayer meetings for members, and the 
transmission of religious experiences shared exclusively among group 
members such as the religious explanation of dreams and the recital of 
incantations for the well-being of the group. The question of religious 
sentiment having been somewhat attenuated by the political strategy of the 
UIOE and its obsession with the relationship with the political authorities, 
the PSM seems to offer an Islamic structure that allows for the combination 
of spiritual life with political aspirations, and this remains quite 
revolutionary. The key to the success of the PSM lies internally in the very 
important relationship of trust with the figure of the Sheikh (the guide), 
especially for the Sufi methods, and externally in the freedom of 
manoeuvrability within the secular state. Although they do not control 
many mosques in Europe, the influence of this movement is continuing to 
increase, thanks to preaching that is effective but not polemical 
(conferences, camping, courses, music festivals...). 
One of the political axes of the PSM comes from the transposition of 
the Moroccan political situation to Europe (the Al’Adl wa-l’hsan party, 
from which comes the PSM, is not recognised in Morocco and regularly 
undergoes waves of violent repression). In addition, Nadia Yassine, the 
daughter of Sheik Yassine, who is currently the figurehead of the 
movement, comes to France regularly to give conferences on the 
compatibility of Islam and the dynamics of political modernisation, almost 
exclusively emphasising questions relating to democracy and human 
rights. It is also responsible for an association for the defence of human 
rights that has no reference to Islam, the Alliance for Freedom and Dignity 
(AFD),  which is responsible for organising some of Nadia Yassine’s 
European conferences. Finally, during the periods of repression against the 
central organisation in Morocco, the European members of PSM worked 
actively to spread information, once again without reference to religion but 
under the banner of the ‘defence of human rights’.22 
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At the beginning of the 1960s in Lebanon, a theologian of Ethiopian 
origin, Sheik Abdallah al-Habachi, founded the Association of Islamic 
Charitable Projects (AICP) which is more commonly known as the 
Ahbash.23 This movement has existed since the 1980s in Europe and has its 
headquarters in Paris. The movement spread throughout Europe thanks to 
the religious activism of Lebanese students studying in Europe, and 
political refugees here to escape the civil war in Lebanon. The Ahbash 
claims to be a Sufi movement and defends a political reading of Islam. 
Today they are active in more than 15 European countries (France, 
Germany, Switzerland, Denmark...), and even in Australia where the son of 
the movement’s founder, Abderrahman Al Habachi, supervises the 
activities. They have several centres in the US, notably in Philadelphia, as 
well as in Ukraine where they have a large mosque in Kiev. 
In France, where the association emerged in 1991, several public 
figures belong, or have belonged, to the movement, such as the rapper Kéry 
James (whose last two albums sold over 150,000 copies) or Abd Samad 
Moussaoui (the brother of Zacarias, one of the presumed authors of the 
September 11 attacks in 2001). In Switzerland the movement is older; its 
establishment dates from the end of the 1970s. Here, under the auspices of 
Lebanese students studying at the University of Lausanne, an association 
was created called the Centre Islamique de Lausanne (CIL). In just a few 
years the movement became the official representative body for Muslims of 
that region. It is the principal interlocutor of the Swiss authorities and is 
solicited to appoint chaplains in prisons and hospitals.  
In Lebanon the movement has been used by the Syrian regime to 
contain the growing influence of Islamists in that country.24 In Europe, anti-
Islamist rhetoric is also one of the ways public opinion is mobilised by the 
Ahbash, especially after the September 11 attacks. In reality, this group 
fights for the ideological monopoly of European Islam, as much among 
young Muslims as with the public authorities. In presenting itself as the 
incarnation of Sufi and moderate Islam, the Ahbash attempt to play the 
‘defence against Islamism’ card. Each year, the French branch of the AICP 
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organises an evening meal during Ramadan in the Salons of UNESCO in 
Paris, where they affirm before an array of international Muslim officials 
and European political personalities their moderate reading of Islam and 
their condemnation of Islamism. This initiative proves, among other things, 
that they are not exempt from political motivations, even if it is more 
discreet. They also often collaborate with European authorities that 
appreciate their opposition to the other tendencies of political Islam in 
Europe. On several occasions Abd Samad Moussaoui has condemned the 
religious jihadist experience of his brother on television, whilst 
simultaneously ensuring the promotion of his own more moderate 
movement.25 Finally, it must be added that the movement organises regular 
demonstrations in support of the Syrian presence in Lebanon. 
2.5  Missionary and predicative movements: The Tabligh and the 
Salafis 
Whereas Turkish and Arab Islamic militants extol the defence and 
recognition of social and cultural rights for Muslims in Europe, and 
political Sufis fight for the conquest of power in their countries of origin 
(Morocco and Lebanon), the third feature of the European militant Islamic 
landscape, represented by the Tabligh and Salafists, has a more predicative 
and missionary logic. This third group of movements is characterised by a 
strong missionary activity that seeks to bring back to Islamic practices those 
who have turned away from them. Taking the Prophet as their example, 
these movements seek to enliven religious life, encouraging knowledge of 
the Koran and of the hadiths  (sayings of the Prophet). They offer their 
members a pious vision of the world, which is founded on a concept of 
society in which the islamisation of the whole of humanity is an 
inescapable element. Thus, their concern is neither the establishment of the 
Islamic state, as was the case for the exiled Islamists, nor the defence of 
European Muslim interests, as is the case for the UIOE and the Milli Görüs, 
but rather a messianic vision that consists of bringing straying believers 
back to Islam. They seek to breathe a ‘pure’ Islamic conscience back into 
Muslims, through a return to the religious practice of the Prophet, a 
practice purified of any addition since the koranic revelation and the 
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prophetic apostolate. Their framework of political protest is historically 
fixed by the Prophet’s example and thus, by consequence, maladjusted to 
the profane reality of contemporary Europe. Thus, the hope for social 
justice is postponed until the day of the Last Judgement in a millenarian 
fashion, this day being when the true Muslims return en masse to the pure 
practice of Islam. For them, protest should be passive and founded on the 
quiet strength of numbers that they are currently acquiring. They believe 
that through predication a social movement can be created that will 
overthrow the hierarchical organisation of the world and give Islam the 
predominant place that it deserves. These movements are thus not directly 
concerned with politics, but are rather concerned about correcting belief 
and religious practices through Islamic education, with a global reform in 
sight. This means a literal application of the koranic message that insists on 
the unity of God, a principle that is not respected, according to them, by 
Muslims and which is behind the political and social decadence of the 
umma (the community of believers). 
Moreover, these movements are opposed to all ‘westernised’ forms of 
political participation by Muslim populations within European societies, 
because such participation would be contrary to Islam. Democracy is 
assimilated to the replacement of God, because European deputies legislate 
in the name of values that are not those of the sharia (Islamic law). Thus, in 
Europe these movements promote an attitude of withdrawal from the 
official political stage even though it directly concerns European Muslims. 
For these movements and contrary to the opinions of the Islamic militants 
who defend European Muslims, the future of Islam on the continent cannot 
be reduced to a process of negotiation with the state. The primacy of Islam 
over all other systems, especially secular ones, prevents them from 
considering themselves as participants in a non-Muslim political system. 
Thus they offer an interpretation of the world that explains Islam as the 
solution to all evil. Although they are apolitical, they maintain an element 
of symbolic protest through this attitude of withdrawal, due to the 
disappointing living conditions of Muslim Europeans (religious and social 
discrimination, economic exclusion, the everyday immorality of the public 
space...). Advocating a religiosity based on the rejection of the dominant 
values of society and the necessity of living one’s faith in private, they do 
not demonstrate any violence. This religiosity often allows young Muslims 
with family, school or personal problems (particularly those from difficult 
suburbs), to develop a sense of atonement for their previous lack of 
religiosity. It also allows them an alternative to violence produced by the 
frustration at daily experiences of discrimination and exclusion in Europe. 32 | BOUBEKEUR 
 
Islam will ultimately compensate the oppressed, explain the followers. This 
feeling of oppression is reinforced by the stigmatisation that is associated 
with their participation in the movement, either in the public space because 
of their physical appearance (long beard, total veil and clothing from the 
Middle East), for which the media labels them a nest of ‘suicide bombers’, 
or even by the incomprehension of their friends and family. 
The Tabligh, which means to bring the message, was created in 1880 
at Merwat, not far from Dehli. Its founder, Muhammad Ilyas, responding to 
the desire for re-Islamisation among the local population which he 
esteemed to be only superficially Islamised, sought to preserve Indian 
Islamic identity through religious predication, in opposition to the English 
colonial presence and the Hindu majority. Before its arrival in Europe, this 
movement had a significant influence on the Indian sub-continent, such 
that many people were Islamised or re-Islamised through contact with the 
proselytism of the Tabligh. In 1944, upon the death of the founder, Ilyas’ 
son decided to internationalise the organisation by taking it out of India 
and setting up permanent missions in the rest of the world. At the 
beginning of the 1950s it set up branches along the main pilgrimage routes 
in the Middle East and in East Africa. In the 1960s it spread to West Africa 
and South East Asia. In just a few years the Tabligh had, following in the 
footsteps of the Muslim Brotherhood, become a multinational religious 
organisation. Wherever it operated it practised a systematic policy of 
regulating Islamic activity by controlling the construction of mosques and 
other predicative activities.  
The internationalisation of the movement, which led to its presence in 
almost 100 countries, was a result of the leaders’ desire to spread their 
message in a universal fashion. It was also a result of the fact that in the 
1940s the movement had reached its peak in India and in order to continue 
its development it was necessary to recruit a new clientele in other parts of 
the world. In the 1960s the movement turned towards Europe as a new 
land of predication, through the intermediary of the Indo-Pakistani 
community in the UK. The first Tabligh missions were set up in the UK at 
the same time as the first immigrants arrived from the Indian sub-
continent, as some of them were members of the Tabligh. They set up their 
headquarters at Dewsbury in Yorkshire and from there, with the help of 
missionary activists from India, the movement expanded across Europe – POLITICAL ISLAM | 33 
above all in those countries with Muslim immigrant populations at the time 
(Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany and France).26 Other European 
countries such as Spain, Switzerland and Italy would only experience the 
predication of the Tabligh from the 1980s, with the arrival of Muslim 
immigrants. In France, although the movement was present as early as 1968 
it was only officially organised in 1972 with the creation of a Muslim 
association called Faith and Practice (Foi et Pratique). Imbued with 
communitarian logic, the members of this movement did not recognise the 
dominant values of French society, such as pluralism or secularism. This 
lack of recognition brought indifference rather than any attempt to 
challenge or reject these values. In Belgium, the Tabligh progressively 
became an important Islamic actor from its foundation in 1974. 
Religious predication is at the heart of the activity of the Tabligh: in 
groups of four or five they travel Europe, and the world, calling on people 
to come to Islam (khuruj fi sabillilah – preaching on the path of God). As a 
religious obligation, each disciple must spend between three days and four 
months proselytising on predicative missions in Europe or in the rest of the 
world. Their protest is symbolic, as in the rejection of the dominant 
aesthetic norms: a militant Tabligh characteristically wears a long robe 
(qamiss), a skullcap and has a beard. Each militant conforms to a great 
moral rigour. The Tabligh does not concern itself with the daily problems 
of young Muslims beyond their spiritual needs. Membership is conceived 
as a passage, more or less long, to the eventual goal of the militant re-
Islamisation of the self. This passage may however, lead unsatisfied 
individuals to question the quietist nature of the Tabligh and to engage in 
violent political action once out of the movement. This was notably the case 
of Khaled Khelkal, former member of the French Tabligh who was 
responsible for the 1995 bombings in the Paris metro, as was also the case 
for the attacks in Casablanca in 2003, which were organised by former 
members of the European Tabligh. 
Salafism makes reference to the salaf, the pious ancestors incarnated 
by the three generations of Muslims that succeeded the Prophet and who 
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represent the golden age of Islam. It is strongly inspired by the national 
Saudi religious doctrine: Wahhabism, named after its founder: Muhammad 
Ibn Abd al-Wahhab.27 The adepts of this movement seek to base their daily 
life on the example of these three generations. Salafism came to Europe at 
the beginning of the 1990s thanks to the predication of graduates of Saudi 
Islamic Universities, as well as the proselytism of former militants and 
sympathisers of the Salafi wing of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), the 
Algerian Islamist party that settled on the continent in the 1990s, notably in 
the UK, France and Belgium. 
Having no desire to engage in society and having no political project 
other than the messianic expectation of divine justice, Salafism controls 
numerous mosques (in Madrid, Copenhagen, Geneva, Brussels, the 
suburbs around Paris...), and like the Tabligh, they defend an apolitical 
non-violent vision of Islam, based on the will to mechanically align life 
with the fatwas of Saudi religious authorities. The current success of 
Salafism among young Muslims in Europe can be partly explained by a 
feeling of disappointment at the failure of re-Islamisation movements such 
as the UIOE.28 Salafis criticise these movements for wanting to defend 
European Muslims using Western political categories and wanting to 
reform Islam in line with Western modernity. Thus they consider the 
majority of the political concessions and evolutions on questions of identity 
that have been obtained by these movements as unacceptable alterations of 
the koranic reference and the tradition of the Prophet. Salafis also reproach 
these currents of the Muslim Brotherhood for having accepted to negotiate 
with the state, especially on the different projects regarding the 
institutionalisation of Islam. The emergence of Salafism in Europe must be 
interpreted as the refusal of an excessive politicisation of Islam according to 
European standards, and a critique of the integration of values seen to be 
foreign to Islam, such as democracy and citizenship, into Islamic heritage. 
Negotiations between public authorities and militant Muslims have thus 
supposedly led to a banalisation of Islamic discourse, diluting its potential 
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for protest and leaving room for Salafism, whose potential for effective 
protest and opposition has however yet to be tested. For many followers it 
has become the means of regenerating a mythology for an ageing Islamism. 
We are describing here the ‘pious’ tendency of Salafism. We return in the 
next chapter to a more detailed treatment of Salafism and its own different 
tendencies. 
Conclusions 
European political Islam is a varied movement composed of multiple 
strains. Overplaying the religious variable without taking into account the 
complex relationships that these different militant groups have with their 
political environments, national and international, would mean considering 
political Islam as a homogenous group, which is not the case. The different 
militant groups can be distinguished by the political methods they mobilise 
in the defence of Islam. 
Thus the Sufi movements remain closely linked to and are controlled 
by the structures in their countries of origin (notably Morocco and 
Lebanon), whereas for those militant groups close to the Muslim 
Brotherhood and Milli Görüs, the rupture with their home countries has 
led them to refocus on Europe and adapt to its political culture. These latter 
groups act like political lobbies, seeking to influence European states by 
resorting to methods of engagement sanctioned by European legislation 
such as demonstrations, petitions or calls for economic boycotts. These 
actors work within a dialectical political framework where dynamics of 
negotiation and mutual influence interact with civil society and European 
political authorities. Finally, movements that are more withdrawn from the 
secular dimension of political Islam, such as Salafism or the Tabligh, 
voluntarily place themselves outside the framework of the state when it 
comes to negotiations about the rights of European Muslims. Their protest 
is manifested by their symbolic estrangement from the dominant values of 
society such as voting or the citizenship of a country they consider to be 
merely a host country, thus constantly affirming the primacy of an 
idealised religious micro-community over any other form of social 
organisation.  
Overall, one can discern a form of political participation that is 
relatively serene emerging from among a large number of militant 
Muslims, notably in comparison with the minority of violent jihadists. 
Those who developed an interest in politics during the major crises 
concerning Islam, such as the headscarf affair in France or the Danish 36 | BOUBEKEUR 
 
cartoons of Mohammad, have mostly done so not in exclusive reference to 
religion but to European law, in soliciting the national jurisdiction of the 
European Court of Human Rights. The cultural and religious ‘otherness’ 
emphasised by Islamism is no longer the privileged means of expressing 
contestation. During these crises the overwhelming majority of militant 
political Islamists asserted the European values of freedom of religion as 
the basis for their political demands, rather than the idea of a Western-
based hatred of Islam. For committed Muslims, change would no longer 
come via the contestations of outsiders who only react to their own 
marginalisation. Establishing a relationship of opposition with the majority 
w o u l d  n o  l o n g e r  b e ,  i n  t h e  s a m e  w a y ,  t h e  o n l y  m e a n s  o f  o b t a i n i n g  
visibility. Today their prime concern is the need to renew and update their 
political discourses, which have only scarcely been efficient up until now, 
and which are emblematic of the supposedly intrinsically oppositional 
nature of Islam. The issue for these militant Muslims henceforth is to find 
new ways of expressing their religiosity in the public sphere, without that 
being interpreted as an opposition to European values. These new 
discourses will also test, for committed Muslims and public authorities 
alike, their capacity to adapt to the political evolution of European society. 
A renewal of the spirit of committed Islam, where the reference to Islam in 
the context of political claims is not a disqualification, seems thus to be a 
major development of European political Islam.  
Recourse to radical forms of political Islam, particularly by young 
people, is often the expression of a lack of political representation and 
participation by those who are excluded and socially and culturally 
discriminated against. On the other hand the mainstreaming of the political 
participation of these militants (through voting, participation in local 
political life, membership of political parties) will allow for a greater 
identification with national and European interests, with their citizenship 
leading them de facto to look beyond those questions only relevant to 
political Islam. In other words, these militants should be induced to 
participate in the construction of European society via the methods used by 
all European citizens. An increasing focus by militant Muslims on the 
general concerns of the society in which they live will disqualify the logic of 
opposition that leads to violence and the rejection of state institutions. 
Moreover, greater political coordination between member states on 
the question of political Islam now seems to be called for, in light of the 
often trans-European nature of these movements, although it is true that POLITICAL ISLAM | 37 
the national contexts are of great importance. In order to understand what 
is at stake in the question of political Islam in Europe, the roots of present 
tensions and emerging conflicts must also be seen as European roots 
corresponding to particular national realities. The responses to these 
conflicts should therefore be considered by European institutions not as a 
matter of intercultural dialogue as was the case during the episode of the 
cartoons of Mohammad, but as a European political responsibility to 
European citizens. The place of European Islam and immigrant 
communities needs to be made visible in the cultural, political and 
historical heritage of Europe. 
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3.  SALAFISM AND RADICALISATION OF 
YOUNG EUROPEAN MUSLIMS  
SAMIR AMGHAR 
Introduction 
European Islam is more than half a century old. Since the end of the 1980s, 
a new form of religiosity has emerged among young people of North 
African, Turkish or Indo-Pakistani origin, some of whom were born in 
Europe. This new variation of Islam was first of all largely the result of ‘re-
islamisation’ movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood. However, the 
1990s also saw the emergence of another movement in the ‘re-islamisation’ 
dynamics in Europe: Salafism. It is possible to distinguish three streams of 
Salafism here. The first is revolutionary; it places ‘jihad’ at the heart of 
religious beliefs. The second is predicative Salafism, which bases its actions 
on preaching and religious teachings. The last is political Salafism, which 
organises its activities around a political logic. Each one of these currents 
entertains a specific relationship with European societies, with Muslim 
societies and with the means – including jihad – of hastening the 
eventuality of the Islamic state.  
The new relationship towards Islamic teachers that is prevalent 
among these young people is not simply the reproduction of the 
communitarian religiosity of their parents. If the religious affiliation of the 
previous generation was founded on an ethno-national logic, as well as on 
the dominance of traditional attitudes towards religion, these young people 
refuse to reproduce the inclinations of their parents.1 Until the beginning of 
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the 1990s, both the Muslim Brotherhood and the Tabligh,2 played a central 
role in re-islamisation, effectively enjoying a monopoly in the supply of 
Islam to Europe. Since then, we have witnessed the diversification of this 
supply with the arrival of new actors. Among them, Salafism, a once 
marginal group in Europe,3 has become a pillar of re-islamisation at the 
beginning of the 21st century, competing with the more traditional 
structures. While both the Muslim Brotherhood and the Tabligh present a 
doctrinal and organisational homogeneity, Salafism appears to be a 
movement that is both pluralist and contradictory,4 of which it is necessary 
to identify its multiple European components.5 
3.1  The origins of Salafism 
Salafism was born with the beginning of Muhammad’s apostolate in the 7th 
century. His teachings brought together men and women, the most famous 
among whom were the four first Caliphs of Islam – Aboubakr, Omar, 
Othman and Ali, who were later to become, among others, what Muslim 
theologians would call the Companions of the Prophet; the sahâba. To these 
companions were added the successors (tâbi’ine), and then the successors of 
the successors (tâbi’i at tâbi’ine).6 These three groups formed what the 
theologians were to call “Salaf”, the pious predecessors: three generations 
that represented the golden age of Islam. The Salaf were distinguished by 
their exemplary piety, and by their military conquests, which were the 
foundations of a great empire stretching from Spain to India. Theologians 
and clerics thus established a causal relationship between the faith of the 
Salaf and their military and political success. Since then, each time a 
Muslim society is confronted with an economic, political or social crisis, 
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certain theologians will recommend a return to the Islam of the Salaf. The 
first to have formalised this idea at a religious level was Ibn Hanbal (780-
855), at a time when the Muslim empire was prone to fighting amongst 
politico-religious factions. Ibn Taymiyya (1263-1328) reiterated the idea 
when his Damas region was subjected to the Mongol invasions. 
This idea of a return to the pious ancestors as a response to the 
decline of Muslim society was later taken up by Muhammad Ibn Abdel 
Wahhab (1720-1792), who was inspired by the writings of Ibn Hanbal and 
Ibn Taymiyya, and who hoped to define the causes of the Ottoman 
Empire’s waning strength in terms of its opposition to European 
hegemony. The origin of the crisis of the Ottoman Empire would thus not 
be imputable to political or economic considerations but to the betrayal by 
Muslims of the original koranic message, organised around the concept of 
tawhid (the unity of God), such as the Salafs had understood and applied it. 
3.2  Three forms of Salafism in Europe 
Three antagonistic tendencies in Europe associated with this heritage today 
claim an explicit link with Salafism.7  
The first is the so-called ‘revolutionary’ or jihadist Salafism.8 This 
movement was initially associated with the political doctrine of the Muslim 
Brotherhood. It conserved only one element of that ideology: political and 
social action must necessarily fit within an Islamic perspective – a 
perspective linked to a literalist reading of the politically-oriented koranic 
texts that deal with the management of power, authority and the caliphate, 
all aiming towards revolutionary action. This discourse is radical and is 
o p p o s e d  t o  a n y  i d e a  o f  e n g a g e m e n t  o r  c o l l a b o r a t i o n  w i t h  M u s l i m 9 or 
Western societies. Even in the West, this discourse defends opposition to 
the state and the fight for the establishment of the Islamic state and, 
eventually, the caliphate. Partly inspired by the religious opinions of the 
13th century Damascene theologian Ibn Taymiyya, who justified the resort 
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to jihad against the Mongols (whom he doubted belonged to the umma), 
this movement defends direct action to implement the reign of God on 
earth. Hostile to religious action that restricts itself to conversion, (da’wa), 
the revolutionary Salafis place the jihad at the heart of Islamic faith.10 
The forms of violence associated with the jihad are of two orders: 
vertical when they contest the state, either European or Arab, horizontal 
when they affect individuals accused of contravening a religious norm that 
the jihadists expect to have respected by all means.11 In the West, this 
violence is only aimed at contesting the legitimacy and the actions of 
Western regimes, with the support of European countries to Arab regimes 
seen as an obstacle to revolution and the eventuality of the Islamic state in 
Muslim countries. The terrorist attacks in Madrid on 11 March 2004 did not 
aim to punish the victims for their non-respect of Islamic norms, but to 
pressure Western states, Spain in this case, into withdrawing their troops 
from Iraq. Another earlier example, the attacks by the GIA (the Armed 
Islamic Group) on a regional train in Paris in 1995, was an attempt to push 
France into withdrawing its support for the Algerian regime. This vertical 
violence is thus different from the Islamic terrorism that rages in the Arab-
Muslim world. In addition to the pressure on the states, action in Arab 
states aims to get individuals to respect religious obligations. When the 
GIA massacre civilians in Algeria, they also intend to sanction those 
populations who, according to them, are acting in contravention of the 
religious norm.  
The idea of the vertical jihad is developed in the text “Knights under 
the banner of the Prophet” by Ayman Al-Zawahiri, who is a theorist of 
Egyptian origin associated with al Qaeda. In this text he affirms that it is 
necessary to obtain the support of the Muslim masses in order to 
overthrow Arab regimes. Al-Zawahiri suggests a strategy of exporting the 
jihad to the West, and particularly to the US, in order to, on the one hand, 
obtain the support of the undecided Muslim masses, and on the other 
hand, to weaken the Western support for those Muslim countries 
considered impious. Strikes against the Western enemy would, by ricochet-
                                                           
10 B. Rougier (2004), ”L’Islam face au retour de l’islam”, Vingtième siècle, No. 82, 
April-June, p. 111. 
11 F .  B u r g a t  ( 2 0 0 2 ) ,  L’Islamisme en face, Paris: La découverte, p. 113. See also F. 
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effect, weaken the Arab states, which would facilitate the ultimate objective 
of seizing power and establishing of the Islamic state.12 
It must be stressed that the jihad, as it is conceptualised in Europe, 
stems from two strategies, depending on whether it operates in the West or 
in the Arab-Muslim world – although they may overlap. Jihad undertaken 
in Europe must be qualified as offensive: it expresses the desire to destabilise 
or at least unnerve Western governments so that they cease supporting the 
Arab-Muslim regimes that the Salafis are fighting against. In the case of the 
jihad launched by young Muslims from Europe in Muslim countries, it 
must be considered defensive. For European jihadists, military action (in 
Iraq, Bosnia-Herzegovina or Chechnya) demonstrates their desire to 
support those Muslim populations that are victims of aggression often 
perpetrated by Western powers.  
Many organisations situate their actions within a Salafist logic of the 
revolutionary type. This is the case for the group Kaplan, the result of a 
schism within the Turkish Islamic party, the Refah (Party of Prosperity). 
Active in France, Germany and Belgium, this group defends the installation 
of the caliphate by all means. This discourse is also found within the Hizb 
ut-Tahrir (Liberation Party), the product of a split within the Muslim 
Brotherhood. Founded by Taqieddin Nabhani in 1958, it is active in the UK 
and Denmark.  
The second tendency pursues the objective of conversion and 
predication. In Europe, this tendency represents the great majority within 
Salafism.13 In opposition to revolutionary Salafism, which it sees as violent 
and heretical, this movement believes that it is neither the jihad14 nor armed 
                                                           
12 G. Kepel (2004), Fitna. Guerre au cœur de l’Islam, Paris: Le seuil; see also under his 
direction: Al-Qaïda dans le texte, Paris, PUF, (2005). See also the text by Ayman Al-
Zawahiri (2002), «Al wala’wa al-baraa», September. 
13 For example, this stream has nearly 500 militants in France, 5000 sympathisers 
and controls nearly 20 mosques out of some 1800. Despite being in the majority 
w i t h i n  t h e  S a l a f i s t  m o v e m e n t  i n  E u r o p e ,  i t  i s  p a r t  o f  t h e  m i n o r i t y  s t r e a m s  
compared to those which are more firmly implanted, such as the Muslim 
Brotherhood or the Tabligh. 
14 For example, a collection of fatwas condemn the attacks in Algeria, Fatâwas al 
‘ulamâ alkabir fîma ouhdira mi dima’ fi-il jaza’ir (Fatwas of the great religious 
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action that will allow the establishment of an Islamic society and state. 
Many of those who today claim to belong to predicative Salafism are thus 
opposed to the entry of Muslim militants into political or revolutionary 
activism. A famous comment by the Albano-Syrian Salafist Sheikh Nasir 
ud-Din Al-Albani explains: “Part of [good] politics today is the 
abandonment of politics”. This theologian, who was the most remarkable 
figure of Salafism along with the Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia, Abdelaziz 
Ibn Baz, from the 1960s until their deaths in 1999, participated extensively 
in the diffusion of predicative Salafism throughout the world. Both these 
men were convinced that the only solution to the problems encountered by 
Muslims was what they called At-Tasfiyatu wa-Tarbiyya: purification and 
education. This meant purification of the religion from ‘innovations’ that 
sullied its dogma and its precepts, in order to return to the religion as it 
was taught by the Prophet and the education of Muslims, so that believers 
may conform to this religion and abandon their bad habits. Any other 
solution (political or revolutionary) would be to lead them astray. Critical 
of revolutionary Salafism, seen as incapable of bringing the kingdom of 
Allah to earth, these theologians offer an opposing vision based on piety, 
which has its foundations in a faith that is both eschatological and 
apodictic, and in which the purification of belief and of Islamic education 
are written into human destiny. This means bringing an Islamic conscience 
back to Muslims, by returning to a religious practice purified of all 
additions subsequent to the last koranic revelation and to the apostolate of 
the Prophet. Through preaching, a new social movement would be created 
to lead to a world order in which Islam is accorded a pre-eminent place. 
Pious Salafis are thus not primarily concerned with politics but rather with 
the correction of belief and religious practices.15 
In Europe, this current is for the most part found in Wahhabi-
inspired Salafism. Linked to the official religious institution in Saudi Arabia 
(Dar el Ifta) and to the different Islamic universities in that country, this 
movement has counted among its chief theologians Ibn Baz, the former 
Mufti of the kingdom, Al-Albani,16 and Ibn Uthaymin17 (who died in 2001). 
                                                           
15  Roy, op. cit., note [7]. 
16 Al-Albani, a specialist of the science of the hadith, emigrated from Albania to 
Syria in the 1940s with his father, a Hanafi Mufti. He was called on to teach the 
science of the hadith at the University of Medina, when it was built in 1962. This 
university educated foreign students, many of them beneficiaries of scholarships 
from the Saudi government. Two years after he began this post, his contract was 
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Fawzan,18 Al-Madkhali19 and the Great Mufti of the Saudi Kingdom, Al-
Cheikh, and the Yemenite Muqbil20 (who also died in 2001) have been the 
contemporary representatives of this movement. 
Predicative Salafis oppose all forms of political participation for 
Muslim populations within European society, with the motive that such 
participation would be contrary to Islam. Democracy is assimilated to a 
form of associationism (chirk) that leads to heresy, because Western 
parliamentarians legislate in the name of values that aren’t those of the 
sharia. Salafis in the west advocate an attitude of withdrawal, even though 
this concerns European Muslims. During the protests organised by Muslim 
associations against the proposed law banning religious symbols at school21 
in France in December 2003 and January 2004, among the few thousand 
participants there were few who belonged to this current of Salafism 
(according to our observations). This absence may be interpreted as a 
demonstration of indifference towards these political questions. These 
                                                                                                                                                    
terminated. He then lived for some time in Lebanon, and in the United Arab 
Emirates, before moving to Amman where he lived until his death in 1999. His 
disciples, mostly of Jordanians and Palestinian origin, then founded the centre Al-
Albani in the Jordanian capital. 
17 Former member of the Saudi Committee of the Wise, he is the author of a famous 
fatwa: the perpetrator of a suicide attack will be in hell forever. 
18 Salih Al-Fawzan is a member of the Saudi Committee of the Wise. 
19 The Saudi Rabi Ibn Had Al (Madkhali) is without a doubt the official spokesman 
for this tendency in Saudi Arabia. Former head of the department of the Sunni 
sciences at the University of Median, he was a student of Al-Albani at this same 
university. Extremely vehement towards revolutionary Salafis, and the Muslim 
Brotherhood, he is the doctrinal reference for many Muslims in Europe who claim 
links to Wahhabi-inspired Salafism. He currently occupies a chair at the University 
of Medina.  
20 Muqbil Ibn Hadi was trained in Saudi Arabia before being expelled. Extremely 
critical of the Saudi government up until his death, he reformed his position when 
Saudi authorities welcomed him and transferred him to the US, and then to Saudi 
Arabia, for treatment. See F. Burgat (2005), L’Islamisme à l’heure d’Al-Qaida, Paris: La 
Découverte, pp. 32-39. 
21 This law, of 15 March 2004, pertained to the application of the principle of laicity, 
the wearing of religious symbols or clothing demonstrating a religious affiliation in 
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Salafists do not engage in negotiations with the state: Islam would never be 
content with such negotiation. Their interpretation, based on the belief of 
the primacy of Islam above any other system – a forteriori secular – forbids 
them to consider themselves as active participants in a non-Muslim 
political system. To participate in this way would mean implicitly 
recognising an identical status between Islam and the problems of society: 
withdrawal is thus preferable to all forms of participation. This attitude vis-
à-vis European societies is confirmed by the fatwas of the Saudi 
theologians, who make emigration (hijra) to a Muslim country a religious 
obligation for any practising Muslim living in the West. 
Although they refuse all forms of integration, these Salafists develop 
a non-confrontational relationship to the dominant power structure, 
refusing all violent action. Whilst predicative Salafism is active in the 
Netherlands and in Belgium as a result of Moroccan immigration, in France 
it is partly based on the proselytism of individuals of Algerian origin. The 
movement was consolidated in France in the 1990s by the intervention of 
Abdelkader Bouziane in Lyon and Abdelhadi Doudi in Marseille.  
The  third tendency emphasises political activism as the means of 
convincing the Muslim masses of the necessity of the Islamic state and 
society. This tendency is in the extreme minority within the Salafist 
movement. Although it draws on the Muslim Brotherhood’s repertoire of 
political action (participation, creation of associations, demonstrations etc.), 
so-called political Salafism criticises them on a number of points. It accuses 
them of excessively modernising Islam. This current is partly the product of 
the combination of the political reading of Islam of the Muslim 
Brotherhood, with the religious literalism of the predicative Salafists, 
particularly the Saudi-Arabians.  
This Saudi Arabian dimension traces back to the refuge given there to 
the Syrian and Egyptian Muslim Brotherhoods, when they had been 
disgraced by Nassar and the Alaouite regimes respectively. These 
Brotherhoods thus constituted the bureaucratic framework for the major 
Islamic institutions of Saudi Arabia, such as the WML (World Muslim 
League) or the World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY).22 In Europe, 
this current of Salafism is above all implanted through the intermediary of 
the LIM, active in many countries thanks to the large network of mosques 
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that it finances.23 In Switzerland, this movement is incarnated by Youssouf 
Ibram, Imam of the Cultural Islamic Foundation of Geneva, linked to the 
LIM. Originally of Moroccan origin, in the 1980s he obtained a Masters in 
Shari’a Law at the Islamic University of Riyad. At the beginning of the 
1990s the LIM name him Imam of the Zurich mosque, before moving him 
to Geneva in 2000. As a member of the European Council of the Fatwa and 
Research, an organisation linked to the European Muslim Brotherhood, he 
participates in the implementation of a European-style Islam. Youssouf 
Ibram defends the idea of Muslim integration in Europe. He is close to the 
vision of the Muslim Brotherhood but nevertheless remains opposed to it 
by virtue of his literalism and his religious rigour.  
In addition to this Salafism, which is close to the Brotherhood 
ideology, there is another tendency, represented for example by Farid 
Benyettou, who as a 23 year-old delivered sermons in the mosques of the 
Paris region encouraging young French people to fight the American army 
in Iraq. If the actions of this man lie within a jihadist logic, they also have a 
political dimension, in terms of negotiations with the French authorities. Of 
Algerian origin, Benyettou frequented militants of the Islamic Salvation 
Front (FIS) for a time in France, through the intervention of his brother-in-
law, who initiated him in literalist and rigorous religious readings. 
Claiming links with Ali Behadj, Saïd Qotb and Safar Al-Hawali, he argues 
that European Muslims must have recourse to democratic instruments and 
liberty of expression in order to influence national policy. Opposing all 
forms of violence on French territory and in the West in general, in the 
name of Islam, he was active in all the meetings and demonstrations 
against the proposed law on secularism, including those organised both by 
Muslim associations or secular structures, and even those organised by the 
extreme left. 
3.3  Common Islamic heritage and political myth 
Although deprived of all organisational synergy and distanced from each 
other by mutual ex-communication, the three streams of the Salafist 
movement have common ideological foundations and myths that structure 
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their political imagination – all things that it shares with Islamists.24 The 
first element that can be identified with the Salafists, and which is also a 
central theme for the Islamists, is the idea that Islam cannot be reduced to 
its religious dimension; cannot be summarised by ritual practices. On the 
contrary, Islam is a global system that reigns over all domains of life, both 
sacred and profane. Like the Muslim Brotherhood, the Salafists, whatever 
their tendency, refuse an exclusively cultural understanding of confessional 
belonging.25 
The second element shared with Islamism is the systematic effort to 
define the contribution of Islamic civilisation to Western society. Salafists, 
like Islamists, see European society as being confronted with a political and 
economic impasse that only Islam can overcome – an Islam that, seen as a 
global system, has the necessary resources to confront the difficulties and 
crises of European and Muslim societies. 
Many myths also contribute to the foundation of the political 
‘imaginaire’ of the Salafist movement, revolutionary, political or 
predicative. One of the first resorts of the political mythology of Salafism is 
the myth of decadence. Islam is, according to this myth, in decomposition 
and Muslim identity is becoming lost in the haze of Western hegemony. 
For Salafists, as for Islamists, the decay of irreligious youth hastens the end 
of time. Muslim society and Muslim minorities in the West have entered a 
state of generalised anomie (disregard for divine law and values),26 in 
particular the product of divisions between Muslims that only Islam can 
combat. Salafist political mythology also emphasises an apocalyptic 
millenarian dimension: the end of the world is near, numerous signs of the 
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political vision and a political project (and not a messianic utopia), which are 
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“Les Frères musulmans francophone: vers un islamisme de la minorité”, in S. 
Amghar (dir.). 
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prophetic tradition announce its imminence, and it will be preceded by a 
holy war, between Muslims and non-Muslims, where Islam will triumph 
over evil as incarnated by the West. 
For the Salafists, the decline of Muslim society is certainly the result 
of the betrayal of the original koranic message, but it is also the product of 
a conspiracy. Along with the idea of the alteration of Islamic practice, this 
conspiracy theory is one of the elements that fundamentally explain the 
weakness of Muslims around the world. Behind this plot are the West and 
the Jews who have concocted a plan to keep Muslims dominated and 
prevent Islam from developing.27 In this ideological representation, Islam is 
the only power able to overthrow Western imperialism and dominance that 
is manipulated by an occult power for which the Jews are responsible. 
“Conspiracy theory” wrote Karl Popper, is a vision according to which 
“whatever happens in society – especially happenings such as war, 
unemployment, poverty, shortages, which people as a rule dislike – is the 
result of direct design by some powerful individuals and groups”.28 
3.4  Salafism: A response to the failure of political Islam? 
The current success of Salafism within certain segments of Europe’s 
Muslim population is partly explained by the disappointment resulting 
from the failure of Islamist-inspired re-islamisation movements, such as the 
Muslim Brotherhood. The development of Salafism in Europe in the 1990s 
must therefore be analysed in light of the aporiae of political Islam.29 
Salafists reproach Islamist movements originating with the Muslim 
Brotherhood for wanting to establish an Islamic state ‘top-down’ (for the 
predicatives), for using Western political categories (for the jihadists) or for 
wanting to regenerate Islam in keeping with Western modernity (for the 
political stream). Thus the Salafists, be they political, jihadist or quietist, 
still share the essential belief that the concessions of the Muslim 
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Brotherhood are unacceptable alterations of the koranic references and the 
tradition of the Prophet.30 In France, a number of predicative Salafists 
(Wahhabi-inspired) reproach the representatives of the Muslim 
Brotherhood (in the UOIF) for having accepted to negotiate with the public 
authorities, notably during the process of the institutionalisation of Islam in 
France, which led in the end to the betrayal of the koranic message. 
The emergence of these different forms of Salafism must thus be 
analysed as a refusal of the excessive politicisation of Islam by means 
borrowed from Western political culture. This is why Salafists criticise the 
Muslim Brotherhood for having integrated into Islamic heritage values 
such as democracy, which are foreign to the Muslim religion. This position 
must be understood less as the total negation of Western political culture 
than as a rejection of the methods of appropriation of Western modernity 
proposed by the Muslim Brotherhood. 
Negotiations with the public authorities and civil society in the West 
make the discourse of the Muslim Brotherhood routine to a certain extent, 
thus diluting its confrontational impact and leaving room for a Salafist 
movement of which the potential for contestation has not yet been tested. 
This movement now appears to be an ‘Islamist variant’, seductive for those 
groups that are marginalised and excluded from all political participation. 
The mobilisation power of Salafist discourse is thus the consequence of the 
rejection of the strategies of social and political participation associated 
with the Muslim Brotherhood – particularly by those people initially 
convinced by the radical rhetoric of this organisation in the 1980s and 
1990s. In entering the negotiation process, the Muslim Brotherhood 
stopped representing a utopia capable of mobilising people. In light of this, 
Salafism would now be a way of regenerating Islamic mythology, as well 
as a new way of engaging the domain of political participation. For the 
jihadists this happens through political violence and for the predicatives 
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through indifference. It is a matter of moving beyond the limits of 
traditional Islam and overcoming the security barriers of both Western and 
Arab regimes. A non-negligible number of French Salafists initially 
frequented the Muslim Brotherhood before joining Salafism and were 
seduced by the discourse of Tariq Ramadan, who is close to the Muslim 
Brothers and the Tabligh. 
Finally, Salafism criticises the Muslim Brotherhood less for their 
political openness than for their partisan instrumentalisation of Islam 
(hizbiyya). This latter point, for the Salafists, leads to the fragmentation of 
the  umma,  which is unacceptable to the extent that it results in the 
weakening of Islam and fitna (division of the umma) – a cause of war for 
Muslims.  
Conclusions 
As we have seen, European Salafists divide into three distinct poles, the 
revolutionary, the predicative and the political. Derived from the same 
desire to return to the golden age of Islam, the three poles are opposed to 
each other on the question of which methods should be used to create the 
Islamic state. Their different operating methods represent three different 
relationships to the Western ‘other’.  
These three tendencies have always maintained multiple links to each 
other. Since the Algerian civil war, and above all since the September 11 
attacks, the demarcations between the three movements have solidified. In 
the wake of these events, there is an increasing autonomy amongst and 
between these movements. Predicative Salafists present themselves as the 
best defence against revolutionary Salafism, which they refer to as takfiri 
(he who pronounces the anathema); as for the revolutionary Salafists, they 
continue to accuse the predicative Salafists of being in the pay of 
monarchies and Arab regimes. 
However they share a common understanding of Salafism’s political 
functions, which are also three: that of protest, of a tribune and as an 
elective function.  
The first consists in the expression of opposition to the social and 
political system, to the dominant political and religious choices on offer, 
rather than in proposition: hence the absence of a precise political project, 
which is more often than not reduced to the establishment of the Islamic 
state, without further precision. Salafists mistrust Islamists, most of all 
those of the middle and upper classes which, according to them, maintain SALAFISM & RADICALISATION| 51 
Muslims in a subordinate position. Rejected by the well-off, true Islam 
attracts those who have a quarrel with the dominant order and the social 
hierarchy.  
It is from this conflictual dimension that the tribune function 
develops: Salafism becomes the tribune for a mass of malcontents that 
neither the political parties nor the other religious currents can 
accommodate.31 Thus the emergence of Salafism appears to be the 
consequence of the crisis of political representation in Europe, manifested 
by a defiance vis-à-vis political structures incapable of incorporating the 
aspirations of a part of the resident Muslim population. Salafism expresses 
a rebellion in which religion symbolises an affirmation of the self in 
opposition to the dominant values of society. 
The third function is elective. For the Salafists, belonging to Salafism 
means being part of an elite, avant-garde movement responsible for the 
realisation of God’s design on earth. As actors in a story defined by God, 
Salafists take care of those Muslims not yet touched by divine grace. 
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4.  ISLAMIC TERRORIST RADICALISATION 
IN EUROPE  
OLIVIER ROY  
4.1  The West European terrorist 
Since 9/11, a great deal of data has been accumulated on the terrorists 
linked to al Qaeda.1 The picture that emerges shows the growing role 
played by Western Muslims. They constitute the bulk of the terrorists 
involved in actions perpetrated here in Europe. But they are also involved 
in terrorist actions abroad and participate in the different international 
military jihad (from Faluja to Kashmir). These Western Muslims have 
varied personal histories and include different categories: the majority are 
second-generation Muslims who were either born in Europe or came as 
children; we also find people who came as students or as political refugees; 
thirdly, there has been a significant number of converts. 
They all share common patterns. They speak European languages, 
are Western educated, and many have citizenship of a European country. 
They have had a ‘normal’ Western teenager’s upbringing, with no 
conspicuous religious practices, often going to night clubs, ‘womanising’ 
and drinking alcohol. None have previous religious training. Most of them 
are born-again (or converts): they became religious-minded Muslims in 
Europe, even if a few of them, in the aftermath of (re)discovering Islam, 
went to Middle Eastern madrasa  (school or college) to improve their 
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religious knowledge (this is mainly true of British Pakistanis and of 
converts). When they went to university, their curricula were modern and 
secular (computer science, engineering, etc.). In many ways they are 
modern.  
They do not represent an Islamic tradition; on the contrary they break 
with the religion of their parents. When they convert or become born-again, 
they always adopt some sort of Salafism, which is a scripturalist version of 
Islam that discards traditional Muslim c u l t u r e .  T h e y  d o  n o t  r e v e r t  t o  
traditions: for instance when they marry, it is with the sisters of their 
friends or with converts, and not with a bride from the country of origin 
chosen by their parents. There is also a growing number of female converts 
among the terrorists. The case of Muriel Degauque (a Belgian woman who 
killed herself in Iraq in 2005) is probably the harbinger of a new generation 
of al Qaeda activists recruiting far beyond the usual pool of second-
generation Muslims and numbering people who, 40 years ago, would have 
joined ultra-leftist groups, like the Red Army Faction. 
The groups are rarely homogeneous in ethnic terms: the Hofstad 
group of Holland includes second-generation Moroccans (Bouyeri himself), 
‘white’ (the former policewoman Martine van der Oeven) and ‘black’ 
Dutch citizens (the brothers Jason and Jermaine Walters): the deeds of this 
group may have destroyed the concept of ‘multiculturalism’ in Holland, 
but it is typically ’post-culturalist’. 
The radicalisation of Western Muslim youth is often considered a 
spill-over of the crisis in the Middle East (Palestine, Afghanistan, Iraq). But 
in fact the chronology of events, the geographical origin of the radicals and 
their own claims most often contradict this assumption. No Palestinian, 
Afghan or Iraqi has been involved in terrorist actions in Europe. There are 
very few Arabs from the Middle East (some Egyptians and Syrians). People 
of Pakistani (in the UK) or Moroccan origin are overrepresented. We also 
find East African activists living in the UK. The perpetrators of the failed 
terrorist attack in London on 21 July 2005, were Ethiopian (Osman 
Hussain), Somalian, Eritrean and Ghanaian; another Ethiopian, Binyam 
Mohammed, had been arrested in connection with the José Padilla case. 
Converts make up 10% (according to the Nixon Institute) to 25% (the 
Beghal group) of the militants in Europe.2 Many converts are Black 
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Caribbeans (Richard Reid, the Bonte brothers, Grandvisir, Willie Brigitte, 
Jermaine Lindsay), or ‘white’ people (Jérôme Courtailler, Lionel Dumont, 
Christian Ganczarski); an interesting case is that of Eisa al-Hindi (alias 
Dhiran Barot) a former Hindu, born in Kenya, a British citizen who went to 
Afghanistan and then Malaysia where he married, before being arrested in 
London for planning attacks in New York: all of al Qaeda is embodied in 
this trajectory. 
In a word, there is no relation between the geographical map of the 
radicalisation and the map of existing conflicts. This geographical 
discrepancy can be pushed further: almost none of the ‘born again’ who 
became terrorists returned to the country of origin of his/her family to 
fight jihad: none of the French of Algerian descent went back to Algeria 
during the 1990s, despite the fact that there was some sort of a jihad there. 
The few exceptions are related to British Pakistanis, but they went back to 
Pakistan not to fight against the regime of President Musharraf, but to join 
the global terrorist hub which is nowadays centred in that country. Instead 
all the European radicals preferred to go to peripheral jihads (Afghanistan, 
Bosnia and Chechnya); none went to Palestine (with the exception of two 
Britons). They did not target specific Jewish or Israeli objectives in Europe 
(contrary to their secular leftist Palestinian predecessors in the 1970s), but 
‘global’ targets (namely transport systems). 
Moreover, the terrorist actions perpetrated in Europe have rarely 
been expressed in direct connection with the events in the Middle East, 
(with the possible exception of the Madrid attack in 2004). 9/11 was 
expressed in terms of a global war between Islam and the West. When 
Mohamed Bouyeri killed Theo Van Gogh in Amsterdam, he did not 
mention in his letter the presence of Dutch troops in Iraq and Afghanistan; 
he referred instead to the desecration of Islam in Holland. 
It is also interesting to note that none of the Islamic terrorists killed or 
captured so far in the West had been active in any legitimate anti-war 
movements or even in organised political support for the people they claim 
to be fighting for. They don't distribute leaflets or collect money for 
hospitals and schools. They do not have a rational strategy to push for the 
interests of the Iraqi or Palestinian people. On the contrary, the few of them 
who have joined a militant group before turning radical, did so in joining 
global and supranational Islamic movements like Jama’at ut Tabligh or 
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There is no clear-cut sociological profile of the radicals or anything 
that could link them to a given socio-economic situation. More precisely, 
the reasons that may push them towards violence are not specific enough, 
but are shared by a larger population that deals with such a situation in a 
very different way. Explanations based on poverty, exclusion, racism, 
acculturation, etc., are simply not specific enough. There is clearly a 
generational dimension: Islamic radicalism is a youth movement. 
Frustration is obviously a key element in their radicalisation, but has more 
to do with a psychological than a social or economic dimension. They tend 
to become radical within the framework of a small local group of friends, 
who either met on a destitute estate (as the Farid Benyettou group in 
France in 2006), a university campus, a gang of petty delinquents and drug 
addicts or … in jail. Jail is a favoured place for recruitment, especially as far 
as converts are concerned.  
A common factor among known radicals is a concern for self-image 
and the endeavour to reconstruct the self through action. In this sense they 
are more in search of spectacular action where they will be personally and 
directly involved, than with the long-term and painstaking building of an 
anonymous and underground political organisation which could extend 
the social and political basis of their networks. They are more activists than 
constructivists. They are very different from the komintern agents of the 
1920s and 1930s. This narcissistic dimension explains both the commitment 
to suicide actions and the difficulty of working underground without the 
perspective of action. Without terrorism, they cease to exist. This 
commitment to immediate or mid-term action as opposed to long-term 
political action is probably their greatest weakness. 
Another significant element of radicalisation is the blending of 
‘Islamic’ wording and phraseology with a typically Western anti-
imperialism and third-world radicalism: their target is the same as the 
Western ultra-leftist movements of the 1970s, even if they proceed to mass 
terrorism (except that they do not target political or business personalities, 
as the European ultra-left used to do). But the paradigm of ultra-leftist 
terrorism from the 1970s might provide a bridge with non-Islamic radicals. 
The Western-based Islamic terrorists are not the militant vanguard of 
the Muslim community; they are a lost generation, unmoored from 
traditional societies and cultures, frustrated by a Western society that does 
not meet their expectations. And their vision of a global umma is both a 
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them what they are. Al Qaeda and consorts offer a narrative of revolt and 
violence that appeals to an unmoored youth and gives a religious and 
political dimension to youth revolt that could have been expressed in other 
forms of violence (gangs, Columbine-style school-shootings, drugs, 
delinquency). It is not by chance that jails in the West seem to be as much 
recruiting grounds as mosques.  
4.2  What can be done? 
The picture is quite variable in Europe. There are countries where Muslims 
are mainly first-generation immigrants (Spain, Italy), while in France, 
Germany, the UK, Belgium and the Netherlands, they are mainly made up 
of second and even third generations. Polls also show that there is an 
impact of the host country’s political culture on the Muslims: the bulk of 
the French Muslims claim individual integration as full citizens and 
complain about discrimination on the job-market, while a majority of the 
British Muslims seem to be more in favour of living as a community with 
its own rules (see the polls carried out the Pew Institute).3 But nowhere is 
there a real Muslim ‘community’ with legitimate leaders and institutions. 
In Europe it is common to oppose two approaches: the British ‘multi-
culturalism’ (where Muslims are defined by a distinct ethno-cultural 
identity) and the French ‘assimilationnisme’ (where Muslims may become 
full citizens only by shedding their pristine identity). But paradoxically 
both approaches share the same premises: religion is embedded in a 
culture, so if one is a Muslim one belongs to a different culture. 
Interestingly enough, the level of radicalism has nothing to do with state 
policy: there have been as many terrorist threats in the UK, France, Spain, 
Belgium and Holland, although the policy toward Islam is very different in 
each country. Radicals do not answer to a specific national policy, but to a 
global perception of the state of the umma. In any event, both policies – 
multiculturalism and assimilation – have failed for the same reason: 
Muslims in the West, with the exception of many British Muslims, do not 
push for an ethno-cultural identity, but want to be recognised as a mere 
faith community. Religion is dissociated from culture: as we have seen 
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radicals don’t express a traditional Islam, but try to recast Islam as a 
militant ideology. In the UK, the born-again Muslims don’t care for 
traditional culture and thus do not answer to traditional community 
leaders. But secularist France was very surprised to see that the erosion of 
traditional Muslim culture has gone hand in hand with a strong religious 
assertiveness: the ‘headscarf affair’ in French schools is not the result of an 
imported culture but a consequence of the construction of a purely 
religious identity among educated and integrated school-girls. The idea 
was that cultural assimilation would take place alongside secularisation. 
The concept of a ‘non-cultural’ religious revival was seen as unthinkable, 
but it did happen. By creating a French Council of Muslim Faith, the 
government reluctantly acknowledged the existence of Islam as a ‘mere’ 
religion. 
So what are the solutions to the current crisis? European countries 
should pursue a clear objective: isolating the Islamic radicals with the 
support of the Muslim population, or at least the neutrality of the non-
violent conservative fundamentalists. The issue is not to solve the crisis in 
the Middle East (which nevertheless would be a good thing per se), but to 
accompany the process of de-culturation and the assertion of Islam as a 
‘mere’ religion. It means making room for Islam in the West as a western 
religion among others, not as the expression of an ethno-cultural 
community. This is the real process of ‘secularisation’, which has nothing to 
do with theological reformation (are the two last Popes ‘liberal’, not to say 
Protestants?), but could of course entail a theological debate, as an almost 
forced secularisation did for the Catholic Church in continental Western 
Europe (the emergence of the Christian Democracy, that is the full 
acceptance by the Church of democracy, is a consequence and not a pre-
requisite of the process of secularisation). 
 Calling on Muslims to adapt the basic tenets of their religion to the 
West is a mistake for several reasons. To sponsor officially ‘good and 
liberal’ Muslims would be a sort of kiss of death and would deprive them 
of any legitimacy. The main motivation for youth radicalisation is not 
theological: political radicalisation is the main driving force. Youth is not 
interested in a theological debate. In modern secular states, theology 
should not and could not be a matter of policy. Pluralism is the best way to 
avoid being confronted by a tight-knit Muslim community. Conservative 
and even fundamentalist views of religion are manageable, as shown by 
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Political authorities should not look for traditional ‘moderate’ 
religious thinkers from the Middle East to appease Western Muslims, nor 
should they expend state subsidies to promote ‘civil’ or ‘liberal’ Islam. They 
should not negotiate the management of Western Islam with conservative 
and authoritarian Arab regimes: these regimes are not interested in 
reforms, democracy or tolerance; they are using the Muslims in Europe as 
leverage for their own interests. And by the way most Muslims in Europe 
feel no sense of loyalty to the existing regimes. European authorities should 
simply make room for Islam without changing laws or principles. Genuine 
pluralism is the best way to avoid confrontation with a Muslim population, 
itself very diverse, but that could feel coerced into a ghettoised community. 
Conservative and even fundamentalist views of religion can be manageable 
in a plural environment, and a pluralistic approach allows civil society to 
reach the cadres of youth that could be prime targets for radicals and neo-
fundamentalist groups. State policy should be based on integration and 
even ‘empowerment’4 of Muslims and community leaders on a pluralistic 
basis. The priority should be to weaken the links with foreign elements by 
pushing for the ‘Europeanisation’ of Islam and preventing the deepening of 
the ghetto syndrome. Transparency and democracy should be the aim. 
The problem is that some governments (i.e. in France) and the bulk of 
public opinion equate European Islam with ‘liberal’ Islam. What can be 
done about this? Waging a ‘global war on terrorism’ is playing al Qaeda’s 
game. The growing isolation of the radicals should allow the Europeans to 
continue with their ‘soft’ approach: police and intelligence services are 
efficient and sufficient tools of counter-terrorism. 
But such a policy will never totally eradicate terrorism. The European 
tradition of terrorism and political violence may have forged the experience 
of the counter-terrorist institutions, but it also makes the entry into violence 
of young activists easier. It is impossible to prevent some young guys from 
becoming radical and looking for some sort of spectacular action. 
Concentrating on sociology and the motivations of the radicals is important 
in understanding their mode of recruitment, but will be of little use in 
drying up the ground on which they prosper. The aim is not total 
eradication, but to make terrorism a residual factor. 
                                                           
4 See the example of Lord Ahmed (Britain’s first Muslim peer) in the Upper House 
of the UK Parliament. TERRORIST RADICALISATION| 59 
 
Such a ‘soft’ approach is sustainable on one condition: that Islamic 
radicalism is kept as a fringe movement. The real danger would be to see 
Islamic radicalism enlarging its social basis or connecting with other 
potentially radical movements. The issue is not going to the roots of 
terrorism to eradicate it, but to prevent the radical fringe from finding a 
political basis among the Muslim population. 
But this political and social analysis, while allowing us to take some 
distance from the usual clichés such as the roots of Muslim wrath and 
Islam’s views on violence, jihad and suicide bombers? – not to mention the 
‘clash of civilisations’ – does not answer the key question: What is going on 
with Islam? 
4.3  Pushing for a Western Islam 
The key issue is thus the attitude of the Muslim population in Europe. It 
has a far greater political stake and plays a far greater role than its 
counterpart in the US for three reasons: it is the main source of 
immigration, and has thus a demographic weight that bears no relation to 
the percentage of Muslims in the US. It originates from the closely 
neighbouring southern countries, bringing a risk of connection between 
radicalisation in the countries of origin and Europe. It is made up largely of 
the under-class and jobless youth; hence the social tensions tend to 
aggravate the feeling of discrimination and alienation. Social, geographic, 
political and strategic implications are thus intertwined. 
We have seen that both the multi-culturalist and the integrationist 
approaches have failed. A more sound approach would be to acknowledge 
and encourage the disconnection between religion and culture. The second 
and third generations are no more the bearers of a traditional culture, even 
if they may reconstruct a tradition (by wearing the veil for instance). Such a 
disconnection is clearly demonstrated by the fact that a significant 
percentage (between 10- 20%) of al Qaeda recruits in Europe are converts. 
But it should be clear that building a Western Islam does not mean 
interfering in theology. It will not work and will brand any reformer as a 
tool for manipulation. It will also unduly interfere in a debate that is taking 
place among Muslims. Another problem is that many ‘Muslims’ advocating 
reform in Islam are in fact avowed non-believers (Ayan Hirsi Ali for 
instance), which could accredit the idea that for the West a good Muslim is 
a non-Muslim. In fact the issue is to promote Western Muslims – not 
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A ‘Western’ Islam is not necessarily a ‘liberal’ Islam (for the same 
reason that a Western Christianity or Judaism is not necessarily liberal), but 
is an Islam that considers itself as a faith community, based on a voluntary 
adhesion. To stress the voluntary dimension of such a faith community, we 
should avoid considering as ‘Muslim’ anybody with a Muslim background. 
It also means that people could change their religion: apostasy will 
certainly become a more and more important issue, as well as 
intermarriages and endeavours to define a non-religious ‘alien’ identity (on 
racial or ethnic criteria). Defining Islam as a ‘mere’ religion also means 
encouraging the training of imams in Europe, in institutions that are linked 
with other European teaching institutions. It means also that Islam should 
be treated and recognised by the same laws and principles that deal with 
the other religions (Christianity in particular).  
A consequence is that the issue of Islam should not be managed 
through the help of foreign governments or institutions, which have no 
interest in delinking Muslims in the West with their countries. 
My argument translates into a number of concrete proposals: 
•  Establish a tighter control on fund-raising and subsidising from 
abroad, which means also a better access to open domestic fund-
raising and subsidies (for building mosques). 
•  Build bridges and links between Islamic religious teaching 
institutions and the universities and academies. 
•  Let instances of religious representations emerge without monopoly. 
•  Enlist Muslim professionals in the mainstream political parties, not as 
‘community leaders’ but as citizens. 
•  Avoid cornering Muslims by imposing a black-and-white choice 
(either you are with us or against us), and let them express a diversity 
of opinions in line with the spectrum of political diversity in the West. 
•  Stress above all the issue of citizenship above any communal 
affiliation. 
Such a set of policies would meet the aspirations of mainstream 
Muslims in Europe: the recognition of Islam as a Western religion and 
Muslims as full citizens, while discouraging the creation of closed 
communities, ghettos and minority status. This would also isolate the 
terrorists and prevent them from building a political constituency.  
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5.  ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF MUSLIM 
COMMUNITIES  
IMANE KARICH 
Introduction 
This chapter gives an overview of the current economic development of 
European Muslim communities and suggests initiatives that could be taken 
to improve the situation. The exercise was quite challenging since there is 
an absence of reliable statistics and figures on Muslim communities in 
Europe.1 
Since 9/11, several subjects have monopolised the main discourses on 
Muslim communities: the debate around the radicalisation of Muslims, 
their integration and so-called ‘identity’, their visibility and their necessary 
adaptation into the host society. In a contemporary Europe characterised by 
the secularisation and privatisation of religious identity, the presence of 
Muslim communities claiming their faith is perceived by some as 
disturbing. 
On the other hand, socio-economic issues such as unemployment, 
discrimination and exclusion, while given less attention in the current 
debate,2 are at the same time considered to be causes of extremism and 
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terrorism,3 and by the Muslims themselves as their most important worry 
for their future.4 As advocated by some sociologists,5 it is imperative to get 
away from the essentialism that dominates reflections on Islam and the 
Muslim communities in Europe.6 Pointing to Islam, its practices and its 
visibility as the main reason for the problems of integration risks widening 
the existing gap between this religious minority and the secularised host 
society.  
The objective of this study is to investigate what the Muslim 
community can contribute to the development of society, to look at how 
religious discourse can help the younger generations identify with success, 
and how the faith factor can be a success factor for economic integration.  
5.1  Economic development and faith 
Since Max Weber, there has been an active debate on the impact of religion 
on people’s economic attitudes. He was the first to identify the significant 
role that religion plays in social change.7 Surveys have shown that religious 
belief is generally positively linked to behaviour that fosters free markets 
and better institutions, emphasising the potentially transformative power 
                                                           
3 Discussion in the Assembly on 29 January 2004 (6th session) (Report of the 
Commission on political questions, rapporteur: M. Mercan, Committee of Experts 
on Terrorism (CODEXTER), Council of Europe, Strasbourg). Text adopted by the 
Assembly on 29 January 2004 (6th session). 
4 Pew Center (2006), “Muslims in Europe: Economic Worries Top Concerns About 
Religious and Cultural Identity Few Signs of Backlash from Western Europeans”, 
Pew Global Attitutes Project, Washington, June. 
5 H. Boussetta (2003), «L’Islam et les musulmans en Belgique, enjeux locaux et 
cadres de réflexion globaux», Synthesis note, Fondation Roi Baudouin, Brussels, 
septembre. 
6Ibid. 
7 M. Weber (1964), “L’éthique protestante et l’esprit du capitalisme”, Paris: Plon, 
originally published in 1904-1905 as ”Die Protestantische Ethik und der ‘Geist’ des 
Kapitalismus”. 64 | KARICH 
 
of religion as a capacity to develop new motivation and activities. Trust in 
others, in politics and in legal systems is characteristic of religious people.8  
The Islamic ethos emphasises the importance of education, trust and 
h a r d  w o r k  a s  t h e  m a i n  c o m p o n e n t s  o f  e c o n o m i c  d e v e l o p m e n t .  T h e  
importance of trade, free-market economics and profit as material reward 
are supported by many koranic and Prophetic quotes. One might then ask 
why such principles have not turned out to be effective for the main 
Muslim nations. The fact that Muslim nations are among the poorest and 
least educated have brought many scholars to link religious faith with their 
economic and educational fate.9 However, our opinion is that this situation 
is more due to corrupt autocratic leaders manipulating people’s fears to 
keep them in ignorance and under control than to Islamic values as such. 
The example of Malaysia illustrates how Islam, when associated with 
democracy, modernity, pluralism and freedom, can foster and sustain 
economic growth.10 Another study comparing different religious cultures 
and the work ethic also supports this idea and shows how Muslim cultures 
display the strongest of work ethics.11 
While it could be an exaggeration to assert that entrepreneurship and 
economic development are mainly fostered by culture and religion, culture 
may be a creative resource that immigrants can use to transform their 
environment. This characteristic is significant in Chinese immigrant 
entrepreneurship. The dynamism and proliferation of Chinese 
entrepreneurship is influenced by the Confucian ethos, considered as a real 
code of business ethics based on practical and rational values. Beyond 
common values such as a belief in thrift, honesty, trust and loyalty, the 
Confucian ethos also covers more specific values. Risk-taking and profit-
seeking are assumed to be imperatives to generate wealth, and 
                                                           
8 L. Guiso, P. Sapienza and L. Zingales (2002), People’s Opium? Religion and 
Economic Activities,  NBER Working Paper 9237, National Bureau of Economic 
Research, Cambridge, MA. 
9 T. Kuran (2005), Islam and Mammon: The Economic Predicaments of Islamism, 
Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press. 
10 M. Bin Ahmad (2003), “Islam and Economic Growth in Malaysia”, Naval 
Postgraduate School, Malaysia, December. 
11 P. Norris and R. Inglehart (2004),”Sacred and Secular, Religion and politics 
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organisational skills are a key feature of a successful business, as is 
protecting and using family and community trust.12 
As far as the Muslim community is concerned, cultural and religious 
principles are already seen to have positive aspects for economic 
behaviour. Migrant groups come with a business culture, working harder, 
saving their money and being more disposed to dedicate their lives to their 
businesses. This would explain why they go into business in such large 
numbers.13 Culture also plays an important role in networking abilities, 
especially in the necessary financial and human resources. Community and 
family links are factors that help the entrepreneur launch companies, by 
finding cheap or free financial loans, and using family members as their 
main employees.14  
5.2  Economic situation of the Muslim community 
Notwithstanding these positive features, several studies on the economic 
level of immigrant communities in Europe show unfavourable results. In 
France, the national institute of statistics concludes that around 15% of 
families of foreign origin and 20% of people of Moroccan and Turkish 
origin live in poverty, against a national average of 6.2%.15 In the UK, 75% 
of Bangladeshi and Pakistani children live in households below the poverty 
level (60% of average income). This compares with under a third (31%) of 
children in all households.16 In the Netherlands, a study confirms the high 
level of poverty among persons from immigrant communities, at least two 
or three times higher than the national level. 
However these rather alarming figures should be handled with care. 
                                                           
12 K.B. Chan and S.N.C. Chiang (1994), “Cultural Values and Immigrant 
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13 A. Pecoud (2005), ”The cultural dimension of entrepreneurship in Berlin’s 
Turkish economy”, Revue Européenne des Migrations Internationales, Vol. 17, No. 2. 
14 Ibid. 
15 N. Perrin and B. Van Robaeys (2006), “La Pauvreté chez les personnes d’origine 
étrangère chiffrée“, in Pauvreté chez les personnes d’origine étrangère, Fondation Roi 
Baudouin and GERME, ULB, Bruxelles. 
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As mentioned, it is very difficult to find statistical data on Muslims 
themselves as the data are mainly based on nationality. For several years, 
many European countries have eased the acquisition of the host 
nationality.17 Consequently, naturalised migrants and their descendants 
born in Europe are not included in these statistics. For example in Belgium, 
in 2000, the number of naturalisations increased mainly because of the 
acquisition of the Belgian nationality by Turks and Moroccans.18 Besides 
the sole naturalisation effect, there are other reasons why these statistics 
cannot be applied to the whole Muslim community. The acquisition of the 
nationality eases access to the employment market and consequently to a 
better standard of living. Moreover these statistics do not take into account 
Muslim converts.  
Nonetheless, even if not fully reliable, these figures at least give a 
rough indication of the current economic situation of the Muslim 
population in Europe: the Muslim communities in Europe have a relatively 
low standard of living and encounter socio-economic barriers that impede 
their integration into society.  
Social mobility, namely the improvement of work status of the same 
individual during his/her career, while relatively limited as far as 
immigrants are concerned, is real and increases with time.19 In France, 
around 30% of young people of the second generation born before 1968 had 
the status of junior executive in 1986.20 Thus young people coming from 
                                                           
17 For instance, in Belgium, the 1984 law grants Belgian nationality to the children 
born from a mixed union and the 1991 law allows children from the third 
generation to automatically obtain Belgian nationality. 
18 ”Immigration en Belgique, Effectifs, Mouvement & Marché du travail”, Rapport 
2001, Direction Générale Emploi et Marché du travail some 70% of Turks living in 
Belgium enjoy Belgian nationality, against 66% of Moroccans, 35% of French and 
22% of Dutch.  
19 J-L Richard and A. Moysan-Louazel (2002), ”De l’immigration étrangère 
parentale à la mobilité sociale des jeunes adultes: Lignée familiale et dynamiques 
professionnelles individuelles au début des années 1990”, Journées d’Etudes CEREQ, 
Rennes, May. 
20 J-L Dayan, A. Echardour and M. Glaude (1996), “Le Parcours professionnel des 
immigrés en France: Une analyse longitudinale”, Revue Economie et Statistique, No. 
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immigrant families have more chance of accessing better employment than 
their parents and possess better social prospects. However, the passage of 
one generation at least is necessary to see the full effect of this social 
mobility.21 
Self-employment and entrepreneurship has become an important 
attribute of the Muslim population on the labour market. Until the end of 
the 1970s, self-employment among immigrants was considered a secondary 
aspect as the immigration flows were first and foremost a response to the 
request for labour in Western countries.22 But since the 1980s, ethnic 
entrepreneurship has become significant. The self-employment level of the 
Turkish population in Europe grew from 3% in 1985 to 5.2% in 1996 and 
several Turkish entrepreneurial organisations have been founded since the 
1990s.23 In France, in 1999, the number of second-generation entrepreneurs 
has grown by 18% in 10 years, compared to a decrease in the total number 
of entrepreneurs by 9% for the same period.24 In the UK, immigrants and 
their descendants are proportionally over-represented among self-
employed workers compared to their native counterparts:25 the rate of self-
employment is high amongst all Asian ethnic minority groups, among 
which are Pakistanis and Bangladeshis.26 In Germany, the number of 
independent foreigners is growing compared to the indigenous level and in 
Belgium, the number of self-employed persons of Moroccan and Turkish 
                                                           
21 Ibid.  
22 S. Palidda (1992), “Le développement des activités indépendantes des immigrés 
en Europe et en France”, Revue Européenne des Migrations Internationales, Vol. 8, No. 
1. 
23 U. Manço (2003), Journées Bruxelloises de la Méditerrannée, Journée Histoire, 
Octobre, originally published in U. Manço (2000), “Turcs d’Europe: de l’image 
tronquée à la complexité d’une réalité sociale immigrée” dans Hommes et 
Migrations, No. 1226, juillet-août 2000, Paris, pp. 76-87. 
24 Body-Gendrot S., E. Ma Mung and C. Hodeir (1992), “Entrepreneurs entre deux 
mondes. Les créations d’entreprises par les étrangers: France, Europe, Amérique 
du Nord”, Revue Européenne des Migrations Internationales, Vol. 8, No. 1. 
25 Ibid. 
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origin has also been growing fast, especially among the Turks.27 What was 
first perceived as a marginal consequence of immigration has become a 
major trend.28 Difficulties of professional integration encourage some 
immigrants and their descendants to launch their own businesses. Ethnic 
entrepreneurship sometimes also offers social mobility opportunities that 
cannot be found in the general employment market.  
Europe-wide, 75% of Turkish businesses are concentrated in the retail 
business (general food, itinerant sales, hotel and catering).29 In the UK, 
Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands, immigrants’ self-employment is 
concentrated in the service sector, except in the latter, where Turkish 
immigrants are seen in relatively large numbers in the clothing industry.30 
These businesses often occupy niche markets abandoned by the indigenous 
population.31 Examples are seen in food production and distribution, 
tourism and transportation companies towards countries of origin, 
communication services, translation, administration and mediation services 
to ease socio-cultural adaptation.32 Businesses launched by the next 
generation are characterised by the larger diversification of sectors and 
qualifications within the immigrant population.33 
The development of self-employment among immigrants also goes 
with the creation of national and international networks that can positively 
stimulate international exchanges34 and business opportunities. Ethnic 
solidarity can help overcome class disadvantages, with internal 
organisations that provide members access to capital or credit.35 Financing 
                                                           
27 A. Manco (2005), ”L’Entreprenariat immigré en Belgique: Contextes, exemples et 
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28 A. Pecoud (2005), “The cultural dimension of entrepreneurship in Berlin’s 
Turkish economy”, Revue Européenne des Migrations Internationales, Vol. 17, No. 2, 
pp. 153-168. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Palidda, op. cit.  
31 Pecoud op. cit. 
32 Manco (2005), op. cit. 
33 Ibid. 
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may come from friends and relatives, where there are no possibilities of a 
bank loan, or where there is reluctance to use interest-bearing money 
forbidden by Islamic law.36 The shaping of this business class in Europe has 
allowed a certain dynamism among the immigrant communities, helping 
ease socio-economic marginalisation.37 
Muslim women and the labour market. As regards their situation has 
improved compared to that of the first generation of immigrants.38 It is still 
far from reaching average European levels, however. Muslim women are 
still mainly economically inactive despite increasing levels of education. 
When they work, their profile is generally low and they occupy posts 
requiring low qualifications in the most precarious sectors. Again, 
however, these observations should be tempered by the fact that most 
figures are based on nationality: naturalised women are almost invisible in 
the statistics. For instance, in France, the activity rate is greater for 
naturalised women, as 52% of women originally from Morocco are active, 
compared to 29% of women with Moroccan nationality. In the Netherlands, 
the employment rate of Moroccan women increases from 16% in the early 
1990s to 23% in 1998.39 Moreover, the second generation has a better level of 
education. Young women currently hold better jobs in the structured 
service sectors such as trading, banking and the liberal professions.40 
Discrimination may be a factor in explaining the low levels of economic 
activity among Muslim women. Cultural reasons also have an influence, 
although these are decreasing in importance.  
The specific emphasis on women and Muslim girls’ performance is 
also interesting as they present certain characteristics that cannot be 
applied to their male fellows, as shown for example by the ‘veil debate’ that 
began in France in 2003 and that led to the French law forbidding religious 
                                                           
36 Islamic law forbids the receiving and the giving of interest because this money is 
not considered as having been earned directly by the beneficiary. 
37 L. Muller and S. Tapia (2005), “Un dynamisme venu d’ailleurs: La création 
d’entreprises par les immigrés”, Paris: L’Harmattan. 
38 C. Catarino and M. Morokvasic (2005), “Femmes, Genre, Migration et Mobilités”, 
Revue Européenne des Migrations Internationales, Vol. 21, No. 5. 
39 M. Khachani “La Femme Maghrébine Immigrée dans l'Espace Economique des 
pays d'accueil: Quelques repères”, Rabbat, Morocco. 
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signs in public schools in March 2004 and the exclusion of hundreds of girls 
from public education. Some of these students turned to correspondence 
education, while others excluded themselves wholly from education.41 
Besides its direct consequences, this legislation and the associated debate 
had repercussions far beyond the school environment, extending to 
workplaces and universities. A negative image of veiled Muslim women is 
undeniable in the minds of many opinion leaders, and this has helped to 
worsen the current exclusion of a large part of the Muslim community from 
the labour market. 
The Halal42 business. In a context where Islam is a minority religion, 
Muslim immigrant populations try to adapt their environment to their 
religious values. Many consider Islamic prescriptions to be absolutely 
mandatory as a condition of their integration into the host society. It is not 
surprising then that the halal market has seen rapid growth.  
The first market influenced by Islamic rules is the food sector, 
especially the meat industry. In most European countries, the primary 
Muslim businesses have been the numerous halal butcher shops. Even if 
some religious opinions allow the consumption of meat from Christian and 
Jewish sources, a majority of European Muslims still require their meat to 
be slaughtered according to Islamic methods. Over the last few years, the 
consumption of halal food has increased tremendously in France. This need 
has seen second-generation Muslims taking to the Burger King Muslim 
(BKM) as the first Muslim fast-food chain in the Paris region. The Zaphir 
company also offers all varieties of cooked meats similar to the non-halal 
varieties. The growth of this market is further illustrated by the growing 
interest of big distribution names such as Carrefour supermarkets, which 
have begun selling halal foods.  
Initially limited to the meat industry, the halal market is in fact much 
bigger: alternative sodas, clothes, music, etc. The halal concept transcends 
                                                           
41 P. Tevanian (2005), ”La loi sur le voile, un an après, un bilan désastreux” 
(www.mrap.fr). Other figures presented by the Comité du 15 mars et libertés 
(March 15 and Freedom Committee) assess the number of ‘victims’ of this law as 
250, among which 70% currently follow correspondence education, 10% are totally 
excluded from education and 20% have left for other countries such as Belgium, 
Turkey or the UK. (see www.saphirnews.com). 
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the sole fact of knowing if the product is proper to Islamic consumption: it 
also concerns the conscience and the moral sense of the Muslim, beyond 
the simple consumption of food. An ethical dimension has been added to 
the simple halal seal, directly inspired by Islamic sources. Islamic clothing 
brands are numerous in main European cities, such as Capsters in the 
Netherlands and HNA in Belgium. The Islamic music industry recognises 
the pull of Islamic singers’ concerts: tickets for Sami Yusuf and Yusuf Islam 
concerts are always sold out. Although there are no official figures, it is 
estimated that 10% of the food in France is halal, while the Europe-wide 
business is valued at around €5 billion.43 The halal market is reckoned to be 
worth $150 billion worldwide and is expected to grow at a rate of 15% per 
year.  
This growing market illustrates two important facts: the first is that 
the Muslim population is increasingly considered as an important potential 
market with specific needs. The second is that the building of a European 
identity of the Muslim community is reconciling capitalist consumption 
norms and Islamic values. 
Migrant remittances. Another indicator of the economic development 
of the European Muslim community is linked to their immigrant origins, 
rather than to their religion. Like the majority of immigrant-origin 
populations, Muslims, especially of the first-generation, maintain strong 
links to their countries of origin and regularly send home money. 
According to the World Bank, $100 billion are transferred every year by 
immigrants. To this official figure, $300 billion should be added, 
representing the money not transferred by official channels. For example 
Germany and Belgium are the sources of remittances totalling $8.2 billion 
and $8.1 billion respectively each year. According to the European 
Investment Bank, these amounts represent 1% of the GDP of European 
countries with significant immigrant communities, exceeding the total 
direct investments and development aid of these countries.44 
This little known phenomenon might be expected to slow down, with 
the increasing integration of Muslim communities in Europe. But the 
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44 Banque Européenne d'Investissement (2006), “Etude sur les transferts de fonds 
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figures show an increasing trend. It is difficult to identify the reasons for 
this paradox. One explanation is simply the continuing attachment of many 
immigrant descendants to their families and to the development of their 
countries of origin. Another reason could be the absence of Islamic-
compliant investment products in Europe and the need on the part of some 
new middle-class Muslims to invest their excess liquidity.  
5.3  Policy issues  
No specific policy has been defined towards the economic development of 
the Muslim communities in Europe. Yet in all European countries, 
traditional policies are now showing their limits. Discrimination in 
housing, employment and education still exists and is even on the increase 
for new generations, despite having being born in Europe. However, the 
current debate at European Union level in terms of integration and the fight 
against discrimination illustrates the political importance that the member 
states attach to the successful integration of their immigrants and their 
descendants. In its spring 2003 report, the European Commission referred 
to the need for instruments to better integrate immigrant workers that can 
substantially contribute to self-employment.45 Also, the need to find a 
solution to integration and employment issues by harmonising rules 
between member states is increasing.46 Challenges for the future mainly 
concern the discrepancies in comparative employment rates between 
European, non-European immigrants and their second-generation off-
spring, the support for the full participation and employment of the 
second-generation, the necessity to adequately respond to female 
immigrants’ needs, the fight against discrimination and the transformation 
of undeclared work into declared work.47 
We could say that economic issues have been underestimated in the 
current debate around the Muslim community’s situation and the threat of 
                                                           
45 European Commission (2003), Le Rapport au Conseil européen de printemps du 
21 mars 2003 sur la stratégie de Lisbonne pour le renouveau économique, social et 
environnemental (COM(2003) 5 of 14th January 2003). 
46 V. Spidla (2006), “Relever le défi de l’immigration et de l’intégration”, European 
Commission speech, February. 
47 “Successful Integration on the Labour Market” (2002), European Commission 
Conference, Report, Copenhagen 4-5 July. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT| 73 
 
fundamentalism and terrorism, although poverty and exclusion are the 
main factors behind identity fallbacks and the vulnerability of young 
people to extremist discourses. While there is no hesitation in considering 
religious identity as part of the problem, we often paradoxically have 
qualms about seeing it as part of the solution.48 Although this approach is 
justified in order to avoid the Islamisation of integration issues, the faith 
and community factor should not be excluded from the solutions 
considered. Individual integration and the preservation of community life 
are not contradictory phenomena.49  
The first barriers to integration are the different forms of 
discrimination that Muslim minorities still face. The current climate of 
mistrust around Islam and Muslims in the Western world has worsened 
the already existing segregation of these communities in the areas of 
housing, employment and education. While different actions, policies, laws 
and other instruments are available to combat all kinds of discrimination, 
discrimination towards minorities has increased in recent decades. The 
consequences of this discrimination are also often understated. Stress, loss 
of self-confidence, discouragement, frustration, insecurity and the absence 
of prospects or the ability to plan projects are all perfect ingredients for 
marginalisation. Discrimination on the labour market for highly educated 
minorities dispels the idea that education can help break the class barriers 
and ease upward mobility and sends a paradoxical message to younger 
generations. Recognised and unpunished discrimination towards young, 
highly educated, veiled Muslim women on the labour market is actually 
hindering their autonomy and emancipation from traditional constraints.  
Given the failure of existing policies, more radical preventative and 
curative policies should also be considered, such as temporary positive 
discrimination in some areas in order to ensure better prospects and foster 
social diversity. Also, Muslim communities need to be made aware of the 
different instruments available to them to denounce all signs of 
discrimination. They should be informed of existing legislation forbidding 
religious and ethnic discrimination in order for them to know what 
protection they have. 
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prepared for the Russel Sage Foundation, New York, N.Y., October. 
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As mentioned earlier, the quality of education is one of the most 
critical determinants in successful integration. There are still areas for 
improvement in the current education systems in different European 
countries. Effective measures should be taken to tackle unacceptable 
voluntary and involuntary educational segregation and to encourage social 
diversity within schools. The refusal to admit Muslim children to elite 
schools and the direction of Muslim students towards low-level education 
areas should be identified and effectively managed. Training of educators 
and teachers should be improved to instil in them an understanding of 
cultural diversity issues in the classroom. School inspectors should be 
trained to recognise discrimination based on religion. 
Given the current low level of employment among the European 
Muslim communities compared to average levels among other groups, 
proactive policies should be defined in order to minimise the gap. The first 
step is to ensure that Muslims are not disadvantaged by their religion when 
trying to enter and progress within the labour market. One way to ensure 
diversity on the labour market is by defining targets50 for the minimum 
level of ethnic and religious diversity, starting with the public services.  
Often, entrepreneurship is seen as the solution to an inaccessible 
labour market. Entrance into the business world requires certain skills that 
help integration: knowledge of the national language and of administrative 
procedures, ability to connect with people outside the group for potential 
partners, employees, providers and clients. Government policies can play 
an important role in the evolution of ethnic economies by determining their 
legal framework, but also through the elaboration of instruments that meet 
the specific needs of potential Muslim businessmen and women.51 
One of these specificities is the reluctance to use interest-based 
financing and the preference for venture capital financing. However, while 
this kind of instrument already exists, lack of knowledge on the part of 
Muslim minorities impedes their access. Specific coaching and financing 
should be offered to young Muslims who express the desire to become self-
employed, helping them to choose the right sector, deal with 
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administration, including marketing and management concepts.52 In 
France, the Besson report presented to the National Assembly underlined 
the inadequacy of the help given to minority entrepreneurs under the 
French system, compared to the American system, which reserves a large 
part of public subsides for certain groups.53 
The establishment of cultural and community business and elite 
organisations can have certain advantages for younger generations. Among 
these advantages are role models, the emphasis on success stories, the 
transfer of knowledge, networking skills and suitable coaching. These 
organisations help fill the gap between existing practices and the 
specificities of Muslim communities. Educated and well integrated 
Muslims can transmit to their fellows the importance of education, work 
and progress as core Islamic values.54 The advantage of such organisations 
is for instance illustrated by the case of a German-Turkish business 
organisation. The entity initiated an impressive sector diversification 
allowing their members to be present in almost all sectors of the German 
economy, including highly successful and competitive sectors like software 
and new technologies.55 
Ghettoisation is a main factor in exclusion and marginalisation. The 
recent riots in France showed the consequences of the anger that housing 
isolation may engender. Social diversity can be achieved by offering easier 
access to housing possibilities outside the ghettos. A good illustration is the 
example of the city of Frankfurt: the municipality practises social diversity 
policies by limiting the proportion of immigrants in social housing to 
30%.56 
 
                                                           
52 Ibid. 
53 E .  B e s s o n  ( 1 9 9 8 ) ,  “ F o r  a n  e m e r g e n c y  p l a n  t o  s u p p o r t  t h e  c r e a t i o n  o f  s m a l l  
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European Commission, DG Enterprise, Brussels.  
54 An important Islamic principle is the fact that the situation of people will not 
change if they do not reform themselves first, rejecting all victimisation behaviours 
whatever the hostility of the environment (Koran, S. 8, V. 53). 
55 Pecoud, op. cit.  
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Home ownership is also considered as a facilitator in successful 
economic integration. Several reasons explain the difficulty for Muslims in 
accessing the property market. One of the factors rarely emphasised is the 
importance for an increasing proportion of the Muslim communities of 
having access to Islamic-compliant means of finance. As Islam rejects all 
forms of interest defined as the price of money, Muslim populations limit 
their access to banking services to the minimum, in the absence of services 
in compliance with their beliefs.57 Besides offering more adequate solutions 
to their banking needs, Islamic banking can be seen as a positive sign of 
genuine efforts to understand the Muslim community. 
Conclusions 
Taking into account Muslim specificities should not be seen as threatening 
the neutrality of the policy environment, but as recognising the legitimacy 
of a religious minority within the host society. Denying these characteristics 
or confusing the respect of Islamic values by Muslims with signs of 
fundamentalism increases the gulf between the Muslim community and the 
rest of society. For a large majority, practising Muslims are moderate 
people who want to live as European citizens in peace and in respect of 
their faith. Diversity should also include the religious characteristics of 
Muslims. In fact, in most diversity policies, race or ethnicity is largely taken 
into account, but this tends not to be so for Muslim characteristics. The 
economic development of Muslim communities, linking integration, 
identity and insertion issues, requires more attention from local, national 
and European communities. Proposals for action have been listed above, 
focusing on the importance of including Muslim specificities in the 
proactive policies to be promoted by authorities.  
 
                                                           
57 CEREI (2003), “Quantification of the Muslim Financial Needs”, December 
(www.cerei.net). | 77 
 
 
6.  MUSLIMS AND DISCRIMINATION 
TUFYAL CHOUDHURY 
Introduction 
The urgent need to tackle the discrimination faced by Muslims in Europe 
has emerged as a key concern of European policy-makers.1 Discrimination 
is considered a significant contributor to alienation and disaffection among 
Muslims, a barrier to integration and a risk factor for radicalisation. 
Developing effective and coherent policy interventions requires a clear 
understanding of the nature of the discrimination faced by Muslims as well 
as an assessment of the strength and limitations of existing policies.  
The first part of this paper examines the nature of the discrimination 
faced by Muslims in Europe. It sets out some of the research and statistical 
data that are available on performance by minority groups in relation to 
key socio-economic indicators. While this provides important information 
about the disadvantages experienced by minority groups that are 
predominately Muslim, the paucity of information on Muslims, as a group, 
limits our understanding of both the disadvantages and the discrimination 
Muslims encounter. In examining the data, the difficulty of identifying the 
role of ‘discrimination’ from data is explored. Furthermore, even when 
there is sufficiently robust data to allow statistical regression that can 
identify an ‘ethnic’, ‘religion’ or ‘migrant’ penalty, the nature of 
discrimination that Muslims are confronted with remains complex and 
varied.  
It is suggested that the main grounds for discrimination that Muslims 
face vary between different Muslim groups. For some, the first order of 
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discrimination may be on the basis of nationality, refugee or immigration 
status. For others, colour and racial discrimination may be prevalent and 
for others it may be religious discrimination. Most importantly, attempting 
to identify a particular area of discrimination overlooks the potential for 
discrimination on intersectional and multiple grounds. Finally, even when 
it is possible to identify religious discrimination, the experience and impact 
of it can vary among Muslims.  
A second part of this paper explores the possibilities, potential and 
limitations within the current EU policies aimed at tackling discrimination. 
It begins therefore, by setting out the developments in EU anti-
discrimination legislation and policy – with a focus on the EC Directive for 
tackling discrimination on the grounds of religion and belief in 
employment (the Framework Directive) – considering the relationship 
between equality and discrimination. It is argued that a fundamental 
constraint on the use of tools provided by the legal framework is the 
absence of any consensus on a vision of what equality for Muslims looks 
like. The paper then explores some of the limitations of the Framework 
Directive; these include the limited scope of the application of the directive, 
the potential for addressing multiple or intersectional discrimination and 
the continuation of an approach that relies on individuals making 
complaints.  
6.1  Disadvantage and discrimination 
Socio-economic disadvantage  
Disadvantage is measured through data. Patterns of disadvantage revealed 
by data are, in part, a product of prior decisions about how to categorise 
people. These decisions, in turn, reflect political decisions about which 
patterns are likely to be important and which groups deserve protection. 
The UK is one of the few EU member states where the national census 
includes a question on religion and thus allows the data to be 
disaggregated and analysed by religion. In many European countries, there 
are legal prohibitions on the collection of data on the basis of personal 
characteristics such as religion. In others, while there is no legal prohibition 
on the collection of such data, the official practice has been to collect data 
on the basis of ethnicity, national origin or country of birth. In the absence 
o f  d a t a  o n  M u s l i m s ,  a s  a  g r o u p ,  s o me ethnic or national categories can 
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Within the research literature, the most significant Muslim proxy 
ethnic groups are Bangladeshi, Maghrebi, Pakistani and Turkish groups. 
The use of data for these groups in understanding the position of Muslims 
is problematic. Firstly, not all members of the proxy group are Muslims. 
Secondly, such data tell us nothing of the situation of Muslims beyond that 
group. Furthermore, where the data are based on country of birth they 
provide limited information on the situation of second- and third-
generation, European-born Muslims from such ethnic or national groups.  
It is only possible, within the confines of this paper, to provide a 
snapshot of some statistics and data relating to Muslims, or to proxy 
groups for Muslims, which indicate disadvantage in respect of some key 
socio-economic indicators within the EU.2 Disadvantage in the labour 
market can be measured in several ways, for example, higher 
unemployment rates, lower employment rates or concentration in unskilled 
or semi-skilled sectors of the economy. Unemployment rates running at 
twice the national average can be found for children of Moroccan and 
Algerian immigrants in France3 and for Turkish nationals in Germany.4 In 
the Netherlands, the unemployment rate amongst Moroccans and Turks is 
                                                           
2 See http://www.eumap.org/topics/minority/reports/eumuslims for reports 
reviewing the existing research literature on Muslims in relation to key socio-
economic indicators in seven EU states. 
3 Data from the 1999 census show that unemployment among young people whose 
parents were born in Algeria or Morocco is 40%, compared to a national youth 
unemployment rate of 20% (see INSEE, Les immigrés en France, Edition 2005, p. 130, 
cited in S. Tebbakh (2007), Muslims in the EU Cities Report – France: Preliminary 
Research Report and Literature Survey, (Open Society Institute, Budapest, p 42 note 
122). A survey of French school leavers in 1998 found that after five years the 
unemployment rate among the North Africans in the cohort was double that of 
young people whose parents were born in France (see Centre détudes et de 
recherches sur les qualifications (CEREQ) (1998), Survey ON “Generation 98”, 
Paris; R. Silberman and I. Fournier (2006), “Jeunes issus de l’immigration: une 
pénalité à l’embauche qui perdure…”, Bref, No. 226, January, p. 3. 
4 Jochen Blaschke, (2004), “Tolerated but Marginalised – Muslims in Germany”, in 
State Policies towards Muslim Minorities. Sweden, Great Britain and Germany, Edition 
Parabolis Verlagsabteilung im Europäischen Migrationszentrum (EMZ), Kempten, 
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between two and a half to three times the national average.5 In Belgium, the 
unemployment rate among Moroccans and Turks, at 38% is five times the 
level of national unemployment rate of 7%.6 In the UK, data from the 2001 
census show that, of young people aged 16-24, Muslims have the highest 
unemployment rate of all groups.7 Even for those with jobs, employment is 
over-concentrated in particular sectors. In the UK, 40% of Muslim men in 
employment were working in the distribution, hotel and restaurant 
industry, compared with 30% of Christian men.8 Moreover, 40% of 
Muslims are in the lowest occupational groups, compared to 30% of 
Christians.9 Muslim men are among the least likely to be in managerial or 
professional jobs and the most likely to be in low-skilled jobs.10 In France, 
40% of Muslims work in factories compared to 21% of the general 
population.11 In the Netherlands, the majority of Moroccans and Turks with 
jobs are employed in ‘elementary or low-level’ jobs.12  
                                                           
5 In the Netherlands the unemployment rate among Moroccans is 29% and for 
Turks it is 21%; this compares to a national unemployment rate of 9% (see SCP 
(2006) Hoge (jeud) werkloosheid onder etnische minderheden. Nieuwe 
bevindingen uit het LAS-onderzoek [High Youth Unemployment among Ethnic 
Minorities. New Findings from the LAS Study], The Hague: Sociaal en Cultureel 
Planbureau, cited in Demant et al. Muslims in the EU Cities Reports – The 
Netherlands: Preliminary Research Report and Literature Survey, Budapest, Open 
Society Institute, 2007, p. 22). 
6 L. Okkerse, and A. Termote (2004), Etudes statistiques no. 111: Singularité des 
étrangers sur la marché de l’emploi, Institut National de la Statistique, Brussels.  
7 22% are unemployed compared to 11% of Christians. UK Office of National 
Statistics (2004), Focus on Religion, ONS, London, p. 13. 
8 Ibid.  
9 Ibid.  
10 Ibid.  
11 Alberto Lopez and Gwenaëlle Thomas, «L’insertion des jeunes sur le marché du 
travail: le poids des origines socioculturelles» (The integration of young people 
into the labour market: The weight of socio-cultural origins), Données sociales, 
INSEE, édition 2006, pp. 293–305, cited in S. Tebbakh, op. cit.  
12 SCP (2005), Jaarrapport Integratie [Integration Annual Report]. The Hague: 
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The impact of poor labour market participation can be felt in other 
areas of life such as income, housing and health. In the Netherlands, the 
average income in a Moroccan or Turkish household (€13,600) is one-third 
below the national average.13 Muslims in the UK are disproportionately 
represented in the most deprived urban communities – one-third of the 
Muslim population lives in the 10% most deprived neighbourhoods.14 In 
France, around half of Algerian and Moroccans and over 40% of people of a 
Turkish and Tunisian background live in social housing. According to 
Tebbakh, “the strong presence of immigrants in [social housing] can be 
ascribed to their limited financial means and to a housing shortage in the 
private sector, which imposed unequal conditions of access and 
selection”.15 Rates of certain chronic illnesses, particularly cardiovascular 
diseases, are significantly higher among those of Turkish background than 
in the general population in both Germany16 and the Netherlands.17 In the 
UK, health data on ethnic minorities show that Pakistanis and Bangladeshis 
have the highest rate of diagnosed heart disease.18 Data from the 2001 
census on the UK reveals that Muslims reported the highest rates of illness 
of all faith groups.19 These findings support the conclusion drawn by the 
                                                           
13 Ibid. 
14 J. Beckford et al. (2006), Review of the Evidence Based on Faith Communities, Office 
of the Deputy Prime Minister, London, p. 39. The census data can be analysed at 
the level of ‘Super Output Areas’ which is equivalent to a neighbourhood. These 
neighbourhoods are classified into 10 deprivation categories based on their score 
on the ODPM Index of Multiple Deprivation.  
15 S. Tebbakh, op. cit., p. 51 
16 N. Muhe, (2007), Muslims in the EU Cities Reports – Germany: Preliminary Research 
Report and Literature Survey, Open Society Institute, Budapest, p. 36. 
17 Demant et al., p. 26. 
18 While one in six people from ethnic minorities over the age of 40 reported 
diagnosed heart disease, the figure for Pakistanis and Bangladeshis was one in 
four. See: J. Nazroo  (2001),  Ethnicity, Class and Health, Policy Studies Institute, 
London, pp. 74-77.  
19 After taking the age structures of the populations into account, it was found that 
13% of Muslim males and 16% of Muslim females reported that their health was 
“not good”, compared to 7% of Christians. Compared to all other faith groups, 
Muslims had the highest rate of disability, 24% of Muslims females and 21% of 
Muslim males had a disability, as compared to 15 and 16% of Christian males and 
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European Union Monitoring on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC) from its 
review of existing data on discrimination that “Muslims are often 
disproportionately represented in areas with poor housing conditions, 
while their educational achievement falls below average and their 
unemployment rates are higher than average. Muslims are often employed 
in jobs that require lower qualifications and as a group they are over 
represented in low-paying sectors of the economy”.20 In education the 
picture is more complex. A study by the OECD, measuring performance in 
mathematics, found that in France, Germany and the Netherlands, there is 
a significant difference in the performance of ‘second generation’ children 
of migrants compared to the national average.21 When compared to the 
national average the last few years have seen significant improvements in 
the attainment levels of Pakistani and Bangladeshi pupils in the UK22 and 
Turkish and Moroccan pupils in the Netherlands.23 In the UK, over half of 
Muslims aged 16-25 participate in post-compulsory education; this is 
higher than the national average (42%).24 
Discrimination in the labour market  
While survey data show the levels of disadvantage experienced by some 
Muslims in Europe, identifying the sources of this disadvantage and the 
role of discrimination in causing, reinforcing or exacerbating this 
disadvantage is more difficult.  
                                                                                                                                                    
females. See UK Office of National Statistics (2004), Focus on Religion, ONS, 
London, p. 8.  
20 EUMC (European Union Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia), (2006), 
Muslims in the European Union: Discrimination and Islamophobia, EUMC, Vienna, p. 8.  
21 OECD (2004), Learning for Tomorrow’s World: First Results from PISA 2003, OECD, 
Paris.  
22 U K  O f f i c e  o f  N a t i o n a l  S t a t i s t i c s  ( 2 0 0 6 ) ,  D e p a r t m e n t  f o r  E d u c a t i o n  a n d  S k i l l s ,  
National Curriculum Assessment, GCSE and  Equivalent Attainment and Post-16 
Attainment by Pupil Characteristics in England 2005-06 (Provisional), London. 
23 Demant et al. op.cit., p. 18.  
24 S. Hussain (2003), An Introduction to Muslims in the 2001 National Census, p. 10. 
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If we take the example of the labour market, disadvantage here is the 
outcome of a variety of interrelated factors including levels of human 
capital, structural changes in the economy, social networks and place of 
residence.25 Fournier and Silberman, for example, suggest that the greater 
risk of unemployment, in France, among the second generation children of 
non-EU migrants cannot be accounted for by their educational levels. They 
suggest that part of the explanation lies in the lower social capital and 
access to employment in the networks of their children’s parents.26 While it 
is not possible to gauge with precision the exact role of discrimination in 
the disadvantage experienced by Muslims, there is evidence that 
discrimination does play some role. The EUMC notes: 
[T]here is a large body of evidence that demonstrates the 
persistent scale and dimension of discrimination in employment: 
derived from controlled experiments in employers’ recruitment 
practices (“discrimination testing”), opinion surveys on 
discriminatory attitudes, and surveys of perceived discrimination 
by migrants…The data show that not all migrants are equally 
exposed to racism and discrimination in employment. Muslims 
appear to be particularly affected.27  
In the UK, a report by the government analysing available data on 
South Asians found that “even after controlling for a range of factors, Sikhs 
and Indian Muslims remain almost twice as likely to be unemployed as 
Hindus and that Pakistanis are almost twice as likely to be unemployed”. 
However, the report authors warn against any automatic conclusion that 
there is a ‘religion penalty’ at work as “religion may simply be a factor for 
                                                           
25 See Z. Bunglawala (2005), “Muslims in the UK and the Labour Market”, in 
Muslims in the UK: Policies for Engaged Citizens, Open Society Institute, Budapest, 
pp. 193-251.  
26 R. Silberman and I. Fournier (1999), “Immigrants’ Children and the Labour 
Market: The Mechanisms of Selective Discrimination. From one generation to 
another. How do the immigrants and their children see their position on the labour 
market?”, paper presented at Fourth International MigCities Conference, Lisbon, 
November. 
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other factors determining employment, like education and fluency”.28 
Lindsey’s analysis of this same data found that Muslims experience ‘some 
unexplainable employment penalty, relative to other non-white religions, 
over and above all other characteristics (including ethnic differences and 
language fluency)’. However, whilst this supports claims that Muslims face 
religious discrimination, the difference may also conceal further 
‘unmeasurable variables’.29  
ILO studies that involve ‘situation testing’ in employment in 
Germany and the Netherlands provide evidence of discrimination against 
some Muslim groups.30 Situation testing in France found that a person from 
the Maghreb had five times less chance of receiving a positive reply than 
other applicants.31  
Surveys of minority groups can provide an indication of their 
perceptions of discrimination. In the UK, the 2004 Home Office citizenship 
survey of those who had been refused a job in the past five years showed 
that a quarter of Bangladeshis and 12% of Pakistanis cited racial 
discrimination as the main reason for this. Perceptions of religious 
discrimination, lower than perceptions of racial discrimination, were 
highest for Bangladeshi (13%) and Pakistanis (9%). Pakistanis were also the 
most likely to cite religion as a reason for being refused a promotion in the 
preceding five years. 
                                                           
28 UK Cabinet Office (2001), Ethnic Minorities and the Labour Market: Interim 
Analytical Report, London, p. 82. See also M. Brown (2000), “Religion and Economic 
Activity in the South Asian population”, Ethnic and Racial Studies, 23(6).  
29 J. Lindley (2002), “Race or Religion? The impact of religion on the employment 
and earnings of Britain’s Ethnic communities”, Journal of Ethnic and Migration 
Studies, 28(3), p. 429.  
30 A. Goldberg, D. Mourhino and U. Kulke (1997), Labour market discrimination 
against foreign workers in Germany, International Migration Papers 7, ILO, Geneva. 
F. Bouvenkerk, M.J.I. Gras, D. Ramsoedh, M. Dankoor and A. Havelaar (1995), 
Discrimination against migrant workers and ethnic minorities in access to employment in 
the Netherlands, ILO, Geneva.  
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Discrimination beyond employment  
Muslims experience discrimination in a wide range of areas outside 
employment. One review of NGO and official reports concludes that 
“direct and indirect discrimination in the housing sector – both public and 
private – appear to be widespread phenomena”.32 Discrimination can take 
the form of a refusal to rent or sell, the imposition of extra conditions to 
secure housing, and the application of discriminatory criteria in the 
allocation of social housing.33 Evidence is also emerging of ethnic and 
religious profiling of Muslims by police and security services in some EU 
states.34 The International Helsinki Federation reports that in Germany 
“since September 11, thousands of Muslims have been subjected to 
screening for their personal data, houses searches, interrogations, and 
arrests solely because their profiles have matched certain basic criteria, 
foremost of which is affiliation to Islam”.35 Other sites where Muslims 
experience discrimination include ‘civic integration’ programmes.36 In 
Germany, the Gesprächsleitfaden (Interview Guidelines) for examining 
citizenship applicants produced by the government of Baden-Württemberg 
provide one example of discrimination: 
Targeting only citizenship applicants from 57 Muslim states, 
these Gesprächsleitfaden consist of 30 questions that should 
help determine whether an applicant’s formal ‘acceptance’ of 
liberal democratic values, which is required by German 
nationality law, corresponds to his or her ‘real convictions’. All 
questions are formulated in terms of a binary opposition 
                                                           
32 J. Ringelheim (2006), Strategic Litigation to Combat Discrimination against Muslims 
in Europe: “State of Law” Legal Memorandum, Open Justice Initiative, New York, p. 5. 
33 See V. Amiraux (2002), “The Situation of Muslims in France”, in Monitoring the 
EU Accession Process: Minority Protection, Open Society Institute, Budapest, pp. 101-
103. 
34 J. Goldstone (2006), Ethnic Profiling and Counter-Terrorism: Trends, Dangers and 
Alternatives, Open Justice Initiative, New York. See also L. Fekete (2004), “Anti-
Muslim racism and the European security state”, Race and Class, 46(1).  
35 IHF (2005), Intolerance and Discrimination Against Muslims in the EU: Developments 
since September 11, March, p. 78.  
36 C. Joppe (2007), “Beyond National Models: Civic Integration Policies for 
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between liberal democracy and a certain idea of Islam, as 
prescribing or condoning arranged marriage, patriarchy, 
homophobia, veiling and terrorism (e.g. question 23: ‘You 
heard about the assaults on 11 September 2001 in New York 
and on 11 March 2004 in Madrid. Were the protagonists in your 
eyes terrorists or freedom fighters? Elaborate on your 
statement’). While one may see insult in the transparency of 
such ‘questions’ (and correspondingly low intelligence imputed 
to citizenship candidates), their discriminatory edge consists of 
‘interpreting … the liberal-democratic order primarily in 
opposition to the presumed values of a specific group’, as a 
legal evaluation of the Gesprächsleitfaden for the city of 
Heidelberg put it. In other words, such ‘liberalism’ is nothing 
but a device for excluding a specific group, Muslims.37 
Increasing restrictions on immigration and access to citizenship are 
perceived by Muslims in Germany and Denmark as being targeted at 
Muslim migration.38 In the Netherlands, a new ‘integration test’ has been 
introduced for applicants for ‘family reunification’ that must be taken at a 
Dutch embassy abroad and passed before a temporary residence permit is 
even granted. Joppe finds that “most of the family migrants targeted by the 
Dutch policy are Muslims of Turkish or Moroccan origin” thus, “what 
began as an immigrant integration policy has…turned into its opposite, a 
no-immigration policy”.39  
A significant proportion of refugees and asylum-seekers in Europe 
are Muslim. For this group, their refugee status may be the dominant way 
in which they experience discrimination in those areas from which refugees 
are excluded from participation. Similarly, there are significant numbers of 
Muslims among the population of undocumented migrants.40 Muhe, for 
                                                           
37 Ibid., p. 15.  
38 T. Choudhury, M. Aziz, D. Izzidien, I. Khireeji and D. Hussain (2006), Perceptions 
of Discrimination and Islamophobia: Voices from members of Muslim communities in the 
European Union, European Union Monitoring Centre of Racism and Xenophobia, 
Vienna, pp. 23-24.  
39 Joppe, op. cit.,  p. 8.  
40 H. Ansari, ‘The Infidel Within’ – Muslims in Britain since 1800, London, Hurst, 
2004, p.172 No. 12 see also S. Tebbakh, Muslims in the EU City Reports – France: 
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example, notes that, ‘the one group that has no access at all to health and 
social protection in Germany is the considerable number of the so-called 
illegal immigrants, many of whom are Muslims. All persons and 
institutions that help those ‘illegals’ are culpable of aiding and abetting 
illegal entry and illegal residence, and by law every official institution must 
report any case of illegal residence’.41   
In European states where the practical exercise of certain religious 
freedoms requires permission or authorisation by public authorities, the 
exercise of discretion by public officials provides further arenas in which 
Muslims can experience discrimination. The most common examples 
include securing planning permission for mosques or religious burial 
grounds,42 the right to slaughter animals in line with religious laws, the 
wearing of headscarves by women, the state funding of Muslim schools 
and the recognition of Islam as an ‘official religion’ by states in which there 
are institutionalised relations between the state and religious 
communities.43  
                                                                                                                                                    
Preliminary Research and Literature Review, Budapest, Open Society Institute, 2007 
(forthcoming).  
41 N. Muhe (2007), Muslims in the EU Cities Reports – Germany: Preliminary Research 
Report and Literature Survey, Open Society Institute, Budapest, p. 7.  
42 R. Gale (2004), “The Multicultural City and the Politics of Religious Architecture: 
Urban Planning, Mosques and Meaning-making in Birmingham, UK”, Built 
Environment, 30(1). 
43 See J. Ringelheim (2006), Strategic Litigation to Combat Discrimination against 
Muslims in Europe: “State of Law” Legal Memorandum, Open Justice Initiative, New 
York; Choudhury et al. (2006), op. cit., see also J. Rath, R. Penninx, K. Groenendijk 
and A. Meyer (1999), “The Politics of Recognising Religious Diversity in Europe: 
Social Reactions to the Institutionalization of Islam in the Netherlands, Belgium 
and Great Britain”, Netherlands’ Journal of Social Sciences, 35(1), C. Soper and J. 
Fetzer (2005), “Explaining the Accommodation of Muslim Religious Practices in 
France, Britain, and Germany”, paper for Stream 3, Public Recognition and Secular 
D e m o c r a c y ,  I M S C O E  C l u s t e r  B 6  w o r k s h o p  o n  E t h n i c ,  C u l t u r a l  a n d  R e l i g i o u s  
Diversity, Amsterdam; 26-28 May, and S. Ferrari (2005), “The Secularity of the 
State and the Shaping of Muslim Representative Organisations in Western 
Europe”, in J. Cesari and S. McLoughlin, (eds), European Muslims and the Secular 
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The debate surrounding the right of Muslim women to wear an 
Islamic headscarf or hijab, illustrates the potential for the public discussion 
surrounding such issues to reinforce stereotypes and prejudices that further 
stigmatise Muslims and thereby increase their risk of experiencing 
discriminatory treatment. The hijab has become a symbolic focus for the 
discussion of multiculturalism and national identity.44 In France, where the 
issue has been under public debate since 1989, national legislation 
prohibiting the wearing of ostentatious religious symbols in schools by 
pupils was passed following a National Commission examining the issue.45 
In Germany, while the Federal Supreme Court deemed the ban on wearing 
the headscarf to be unconstitutional, as the ban did not have sufficient legal 
basis, it left it open for individual Länder to bring in legislation banning 
religious symbols in schools.46 The Court emphasised that regulations 
introduced by individual states should be non-discriminatory. However, 
many states have not adhered to this principle. In Baden-Württemberg, for 
example, the preamble to the legislation made it clear that the regulations 
were aimed at Islamic headscarves. Furthermore, it provided that the law 
did not concern the representation of Christian and Western values and 
traditions. Law-makers relied on state constitutional provisions which 
require schools to pass Christian values and traditions onto pupils.47  
                                                           
44 The issue has also generated considerable literature. See for example, C. El 
Hamel (2002), “Muslim Diaspora in Western Europe: The Islamic Headscarf, the 
Media and Muslims’ Integration in France”, Citizenship Studies, 6(3); B. Gökariksel 
and K. Mitchell (2005), “Veiling, secularism, and the neoliberal subject: national 
narratives and supranational desires in Turkey and France”, Global Networks 147, 
5(2).  
45 B. Stasi, (2003) Working group (Commission de réflexion) on the application of 
the principle of laicity. Report to the President of the Republic, La Documentation 
Française, Paris.  
46 Ludin, 2 BvR 1436/02, 24 September 2003. For a discussion of the case see: M. 
Mahlmann, ‘Religious Tolerance, Pluralistic Society and the Neutrality of the State: 
the Federal Constitutional Court’s Decision in the Headscarf Case’, 4 (11) German 
Law Journal 1099.  
47 I. Gallala, (2006) “The Islamic Headscarf: An Example of Surmountable Conflict 
between Shari’a and the Fundamental Principles of Europe”, European Law Journal, 
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The issue of the veil has also been addressed by the European Court 
of Human Rights in cases involving a school teacher in Switzerland48 and a 
university medical student in Turkey.49 The comments of the European 
Court of Human Rights were particularly unfortunate in reproducing and 
reinforcing stereotypes about Muslims in the Dahlab case. Here, the Court 
found that the veil “seemed to be imposed on women” and that it results 
from a prescription “difficult to reconcile with the principle of equality of 
the sexes”… furthermore, they found that “it is difficult to reconcile the 
wearing of the Islamic veil with the message of tolerance, of respect for 
others and above all of equality and non-discrimination that, in a 
democratic society, every teacher must transmit to his or her pupils”.50 In 
France, the President of the French State Commission for Laicity stated that 
the headscarf was a “sign of the alienation of women” and that Muslim 
women “wear the headscarf especially because their parents, their older 
brothers, as well as their religious groups, oblige them to do so. If they do 
not wear it they are insulted”.51 In both instances, the hijab is inscribed with 
a single symbolic meaning that excludes alternative interpretation and 
narratives, whereas the hijab can be a source of empowerment, a way of 
challenging stereotypes and challenging gender identities.52 It was left to 
the dissenting opinion of Judge Tulkens in Sahin to note that “(…) wearing 
the headscarf has no single meaning; it is a practice that is engaged in for a 
variety of reasons. It does not necessarily symbolise the submission of 
women to men and there are those who maintain that, in certain cases, its 
can be a means of emancipating women.”53 By contrast, the German 
Federal Constitutional Court, in the Ludin case, accepted that the meaning 
                                                           
48 Dahlab v Switzerland (App.42393/98), Admissibility Decision of 15 February 2001.  
49 Leyla Sahin v Turkey (App.44774/98), Judgment of 10 November 2005  
50 Dahlab v Switzerland (App.42393/98), Admissibility Decision of 15 February 2001.  
51 W. Shadid and Van Koningsveld (2005), “Muslim Dress in Europe: Debates on 
the Headscarf”, Journal of Islamic Studies, 16(1), p. 46. 
52 See for example, C. Dwyer (2000), “Negotiating diasporic identities: Young 
British South Asian Muslim women”, Women's studies international forum, 23(4), and 
C. Dwyer (1999), “Veiled meanings: Young British Muslim women and the 
negotiation of differences”, Gender, place and culture, 6(1).  
53 Leyla Sahin v Turkey (App.44774/98), Judgment of 10 November 2005, dissenting 
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and impact of wearing the veil depends on a complex set of circumstances 
including not only the individual’s intentions but also the general 
behaviour of the teacher who wears it and the message as it is received by 
the pupils and parents involved. Therefore, according to the Court, the veil 
could not just be reduced to a symbol of the social oppression of women.54 
Shadid and van Koningsveld conclude that discussions about the hijab in 
Europe, by judges, politicians and in the media, perpetuate stereotypes 
about the women who wear them, about Islam and the attitudes of 
Muslims towards Western civilisation and their willingness to integrate 
into its societies.55 They find that “almost without exception these 
stereotypes attribute highly negative characteristics to the group 
concerned” and as such, “they can be considered a form of collective 
stigmatisation”.56 Even where, as in France, the legal ban is limited to 
pupils and teachers in schools, research suggests that there are knock-on 
effects, in terms of discrimination, for women who wear the hijab in other 
areas of life.57 Qualitative studies of the experiences of Muslim women 
comment on the ways in which stereotypes about Muslim women impact 
on the lives of the women interviewed. Dwyer finds that gendered, class 
and racialised explanations reinforce the representation of young Muslim 
women as both oppressed and powerless. Such stereotypes impinged on 
the lives of those she interviewed. For example, a pupil interviewed for a 
medical degree was questioned about her commitment to the profession. 
Others reported that they were often judged on the basis of being 
representatives of a stereotype rather than as an individual.58  
The targeting of Muslims, through violence and hate speech directed 
at individuals because of the groups to which they belong or are perceived 
                                                           
54 I. Gallala (2006), “The Islamic Headscarf: An Example of Surmountable Conflict 
between Shari’a and the Fundamental Principles of Europe” European Law Journal, 
12(5), p. 599.  
55 W. Shadid and Van Koningsveld (2005), “Muslim Dress in Europe: Debates on 
the Headscarf” Journal of Islamic Studies, 16(1). 
56 Ibid., p. 43. See also N. Guenif-Souilmas and E. Mace (2004), Les féministes et le 
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to belong is a further form of discrimination or ‘exclusion’.59 In the 
aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, as well as the 
killing of Theo Van Gogh in Amsterdam and the Madrid 2004 and London 
2005 bombings, there has been a significant increase in the number of 
attacks on Muslims and those perceived to be Muslims, usually in the days 
and weeks immediately following such incidents.60 The majority of attacks 
take the form of verbal abuse, but there are also cases of severe physical 
attacks and murders as well as violence aimed at mosques, Islamic schools 
and cemeteries. In France, the report of the National Consultative 
Commission on Human Rights for 2004 recorded a rise in anti-Muslim and 
anti-Arab attacks; 81% of recorded racist or xenophobic violence targeted 
people of North African or Muslim origin.61 The EUMC report on 
Islamophobia in the EU after September 11 noted a significant number of 
incidents in the Netherlands, including insults, graffiti and threats (53 
incidents), and vandalism and acts of aggression against Muslims and 
Islamic symbols (13 incidents). Following the murder of film director Theo 
van Gogh, there were attacks on Muslim schools and mosques in the 
                                                           
59 See M. Malik, ‘Muslims in the UK: Discrimination, Equality, and Community 
Cohesion’, in Muslims in the UK: Policies for Engaged Citizens, Budapest, Open 
Society Institute, 2005, pp. 69-73, where Iris Marion Young’s ‘five faces of 
oppression’ – the first of which is oppression through violence – is utilised to 
provide a framework for understanding the experience of exclusion of Muslins in 
Britain. She notes that ‘Young’s definition of violence also encompasses “less 
severe incidents of harassment, intimidation, or ridicule, simply for the purpose of 
degrading, humiliating or stigmatising a group member”’ see also I. M. Young, 
Justice and the Politics of Difference, p.61, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1990.   
60 See: European Union Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia, Muslims in 
the European Union: Discrimination and Islamophobia, Vienna, EUMC, 2006, pp. 
66-90; European Union Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia, The Impact 
of 7 July 2005 London Bomb Attacks on Muslim Communities in the EU, Vienna, 
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on Racism and Xenophobia, 2002.  
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Netherlands.62 In 10 opinion polls since 2002, Muslims in the UK have been 
asked if they have experienced hostility and discrimination. Around 30% of 
Muslims consistently report experiencing some form of hostility directed at 
them (the actual figures range from 20-38%). A poll in July 2005 asked 
Muslims about the kinds of adverse treatment they might experience: 14% 
said they had experienced verbal abuse; 3% reported physical violence; 5% 
said they had been stopped and searched by police; 32% felt they had been 
the object of hostility; and 42% felt they had been the object of suspicion.63  
The multi-dimensional nature of discrimination  
The nature of the discrimination Muslims encounter, the boundaries 
between different characteristics, race, ethnicity, religion and gender, are 
less precise and stable than might first appear.64 Identifying the ground of 
discrimination or even the primary ground may not be possible where a 
person has more than one characteristic that makes them a target of 
discrimination. Furthermore, individuals interpret their experiences in 
ways that allow them to ‘mediate’ that discrimination.65 Muslims face 
                                                           
62 Demant et al. (2007), Muslims in the EU City Reports – The Netherlands: Preliminary 
Research Report and Literature Review, Open Society Institute, Budapest, 
(forthcoming).  
63 A. Blick, T. Choudhury and S. Weir (2006), The Rules of the Game: Terrorism, 
Community and Human Rights, Joseph Rowntree Reform Trust, York, p. 19.   
64 For a discussion of the racialisation of religion, see M. Chon and D. Artz (2005), 
“Walking While Muslim”, Law and Contemporary Problems, 68, p. 228, where they 
note that “Religion is not ‘immutable’ in the way we understand skin colour to be. 
Religious affiliation or identity is always a matter of choice. Yet, especially through 
the war on terror, Islam is acquiring characteristics of immutability, innateness, 
inevitability, inheritability and, importantly inferiority. In other words religious 
differences are being ‘racialised’”.  
65 M. Bying (1998), “Mediating Discrimination: Resisting Oppression Among 
African-American Muslim Women”, Social Problems, 45(4), pp. 474-5, “mediation 
means having the agency to respond to discrimination in ways that resist its power 
and oppression…human agency is central to mediation: ownership, accountability, 
self definition, self-determination, and self-evaluation mean that in the face of 
painful discrimination people maintain their humanity and recognise the 
humanity of others”. Bying’s finds that the African-American Muslim women she 
interviewed “were able to resist the oppression of discrimination by a humanist 
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different forms of discrimination and experience differing disadvantages 
depending on a wide range of characteristics including perceptions of race, 
ethnicity and gender. Across Europe, different ethnic groups are 
synonymous in the public imagination with Muslims: in France, North 
Africans; in Germany, Turks; in the Netherlands, Moroccans and Turks, 
and in the UK, Pakistanis and Bangladeshis. Islam is embedded in the ways 
in which these groups are racialised in those countries. Thus, being Muslim 
is significant in structuring the discrimination directed against Turks in 
Germany but not in London.66 As with identity, the characteristic that 
comes into play in the discriminatory treatment is context-sensitive.  
Moreover, even when considering discrimination concerning a 
particular characteristic or religion, the circumstances and experiences of 
discrimination vary greatly within the Muslim group. For example, race, 
ethnicity, employment, religious practice and visible signs of religious 
identity are significant variables in the intensity and frequency of religious 
discrimination experienced by Muslims.67 There is no homogenous Muslim 
experience of religious discrimination.  
6.2  The legal and policy tools available to address discrimination 
Prohibitions on discrimination in EC Law  
This part examines the legal and policy tools that can be mobilised to tackle 
discrimination experienced by Muslims in Europe. Our focus will be on 
                                                                                                                                                    
vision that views discrimination as triggered by difference. Even though these 
women experience classic cases of discrimination, they maintain the ability of self-
definition, determination, and valuation. They define the importance of the 
experience for themselves and their lives, and thereby are able to mediate 
discrimination… [They] use their membership in the Muslim community as a self 
defining and safe social space”’   
66 See for example P. Enneli, T. Modood and H. Bradley (2005), Young Kurds and 
Turks: A set of ‘invisible’ disadvantaged groups, Joseph Rowntree Foundation, York, p. 
41, where young Turkish and Kurdish respondents suggested that religion was not 
the main for the discrimination targeted at them, but that “negative feelings 
against Muslims were targeted at Pakistanis”.  
67 S. R. Ameli, M. Elahi and A. Merali, British Muslims’ Expectations of Government: 
social discrimination across the Muslim divide, Islamic Human Rights Commission, 
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action that is possible at the European Union rather than member state 
level. Discrimination was only a concern of the European Economic 
Community at its inception in 1957 to the extent that it interfered with 
market integration. The Treaty of Rome68 contained only a general 
prohibition on discrimination on the grounds of nationality,69 for workers 
of member states, and a provision on equal pay for men and women, for 
equal work or work of equal value.70 Thus, in the Treaty of Rome, “there 
was something, but it looked like nothing”.71 The Treaty’s sparse 
provisions were not expected to form the basis for developing a far-
reaching system of tackling discrimination or promoting equality, their 
primary purpose was market integration.72 Yet, over the past 50 years, the 
EC has become a significant catalyst for anti-discrimination measures in 
member states, as “the limited conception of non-discrimination which was 
concealed in the Treaty evolved over the years into a fundamental principle 
of social policy with constitutional aspirations”.73 The initial expansion of 
Community measures as confined, by the treaty, to sex discrimination, first 
in relation to equal pay74 but then, through invoking Article 308 EC, with 
                                                           
68 Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, 25 March 1957, 298 
U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter EEC Treaty] 
69 Article 48 EEC, now revised Article 39 EC 
70 Article 119 EEC, now revised Article 141 EC 
71 Perchal, S., ‘Equality of Treatment, Non-Discrimination and Social Policy: 
Achievements in Three Themes’ 41 Common Market Law Review 533, 2004.  
72 See C. Barnard, “The Economic Objectives of Article 119”, in Hervey T., and 
O’Keeffe (eds.), Sex Equality Law in the European Union, 1996.  
73 Perchal, S., ‘Equality of Treatment, Non-Discrimination and Social Policy: 
Achievements in Three Themes’ 41 Common Market Law Review 533, 2004, at p. 534. 
See also G. More (1999), “The Principle of Equality Treatment: From Market 
Unifier to Fundamental Right?”, in P. Craig and G. De Búrca (eds), The Evolution of 
EU Law, pp. 517-543.  
74 EC, Council Directive 75/117 of 10 February 1975 on the approximation of the laws of 
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respect to equal treatment in access to employment75 and in social security 
schemes.76  
The potential for action in relation to other grounds of discrimination 
came with the insertion of Article 13 into the Treaty of Rome by the Treaty 
of Amsterdam.77 Article 13 provides that the Council, “acting unanimously 
on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the European 
Parliament, may take appropriate action to combat discrimination based on 
sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual 
orientation”. This dramatic expansion of the grounds of discrimination 
covered by EC law was the result of determined lobbying and concern for 
ethnic tension in an enlarged EU.78 Initial scepticism that the necessary 
unanimity would be ever be found for passing any measures in the Council 
was confounded, as the inclusion of the far right Freedom Party in the 
government of Austria in October 1999 provided the impetus for urgent 
community action. Two Directives were adopted in 2000. The first, adopted 
in June, covered discrimination on the grounds of racial or ethnic origin 
(hereafter the “Race Directive”).79 The second, adopted five months later, 
prohibited discrimination on the grounds of religion or belief, disability, 
                                                           
75 EC, Council Directive 76/207 of 9 February 1976 on the implementation of the principle 
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76 EC, Council Directive 79/7 of 19 December 1978 on the progressive implementation of 
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age or sexual orientation (hereafter the ‘Framework Directive).80 The 
Framework Directive limits itself to prohibiting discrimination in 
employment and occupation. The Race Directive goes beyond employment 
to cover education, social protection including social security and 
healthcare, social advantage and access to and supply of goods and 
services. Thus, “touching on areas at the outer limits of Community 
competence”.81  
The recitals to the Directives suggest that Community action is no 
longer driven by market integration alone; it recognises that discrimination 
undermines the achievement of the objectives of the EC Treaty, including 
the attainment of economic and social cohesion and solidarity.82 Racial 
discrimination undermines the European Union’s goal of creating an ‘area 
of freedom, security and justice’; moreover, tackling such discrimination, 
beyond the narrow confines of employment, is needed “to ensure the 
development of democratic and tolerant societies which allow the 
participation of all persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin”.83 Ellis 
argues that the rationale for adopting Article 13 and its Directives “lies 
preponderantly in the concepts of fairness, autonomy, human dignity and 
respect for human rights, the creation of a better society in which the 
quality of people’s lives will be improved”.84 The European Court of Justice 
in Mangold v Helm held that the source of this principle of equal treatment 
found in the Framework Directive comes from “the various international 
instruments and in the constitutional traditions common to the Member 
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States”.85 Schiek suggests that “the principle of equal treatment of persons 
irrespective of a set of ascribed characteristics should be accepted as a 
general principle of law, which is to be applied to all areas of law, 
irrespective of whether the main actors in the field of law are public or non-
state actors”.86 The move from prohibiting discrimination towards 
achieving equality is further strengthened in the Treaty establishing a 
Constitution for the European Union87 and in Charter of Fundamental 
Rights. The result, it has been suggested, is a model in which the traditional 
anti-discrimination approach has been joined by a new attachment to 
substantive equality and a desire to manage diversity.88 Such a shift, from 
non-discrimination to equality, leaves the concept of equality unresolved.  
The two Directives cover both direct and indirect discrimination89 – 
direct discrimination is taken to occur when a person is treated less 
favourably than another has been or would be treated on the prohibited 
grounds. Indirect discrimination90 is taken to occur where an apparently 
neutral provision, criteria or practice would put a person having a 
particular relevant characteristic at a particular disadvantage compared 
with other persons, unless that provision, criteria or practice is objectively 
justified by a legitimate aim and the means of achieving that aim are 
appropriate and necessary. They also deem instructions to discriminate91 
and harassment to be forms of discrimination. The latter is defined as 
unwanted conduct related to the prohibited ground which takes place 
“with the purpose or effect of violating the dignity of a person and of 
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creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive 
environment”.92 
Both Directives provide an exemption that allows for discrimination 
on the basis of a prohibited characteristic where “by reasons of the nature 
of the particular occupational activities concerned or of the context in 
which they are carried out, such a characteristic constitutes a genuine and 
determining occupational requirement, provided that the objective is 
legitimate and the requirement is proportionate”.93 Furthermore, Article 
2(5) of the Framework Directive provides that it “shall be without prejudice 
to measures laid down by national law which, in a democratic society are 
necessary for public security, or the maintenance of public order and the 
prevention of criminal offences, for the protection of public health and for 
the protection of the rights and freedoms of others”. As will be discussed 
below, the importation of such a broad exemption, mirroring the language 
of the European Convention on Human Rights may restrict the potential to 
challenge actions sanctioned by the states which indirectly discriminate.94 
The Framework Directive also provides an exemption from the prohibition 
on discrimination on the grounds of religion and belief, for organisations 
with an ethos based on a religion or belief, where, “by reason of the nature 
of these activities or of the context in which they are carried out, a person’s 
religion or belief constitutes a genuine, legitimate and justified 
occupational requirement, having regard to the organisation’s ethos”. 
Furthermore, such organisations can require individuals working for them 
to act in good faith and with loyalty to the organisation’s ethos.95 
These Directives lie at the core of the protection that European law 
offers Muslims in addressing the discrimination they experience. While 
Article 13 is framed in terms of combating discrimination, several aspects 
of the Race and Framework Directive appear to entail more substantive 
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equality.96 Firstly, there is the reference to “equal treatment” in the title of 
the Directives. Furthermore, in contrast to the earlier Directive on Equal 
Treatment between men and women, in which provisions allowing positive 
action are framed as exceptions to the principle of equal treatment,97 the 
Race and Framework Directive link positive action more clearly to the goal 
of ”ensuring full equality in practice”.98 The inclusion of indirect 
discrimination among the forms of discrimination encompassed by the 
Directive provides the greatest potential for using the directives to go 
beyond formal equality.99 Two distinct conceptions of the function of 
indirect discrimination coexist. Under the first conception, indirect 
discrimination serves to unmask instances of intentional discrimination. 
Under the second conception, intention is no longer relevant, instead 
indirect discrimination aims to “permanently revise institutionalized habits 
and procedures”.100 Thus, indirect discrimination has been identified by 
Hervey as the “primary legal tool” for tackling structural inequality.101 
However, the potential for achieving structural change is circumscribed as 
a criterion, provision or practice that has a distinct impact on those within 
the protected group and remains open to being ‘objectively justified’ if the 
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measure is in pursuit of a legitimate aim and the means of achieving that 
aim are appropriate and necessary.  
The need for a vision of equality for Muslims 
The use of indirect discrimination to challenge the structures and 
institutional settings which discriminate against members of a particular 
group, is more likely where there is an understanding of why there is 
protection from discrimination on particular grounds and when there is a 
general consensus as to what equality for that group looks like, at least in 
those areas where equality law is being applied. Such understanding and 
consensus are necessary but not sufficient to cause a shift from using 
indirect discrimination to address only concealed intentional 
discrimination, to using it as a tool to permanently revise institutional 
habits and procedures. In tackling sex discrimination, a growing 
understanding of the role of stereotyping and the need to change structures 
that reproduce gender roles is important in developing a clearer vision of 
what gender equality in the workplace looks like.  
The potential for Muslims to utilise the indirect discrimination 
provisions to “revise institutionalised habits and procedures” is 
constrained by the absence of any Europe wide consensus over or vision of 
substantive equality for Muslims. Indirect discrimination provides a tool 
with which to challenge institutionalised habits and procedures and seek 
the accommodation of religious practices, such as religious dress, festivals 
and holidays, prayers and dietary requirements. However, without broad 
consensus over the vision of religious equality, and agreement over the 
extent to which religious equality requires such accommodations, using the 
Directives to challenge societal norms concerning the role of religion in 
public life will be difficult. This is because, as noted above, any provision, 
criteria or practice that indirectly discriminates against Muslims, is subject 
to being objectively justified. Here it is noted that the European Court of 
Justice has taken a ‘bifurcated approach’ to justifications in relation to 
gender discrimination.102 The Court is willing to question and challenge a 
justification when it is put forward by an individual employer, subjecting 
them to a ‘robust proportionality test’; however, it grants a broad discretion 
to justifications put forward by member states where the practice has been 
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agreed at the state level and is found in legislation or reflects official state 
policy.103 Agreement and consensus around what equality looks like makes 
it easier for the courts to challenge the justifications put forward by 
individuals or the state. Furthermore, Article 5(2) of the Framework 
Directive introduces an extra layer of protection for state-endorsed 
practices. This exemption echoes the language of the European Convention 
on Human Rights. In cases taken to the Strasbourg Court by Muslims 
claiming failures to accommodate manifestations of their religious belief, 
the Court has shown a readiness to defer, without significant interrogation, 
to the state’s claims that the restrictions on the manifestation of religious 
belief are justified within the term of Article 8(2) of the ECHR.104 
Positive action  
Alongside indirect discrimination, positive action is an important tool for 
eliminating structural forms of discrimination. The Race and Framework 
Directives provide that “with a view to ensuring full equality in practice, 
the principle of equal treatment shall not prevent any member state from 
maintaining or adopting specific measures to prevent or compensate for 
disadvantages linked to the prohibited grounds”.105 The first point to note 
is that under the Directives, positive action is discretionary rather than 
mandatory. The Directives do not prevent positive action measures being 
taken, nor do they require such measures to be taken. The scope of the 
action that is permissible by the Directives is likely to be interpreted in the 
light of the ECJ’s jurisprudence on positive action in respect of gender. 
Here, positive action is found to encompass a broad range of measures that 
aim to benefit women, ranging from mainstreaming through to targets and 
preferential treatment. The latter is permitted as long as it does not entail 
an automatic preference.106 Ambiguity around what constitutes an 
automatic preference is argued to have a ‘chilling effect’ on the willingness 
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to use forms of preferential treatment where there is a risk that such 
schemes would be determined to be automatic preferences.107 
Limitations in the material scope of the Directive  
The limited material scope of the Framework Directive places a further 
constraint on the potential for EU anti-discrimination law to address any 
discrimination that Muslims face on the grounds of religion. The 
Framework Directive only prohibits discrimination in employment and 
occupation. Thus, significant areas in which Muslims face discrimination 
remain beyond the reach of the Directive. These include health, housing, 
education and the action of state officials, including law enforcement 
agencies. Discrimination in some of these areas falls within the scope of the 
Race Directive. The wider reach of the Race Directive has already provided 
the impetus for broadening action on gender equality into the provision of 
goods and services, although not to education.108 As a first step to rectifying 
this imbalance, the scope of the Framework Directive needs to be extended 
to match the reach of the Race Directive. This would still leave areas such 
as law enforcement and access to citizenship, where there is evidence of 
discrimination, beyond the reach of European protection. Both the Race 
and Framework Directive provide that they do not cover differences of 
treatment based on nationality and are “without prejudice to provisions 
and conditions relating to the entry into and residence of third-country 
nationals and state-less persons on the territory of the Member States, and 
to any treatment which arises from the legal status of the third country 
nationals and state-less persons concerned”.109 Whether there is room to 
argue that access to nationality and citizenship – when it is a significant 
precondition to access to employment – can come within the scope of the 
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Directive, if such access is regulated in a discriminatory manner, remains to 
be tested.  
In areas where the Community lacks competence to introduce hard-
edged legal frameworks, Community Action may still be possible using 
softer co-operative governance mechanisms.  
A proactive model of equality  
The Framework Directive potential to provide the catalyst for the deeper 
structural changes needed for attaining substantive equality is further 
limited by its focus on addressing individual instances of discrimination 
through a negative prohibition of discrimination rather than the positive 
promotion of equality. Fredman identifies four central difficulties in the 
individualised discrimination model for achieving equality. First, it is 
reliant on the individual in bringing an action. It therefore places excessive 
strain on the individual in terms of resources and personal energy. 
Secondly, victim-initiated litigation means that the court’s intervention is 
random and ad hoc. The remedy is limited to the individual; it does not 
create an obligation to change the institutional structure that gives rise to 
the discrimination. Thirdly, the basis in individual fault means that there 
must be a proved perpetrator. But discrimination that arises from 
institutional arrangements is not the result of the fault of any one person. 
Finally, this approach is adversarial and so instead of viewing equality as a 
common goal, to be achieved co-operatively, it “becomes a site of conflict 
and resistance”.110 By contrast the proactive model places the initiative of 
addressing discrimination on employers and public authorities, institutions 
and organisations, rather than the individuals facing disadvantage. They 
are tasked with taking action because they have the power and capacity to 
do so, not because they are responsible for the discrimination. It ensures 
that change is systematic rather than random and ad hoc. Action for change 
does not require the finding of fault or the naming of a perpetrator. The 
right to equality is available to all not just those able to complain. Finally, 
this approach provides for the role of civil society in setting and enforcing 
norms.111 
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Protection from violence  
Outside the confines of the Article 13 Directives, there are some measures 
that the EU is attempting to take in response to religiously motivated 
violence and incitement to religious hatred. On 15 July 1996, the Council 
adopted a Joint Action concerning action to combat racism and xenophobia 
on the basis of article K.3 of the EU Treaty (now: Article 31EU).112 Its main 
objective was to ensure effective legal cooperation between member states 
in combating racism and xenophobia. The Joint Action stressed the need to 
prevent the perpetrators of such offences from benefiting from the fact that 
they are treated differently in the member states by moving from one 
country to another to avoid prosecution. In particular, it wanted to address 
the situation where, under the principle of double criminality, member 
states may refuse cooperation on the grounds that conduct, though illegal 
in the state requesting assistance, is not illegal in the requested state. The 
Joint Action requested member states to ensure that racist and xenophobic 
behaviour of the type listed, be punishable as criminal offences or, failing 
that, and pending the adoption of any necessary provisions, to derogate 
from the principle of double criminality for such behaviours. The 
Framework Decision on Racism and Xenophobia was developed to take 
forward the Joint Action programme. The Council Framework Decision on 
Combating Racism and Xenophobia provide that:  
Article 4 Offences concerning racism and xenophobia  
Member States shall ensure that the following intentional 
conduct committed by any means is punishable as a criminal 
offence:  
(a) public incitement to violence or hatred for a racist or 
xenophobic purpose or to any other racist or xenophobic 
behaviour which may cause substantial damage to individuals 
or groups concerned…  
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Article 5  
…that instigating, aiding, abetting or attempting to commit an 
offence referred to in Article 4 is punishable.113 
Despite intense negotiations, no agreement was reached by member 
states on the draft Framework Decision. In February 2005, the Council 
instructed the working group on substantive criminal law to resume 
negotiations on the draft Framework Decision. No text was agreed by the 
time of the Justice and Home Affairs Council Meeting in June 2005. In 2006, 
the Austrian Presidency hosted a conference to review progress with a 
view to reopening the discussion on the proposal for a Framework 
Decision.  
Conclusions  
The lives of many Muslims in Europe are marked by social and economic 
exclusion and marginalisation. The absence of systematic data collection on 
Muslims prevents us from drawing a comprehensive picture of the 
disadvantages experienced by Muslims; it should not however preclude us 
from seeing the mounting evidence of their situation. The reasons for these 
disadvantages are complex and multi-faceted. While it is not possible to 
identify the precise contribution of discrimination to this situation, it is 
clear that discrimination plays some role.  
Article 13 of the EC Treaty provides the basis for European Union 
action in addressing discrimination. Weaknesses remain in the legal 
framework that has developed out of this article. Firstly, the Framework 
Directive, which covers discrimination on the grounds of religion or belief, 
does not cover key areas where Muslims continue to experience 
discrimination, including housing, education, access to goods and services, 
the actions of public officials particularly, police and immigration officials. 
Some of these areas – education, housing, the provision of goods and 
services – will be covered if the scope of the Framework Directive were 
extended to match that of the Race Directive. Other areas would still 
remain outside the scope of the Community action.  
In those areas covered by the scope of the Directives, the legal tools 
for challenging embedded structural discrimination are in place, but their 
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effective utilisation requires a clear vision and consensus around what 
religious equality for Muslims looks and feels like. The task of developing 
such a vision can neither rest on Muslims alone, nor be developed without 
their contribution. Here, organisations such as the European Union Agency 
for Fundamental Rights (FRA) and the equal treatment bodies of the 
member states have an important role in fostering debate and seeking to 
develop this vision.  
Finally, it is important to place discrimination law in the wider policy 
context. Legal protection from discrimination is only one tool for 
addressing Islamophobia and anti-Muslim prejudice. Effectively tackling 
discrimination requires using a broader range of policy tools. Where, for 
example, discrimination is the result of the reproduction and reinforcement 
of stereotypes and the perpetuation of prejudices about Muslims, then the 
solutions lie in empowering Muslims to challenge and disrupt these 
discourses. There is a role here for arts, media and cultural policies that 
encourage and support Muslim participation in all areas of cultural 
reproduction from film, theatre and television to art and journalism. 
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7.  ACCESS TO MEDIA FOR EUROPEAN 
MUSLIMS 
ISABELLE RIGONI 
Introduction 
Despite its rank as the second-largest religion in several European 
countries, Islam is facing severe resistance at both state and societal level. 
Certain conservative political and media discourses associate Islam with 
violence and fanaticism. For most Muslims, however, their religion is 
associated with notions of justice and democracy. The conflict between 
these two conceptualisations of Islam has reinforced defensive attitudes on 
both sides. While Muslim stereotypes have increased since 9/11, so have 
the voices in favour of civil liberties for Muslims in Europe. As is argued 
here, ethnic media (i.e. Muslim media) are playing a major role on both 
sides of the debate. 
These questions are of common concern to many EU member states 
and associated states and European institutions. They are based on three 
assumptions. Firstly, new information and communication technology 
(ICT) has reshaped the media scene, which is now accessible to increasing 
numbers of people, including exchanges between European countries and 
third countries. Secondly, the transnational mobilisations are increasingly 
influenced by ICT, which makes it possible for individuals to travel – both 
virtually and in reality – between several countries. Thirdly, the 
representation of the minority or marginalised groups, particularly in the 
case of Muslims, has become one of the key questions of European socio-
political debate, and at the same time can be seen as a test for European 
democracy.  
I would like to propose a historical reading of the representation of 
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media discourse evolved as it did and how and when Muslims are 
portrayed in the media. Several questions can be raised: How do media 
technologies influence conditions within both the Muslim community and 
the mainstream? What are the consequences of national and EU policies for 
Muslim citizens and their media regarding their social and political 
inclusion? How do European Muslims aggregate interests in a more 
effective and efficient way via their own media? Do Muslim media 
advocate social inclusion or pursue narrow interests?  
7.1  Problem description 
Mainstream media discourse on Islam and Muslims 
Much ink has flowed in the Western media on the subject of Islam in the 
last few years. The audio-visual media were not to be outdone and often 
broadcast ‘debates’ related to this topic. Islam is frequently presented as a 
threat, a danger or a form of subversion.1 At the very least, it is an 
‘otherness’ and very rarely a legitimate private belief or a freedom of 
thought guaranteed by a legally constituted state. This tendency was 
particularly notable around the debate on the Islamic headscarf in French 
schools,2 a t  t h e  t i m e  o f  u r b a n  v i o l e n c e  i n  F r a n c e  i n  O c t o b e r - N o v e m b e r  
2005,3 and over the issue of the Danish caricatures, and has become 
manifest all over Europe, especially in France and the UK.  
In France, the subject of religion4 and, more particularly, that of 
Islam,5 became more apparent at the end of the 1990s in media discourse on 
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immigration. However, this was a very gradual phenomenon. In his book 
L’Islam imaginaire, Thomas Deltombe analyses how the dominant media 
message and political discourse have gradually constructed a frame of 
reference for French people originating from former colonies: “During the 
1980s, with the abandonment of Marxist frames of reference and the 
emergence of a ‘second generation of immigrants’ into the public arena, we 
witness a first evolution: the term ‘Islamic’ is increasingly employed by the 
media to talk about ‘immigrants’ who are no longer, as was the case a 
decade ago, described first as ‘foreign workers’”(our translation). 6 Thus, at 
a time when ‘integration’ is placed at the centre of the debates, the recourse 
to an ‘Islamic’ reference makes it possible to perpetuate the symbolic 
remoteness of a segment of the population that is in fact no longer ‘foreign’. 
If media discourse were seeking to be alarmist, the mainstream media 
did not need a dramatic topical event to put Islam on the scene.7 Research 
shows that generally the French media depict Islam as a threat to the laws 
of the Republic, secularism, freedom of expression, women’s rights and, 
because of the terrorism with which it is often associated, to the safety of 
the country or ‘the West’ as a whole. Cédric Housez stresses that Islam “is 
often associated with Islamism, which for its part, following the imported 
rhetoric of American neo-conservatives, and is presented as a new 
totalitarianism, comparable to Nazism or Stalinism. This analogy rests on 
(improbable) amalgamations and on a unified vision of Muslim 
fundamentalism, even of the Muslim world, which denotes a total 
misunderstanding of Islam” (our translation).8 The media essay writer and 
chronicler at Le Point, Bernard Henri Lévy, uses the term ‘fascislamist’ and 
the leader-writer of Le Figaro, Yvan Rioufol, speaks for his part about 
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‘nazislamist’. The two leader-writers are not the only ones in France to use 
these word-plays. The satirical weekly magazine Charlie Hebdo, now at the 
forefront of French media in the denunciation of the ‘Islamist danger’9 and 
which distinguished itself at the time of the scandal of the Danish 
caricatures, by publishing a proclamation entitled “Together against the 
new totalitarianism” on 1 March 2006, which also proclaims the 
amalgamation of Islamism and Nazism.  
In Britain, the contribution of Elizabeth Poole10 provides a systematic 
and thoroughly researched analysis of the ways in which Muslims are 
represented in the British national press. Poole shows that coverage is not 
homogenous, but dissenting voices appear mainly in the margins of the 
papers “while the bulk of coverage shared the news values, constructions 
and categorizations of its conservative counterparts”.11 Indeed, since the 
Rushdie affair, the Gulf and Iraqi wars and 9/11, British journalists have 
published many articles against Islam. Although some dailies such as The 
Guardian sometimes call on Muslim journalists’ cooperation, many of them 
focus on the debate over whether Islam is a progressive/rational or a 
barbaric/irrational religion. Media coverage of global terrorism now sits 
uneasily alongside the views of ordinary British Muslims. 
Despite national differences, the mainstream media are acting quite 
similarly in Western Europe, siding from time to time against Islam and 
Muslims. Due to the processes involved in its production, news tends to be 
a limited, conservative and consensual product. Journalistic practices of 
gathering and selecting news are subject to the organisational constraints 
shaped by a capitalist system – in other words, their aim is to attract large 
audiences with sensational issues. Gradually in the Western world, one 
sees the Manichean image of a bipolar Islam opposing ‘the integrated’ or 
‘modern’ Muslims. Little by little, the figure of the terrorist joins that of 
Islamist, legitimising the hardening of immigration policies. Islam is thus 
one of the prisms through which the populations coming from the old 
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10 Elizabeth Poole (2002), Reporting Islam. Media Representations of British Muslims, 
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colonies are presented, and through which it is possible to stigmatise them 
as a group.12 
The rise of a concept: Islamophobia 
In view of the foregoing and despite the diversity of membership within 
Islam, many public discourses promulgated by the Muslim communities 
themselves would like to show that Muslims form a unique group, are 
victims of discrimination and inclined to assert certain rights as a minority. 
The case of the UK is exceptional in Europe for this reason. Attempts by 
Muslims to preserve their faith and practices have sometimes been 
interpreted as separatism; a threat to ‘traditional British’ values, and have 
led to a questioning of the loyalty of ‘Muslims within’ Britain’s boundaries. 
This series of questions/responses has in turn considerably sharpened the 
sense of Muslim identity (or identities), and resulted in the politicisation of 
Muslims in Britain, who have made numerous claims, including the one to 
be recognised as a religious minority – like the Jews or Sikhs – rather than 
as an ethnic minority. Although they enjoy a significant number of rights as 
an ethnic group, a report by the Runnymede Trust,13 which gathered data 
on examples of ‘Islamophobia’ in the UK, argued that several events 
beginning in the early 1980s, such as the Rushdie affair, the Honeyford 
affair and issues such as halal meat in schools and the Gulf War, projected 
debates about Islam into the national public sphere. 
The Runnymede Trust report considered the use of the term 
Islamophobia, as it has come to be used in English-speaking countries. It 
has since been imported into other European countries and continues to be 
the subject of intense political and scientific debate. For about ten years, but 
mainly after 9/11, European Muslims have complained of unjust treatment 
as a consequence of educational policies and practices which remain 
insufficiently sensitive to their culture. This is the case in France, which has 
more Muslim citizens than any other European country: the arrival of the 
first Muslim immigrants dates back to the 1920s when 90,000 Muslims 
came to France. Their numbers have grown rapidly since the 1950s, from 1 
million after the War of Independence in Algeria to between 4.5 and 5 
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million today; that is, 8% of the population. That France is a secular country 
and a republic poses several complications for Muslim populations. Pupils 
wearing the hijab have been extensively targeted and have become a 
‘national problem’.14 One finds similar examples in the world of work 
(discrimination in recruitment, in the workplace, in access to training), to 
which the media give more and more attention. The two French leitmotivs 
of secularism and integration have led to ambiguous relations with French 
Muslims in particular, and Islam in general. However, it often remains 
difficult to provide evidence of the discrimination to which Muslims are 
subject. Is Islamophobia really visible in social practices, or is there more 
racism towards the migrants originating in former colonies?  
Several studies show that the events of 9/11 caused an increasingly 
close association between Islam, terrorism and fundamentalism. In several 
countries of the EU, one can observe a rise in harassment and violence 
directed against Muslims and those perceived as Muslims, since 9/11. In 
France, although the number of racist acts has fallen overall, the majority of 
those that took place were related to 9/11. In Western Europe, racist 
violence often has a clearly religious dimension: places of worship 
(mosques and synagogues) are often the targets of attack, of partial or total 
destruction. The journalistic treatment of the policies regarding the fight 
against discrimination does not achieve a balance with the often-negative 
portrayal of Islam through migratory flows (with references to clandestine, 
sans-papiers, refugees), and the suburbs (as zones of urban violence). It is 
above all the Muslim media that, as we will see, are mobilised against this. 
We return to a more detailed consideration of Islamophobia in a later 
chapter. 
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7.2   Policy Alternatives for Europe 
Actions in favour of a better representation of visible minorities 
The Council of Europe has organised three conferences on the theme of 
‘Media and Migration’: in Tampere in 1983, in Cologne in 1986 and in The 
Hague in 1988. It has tried to focus attention on the difficulty for television 
media of taking into account the plurality of society. These meetings have 
stimulated reflexion at European level and led to several recommendations 
relating to migrants and the media being adopted by Parliament or the 
Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe.15 Other recommendations 
aim, in parallel, at the development of ‘codes of good conduct’ to be 
adopted by several European television channels in Scandinavia and in the 
Anglo-Saxon countries.  
The positive commitments at supranational level have made it 
possible to inspire a new dynamic at national level. However, in spite of the 
increase in debates and exchanges at the European level, at the initiative of 
governments, intergovernmental authorities or nongovernmental 
organisations, some European states, for example France, often remain 
absent from these debates.  
Admittedly, policies aiming to take into account the populations of 
immigrant origin within the media have existed in France for about 30 
years.16 Initially, they were mainly the doing of the Fonds d’Action Sociale 
(FAS). More recently, other public organisations, in particular the Conseil 
Supérieur de l’Audiovisuel (CSA) or the Haut Conseil à l’Intégration (HCI), also 
intervened in this field, often after pressure from civil society organisations. 
Two major periods characterise the development of the audio-visual policy 
of the FAS. In its first initiatives, the FAS gave support to programmes 
known as special-interest (Mosaic,  Rencontres,  Premier service), targeting 
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immigrants and their families, while also hoping to sensitise mainstream 
opinion. The participation of the FAS in the financing of the programme 
Saga-Cités, between 1991 and 2002, opened a new strategic era in its 
televisual policy. As successor to the FAS, the FASILD17 has since 
prioritised programmes aimed at a mainstream audience (telefilms, 
documentaries, etc.) to reinforce the awareness-raising role they can play in 
relations between the various components of society.  
However, the extension of the debate on ‘visible’ minorities could not 
have been achieved without the involvement of new actors, initially from 
civil society, taken up further by other public institutions. Among the first 
actions undertaken by civil society was a press conference, organised in 
September 1999 by the Collectif Egalité, founded by the female writer 
Calixthe Beyala, and bringing together mainly artists and intellectuals of 
African and West-Indian origin. The message was to denounce the ‘under-
representation’ of blacks on television18 and request the application of 
quotas. Parallel to the Collectif Egalité, and taking it up thereafter, are other 
claims for a better representation of minorities within the media. The Club 
Averroès also comes into play, with another approach, a key role in the 
representation of minorities in the media. Created in 1997 and chaired by 
Amirouche Laïdi, it gathers media professionals from all backgrounds but 
also elected officials and business leaders. The Club meets the highest 
leaders of TV channels, launches specific proposals for a different 
representation in front of and behind the screen. Other movements19 also 
make claims for the social and media recognition of minorities in society.  
                                                           
17 The FAS became the Fonds d'action et de soutien pour l'intégration et la lutte contre 
les discriminations (FASILD), and in 2006 the Agence nationale pour la cohésion sociale 
et l'égalité des chances (ANCSEC). 
18 For Marie-France Malonga, there is now an ‘overrepresentation’ of Blacks on 
French TV channels: Marie-France Malonga, «La représentation des minorités dans 
les séries télévisées françaises: entre construction et maintien des frontières 
ethniques», in Isabelle Rigoni (éd.), Penser l'altérité dans les médias, La 
Courneuve, Aux Lieux d’Être, to be print in 2007. 
19 The Collectif des Antillais, Guyanais, Réunionnais created in 2003 by Patrick Karam; 
the Cercle d’Action pour la Promotion et la Diversité en France (CAPDIV) created the 
same year by Patrick Lozès to make the voice of Black people heard; the Club du 
XXIe siècle, created in 2004 by important persons of immigrant origin, such as 
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The Conseil supérieur de l’audiovisuel (CSA) evoked, for the first time 
publicly, the question of the representation of minorities on television in 
February 1999, largely thanks to the hearing of the Collectif Egalité in 
October 1999. It is on this date that the president of the CSA publicly 
requested a modification of programming on the public television 
channels, France 2 and France 3, to encourage them to take account of the 
multi-ethnic and multicultural reality of French society. In 2000, it made 
public the results of the study carried out within its services on the 
representation of visible minorities.20 The same year, the Rapport d'activités 
du CSA introduced, for the first time, a heading entitled “Representation of 
minorities”. In 2004, the CSA wrote to the TV channels to require them to 
include their initiatives concerning these new obligations, in their annual 
report in order to allow the evaluation of their progress compared to 
experiences abroad. From January 2006, the CSA considered the conditions 
of adaptation of these new measures to radio, to community or confessional 
TV channels, to local and overseas television channels, as well as to the 
current and future channels of digital television. The CSA enjoys alliances 
with other public organisations, like the Haut Conseil à l’Intégration, so that 
declarations and other decrees are translated into concrete and visible acts. 
Created in 1989, the Haut Conseil à l’Intégration is an authority that 
formulates policy and proposals and which, at the request of the Prime 
Minister or interdepartmental committee, gives its opinion on all matters 
relating to the integration of foreign residents. It is on the initiative of one 
of its members, Zaïr Kedadouche, that the Haut Conseil à l’Intégration 
became interested in the representativeness of immigrants in the media as a 
factor for integration in France.21 In addition, the HCI has invited the 
government to re-examine legal texts concerning the obligations of public 
television, since these are considered to be less explicit than those planned 
for the private channels.  
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The urban violence of November 2005 sparked an increased interest 
in these media aspects at the highest political level, with little impact 
however on the media in practice.  
Compared to France, the British model is quite different. Its colonial 
past has shaped policies of migration and integration.22 Thus, the official 
ideologies of ‘inclusion’ and integration have been reflected in a national 
legislation which has not only allowed, but protected religious and 
linguistic diversity. In this way, the British model of tolerance and 
‘inclusion’ is very different from the French Jacobin model founded on 
secularity or from the German model centred on the right to citizenship by 
‘blood’.23 The concerns of the British state around the questions of race and 
ethnicity are reflected in the work of various organisations, public or not 
(Commission for Racial Equality, the ex-Independent Television 
Commission, Press Complaints Commission, National Union of Journalists) 
having, in particular, the aim of promoting actions, for example codes of 
good practice, aiming at a better representativeness of the ethnic minorities 
within the media. Whatever their statute, these organisations come up 
against major obstacles to the development of their actions, and thus to 
their impact. Indeed, whereas the codes of good practice or the opinions 
that they formulate influence media practices, none of these tools is 
constraining enough. However, in 2003, the creation of the OFCOM – new 
independent organisation to regulate competition in communication 
sectors and of audio-visual in the UK – represented an evolution of political 
strategy of the British government in the communications and audio-visual 
sector. OFCOM has a right to oversee the way in which the media account 
for the diversity of British society’s various ethnic communities. Parallel to 
this change, the British government supported similar initiatives launched 
by the media industry itself, for example the Cultural Diversity Network 
(CDN). Created in 2000 on the initiative of the principal operators of audio-
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visual media, the CDN aims first to evaluate, and then self-control, the 
policies and practices of the various audio-visual operators as regards 
representation of the minorities on the screen. It is the organisation best 
symbolising the current strategy of the British government. Besides 
institutional organisations, several independent ones have arisen such as 
Migrant Media, a training centre and a production company created in 1989 
by descendants of immigrants. 
At the European level an increasing number of non-governmental 
organisations were created during the 1990s, which have shown a great 
capacity for initiative and invention concerning the representation of 
minorities in the media sector. The European network of journalists 
OnLine/More Colour in the Media, has set up specialised training centres and 
various multicultural organisations in West European countries, with the 
aim of improving the representativeness of cultural minorities in media 
programmes. Among other national initiatives one may note the case of the 
Netherlands: Mira Media, an independent organisation created in 1986 by 
the largest organisation of migrants; Migrants and the Media, a working 
group that intends to ensure a greater diversity of media coverage and 
which fights for greater recruitment of foreign journalists; Multiculturele 
Televisie Nederland (MTLN), which produces multicultural programmes, etc. 
In France, the Panos Paris Institute is developing the programme 
Mediam’Rad on ‘diasporas and ethnic minorities’ media, aiming at a 
renewed awareness of the European civil societies. Its main objectives are 
to increase a pluralism of opinion and to reinforce the diversity of 
standpoints in the media  in promoting the diasporas’ media and the 
minorities’ media as an alternative source of information and by 
encouraging lasting partnerships with the mainstream media. 
The examples of good practice are numerous. Many European states 
have adopted various measures in favour of a better representation and 
representativeness of immigrants in the media, with a major role being 
played by non-governmental organisations. But all this still mainly 
concerns immigration, or, with a semantic slip, the ‘visible minorities’ i.e. 
naming the various ethnic components of society, but without naming 
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European Muslim media 
Alongside the mainstream media, whose positions are often ambiguous to 
say the least, some Muslim media have been created. Muslim media refers 
to written media – both online and offline – as well as radio and, when 
applicable, television programmes targeted at the ‘Muslim community’. 
They are present in Britain more than in any other country in Europe. 
British Muslim newspapers such as The Muslim News,  Q-News,  Crescent 
International, Impact International and Trends; media committees such as The 
Muslim Council of Britain and the Forum Against Islamophobia and Racism 
(FAIR); or radio stations such as Radio Umma and Radio Ramadan have taken 
advantage of emerging communication and information opportunities to 
produce serious alternative views to the mainstream. While the older 
generations of immigrants have given Muslim media the benefit of their 
own experiences, the younger Muslim generation, including women, has 
brought new blood and new ideas. British Muslim newspapers were 
established between 1972 and 1992. They contain between 12 and 16 pages 
each of news and analysis on Muslim issues. They are all written in English 
although they are also distributed in countries like Pakistan, Nigeria, South 
Africa, Sri Lanka and Malaysia and sometimes in Canada and the US. In 
the UK, most of them are distributed free of charge in bookshops and 
associations. Within the British Muslim media, we can distinguish the 
community newspapers from the international news magazines. In 
addition to ideological divisions, the selection of the news differs broadly: 
while Crescent International and Impact International are clearly international 
news magazines, The Muslim News combines both national and 
international news, and Q-News attaches the utmost importance to British 
Muslim issues. 
The situation is very different in France where Muslim media as such 
have developed only very recently. Until the late 1990s, ethnic and 
religious media were much more oriented towards a community of 
immigrants (i.e. Algerians, Moroccans, Turkish, etc.) than towards a 
community of believers.24 Some Muslim magazines – Hawwa and La Medina 
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are the best known; Réflexions (Saphir-Médiations group), Columbus, 
Actualis (the magazine of the Union of Islamic Organisations in France) – 
were created between 1998 and 2003 but have all disappeared whereas La 
Medina became a website (sezame.info). Some internet magazines such as 
oumma.com, Saphirnews.com or Aslim Taslam are still striving to make their 
voices heard. There are no exclusively Muslim radio stations although 
some radio stations like Beur FM or Radio Méditerranée attract large Muslim 
audiences. 
In Germany,25 the monthly magazine Die Islamische Zeitung plays a 
prominent role in the Muslim media scene. Die Islamische Zeitung was 
created in 1994 mainly by German converts to Islam, such as Abu Bakr 
Rieger (director) and Sulaiman Wilms (chief editor). As in several other 
Western European countries, the role of converts is very important for the 
development of Muslim media.26 Die Islamische Zeitung defends a position 
often considered as conservative and does not consider Islam as a culture 
but as a religion for everyone. Its influence on politics appears to be less 
important than The Muslim News in Britain for instance, but it remains one 
of the leading Muslim media in Germany. Besides associative ones, other 
Muslim media are Al-Raid (Islamischer Informationsdienst e. V.), Dunia 
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(Teblig), Enfal (Internet Magazine, Turkish language), Huda (Netzwerk für 
muslimische Frauen e. V.). 
The young Muslim generation is becoming increasingly involved in 
the Muslim media in several European countries. They insist on the need to 
go beyond generational conflicts and national conflicts between Muslims of 
different backgrounds. They also aim to go beyond matters of post-colonial 
ideologies, and emphasise dialogue with national and European 
institutions.  
They also seem open to women’s participation. In Britain, Muslim 
women now have access to prominent roles as magazine editors and 
associations or as conference organisers.27 Sarah Joseph was the first 
woman to become editor-in-chief of a Muslim magazine in Britain. She 
converted to Islam at the age of sixteen and studied religion at university 
on a scholarship provided by the King Faysal/Prince of Wales Chevening 
Foundation. After her experience at the helm of Trends in the second half of 
the 1990s, she reoriented her career towards consulting in Islamic affairs 
and the teaching of training courses. However, she is still a presence in the 
media, with appearances on televised programmes such as Panorama and 
Dimbleby. Other pioneers include Sara Kahn, the president of The Young 
Muslim Sisters, and Rehana Sadiq, who played a key role in the creation of 
the female branch of The Young Muslims UK at the end the 1980s, and then 
became an active member of The Islamic Society of Britain, a lobbying 
group associated with Muslim media organisations, which broadcasts on 
the internet. Since then, other young women have risen to production and 
management positions. Shagufta Yaqub became the editor in chief of the 
news and analysis monthly magazine Q-News in 2000 at the age of 24. She 
was replaced in 2004 by Fareena Alam, another recent university graduate. 
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These young women often come from families who emigrated in the 1960s 
and 1970s. Most of them say they have ‘rediscovered’ faith during their 
adolescence or in the transition to adulthood. Their religious commitment 
is intellectualised and their Islamic practice is reinterpreted. In a Western 
context and in a country where Islam is not the religion of the majority, the 
decision to wear the veil, rather than just a headscarf, is an especially 
strong statement. Some of these young women explain their wearing of the 
veil in terms of a personal quest for spirituality, others as proof of their 
political engagement in a world where they consider Islam threatened, and 
for some, both reasons are equally relevant.  
The role of young women in the Muslim media in other European countries 
is also worth noting, despite a more recent and limited development. In 
France, the print magazine Hawwa specifically targets young Muslim 
women. Its staff, mostly female, is directed by Dora Mabrouk, a young 
woman of Maghrebi origin. Launching this media, she intended to create a 
platform for ‘women’s struggle’. Hawwa addresses women who wish to 
assert themselves as women, as French citizens and as Muslims. Both 
‘puritan and rebellious’,28 the young Muslim women discover and promote 
innovative practices in everyday life.  
In Germany, a group of Muslim women, the Netzwerk für muslimische 
Frauen e.V., started Huda magazine, available online at huda.de. In each 
case, a personal connection to Islam has influenced their professional 
orientation. While some women mention the difficulties they have faced 
finding a place in the mainstream media, their strong commitment to and 
participation in the Muslim media is the result of a personal choice closely 
tied to their religious activism. This choice does not prevent them from 
occasionally contributing to the mainstream media, particularly since 9/11. 
These contributions are considered complementary to their involvement in 
the Muslim media, and at the same time, serve both pedagogical (i.e., 
presenting information about Islam) and advertising purposes (i.e., by 
providing exposure to Muslim media). 
The Muslim media have changed the perception of Muslims. They 
have drawn attention to the involvement of British and French Muslims in 
the home affairs of these two countries. Most of the Muslim media do 
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indeed show a deep concern for notions and practices relating to 
citizenship and inclusion in multicultural and multi-religious societies. For 
young Muslims, the challenge is to show that they can be Muslims and 
Republicans in France (cf. issues of La Medina on ‘Islam and the Fifth 
Republic’ and ‘Muslim France’), or Muslims and British in the UK. For 
young Muslim women in particular, the challenge is to show that they can 
‘fit their citizenship with their femininity’, as the journalist Saïda Kada 
wrote in the French Muslim magazine Hawwa. 
Ethnic media using NTIC are indeed challenging the boundaries. In 
Britain in particular, the Muslim media have become skilled at applying 
significant pressure on the local and national authorities. Civil society, 
through its actions and claims, notifies its respect for the state.29 We have 
learnt from our case-studies that the Muslim media and most of the 
Muslim solidarity mobilisations are working for full inclusion in the 
European nation-states. Acting from within, they fully recognise state 
legitimacy.  
Conclusions 
There is a need to integrate the problems of the media with those of 
citizenship, representation and discrimination. It is understood that the 
representation of people from minority groups in the media influences 
public opinion, its stereotypes and thus its acceptance of the ‘otherness’ of 
society. Conversely, perceptions in public opinion about minority or 
marginalised groups will influence the representations exchanged in the 
media about these groups, especially as the professionals of the media 
(producing, writers, editors, journalists, scenario writers, advertising 
executives...) are full members of the societies in which they develop their 
activity.30 
However the positioning of public opinion, in a democracy, is a 
determining element in the definition and implementation of public 
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policies. In the field of integration and the fight against discrimination with 
regard to the people from minority or marginalised groups, public opinion 
can be a determining factor in the policies implemented. Thus, to modify 
the perception of opinion relating to minorities can be a positive element 
contributing to an increase in effectiveness of public policies. The ethnic 
media, and among them the Muslim media, can for their part influence the 
individual and collective forms of integration within ‘their’ community to 
work in favour of anti-discriminatory practices.  
Media have a double responsibility in this direction, on the one hand, 
they influence the concerns of public opinion by determining the agenda 
and, on the other hand, they contribute towards creating a perception of 
reality by this same public opinion. Any policy, any action in the field of 
integration and the fight against discrimination must therefore include the 
media. In other words, the media – and in particular ethnic media – are one 
of the key groups of actors influencing the integration of minority or 
marginalised people and groups, and thus of their acceptance as belonging 
to society. 
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8.  THE HEADSCARF QUESTION:  
WHAT IS REALLY THE ISSUE? 
VALÉRIE AMIRAUX  
Introduction 
Dangerous, scary, intriguing, threatening, intimidating, oppressive, 
irritating, aggressive, traditional, conservative, reactionary … These are a 
few of the adjectives one hears in discussions of what is confusingly called 
in European contexts not only the headscarf, but also the veil,1 hijab, nikab, 
tchador, jilbab, burqa or khimar.2 All these terms designate a scarf that 
                                                           
1 In French both terms – voile (veil) or foulard (headscarf) - are used to refer to the 
Islamic headscarf, bringing more confusion than clarity to the discussion. In this 
text, I will stick to the use of ‘headscarf’, which I consider as purely descriptive, 
while ‘veil’ brings in a lot of Catholic symbolism that is not relevant to our 
analysis. 
2All these words refer to a piece of clothing Muslim women put on when leaving 
their houses to go outside, but they belong to varying regional traditions. The hijab 
usually refers to a scarf covering the hair, neck and shoulders, and sometimes also 
the breasts (but in the Koran it refers to piece of cloth that serves more widely to 
hide, cover or screen an object or a person, therefore not only in the limited sense 
of headscarf). The nikab is a face veil that does not cover the eyes. The tchador, 
djilbab or burqa, cover the body and not only the head. The burqa is a single-piece 
garment, coloured, cloaking the entire body. The tchador (Persian) is a full length 
scarf, usually a semi-circle piece of cloth, thrown over the head and held by the 
hand. It goes with the hijab (under the tchador). Similarly, the jilbab (Arabic), which 
is also referred to in the Koran, designates a long garment, usually a coat, covering 
the entire body but not head, hands or feet. The use and wear of all these garments 
vary from one place to the other, from one generation to the other But they also 
refer to different regions, and do not have the same religious significance  THE HEADSCARF QUESTION| 125 
 
Muslim women wear when outside the home to cover their hair, shoulders 
and breasts and, in some cases, their entire body including face and hands. 
The headscarf has become a sensitive issue, giving rise to legal disputes 
and political controversies in several EU member states, notably France, 
Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands and the UK.3 Headscarves, and by 
definition the Muslim women wearing them, nowadays stand for 
“everything that is thought to be wrong with Islam”.4 In addition to being 
obliged to be bare-headed on ID documents as in France, women wearing 
the headscarf have also been excluded in courts, universities, work places, 
hospitals and city halls. While the terrain of exclusion is widening, the 
groups of people affected are also widening to include young girls 
(adolescents) as well as adults.  
In most EU member states, the wearing of the Muslim headscarf is 
becoming a very awkward issue politically.5 The religious dress of Muslim 
women has generated both moral panic6 and hysteria.7 In many cases 
overreaction has led to public obsession, with local incidents occupying 
national debate and attracting extensive press coverage. The debate 
surrounding the headscarf tends to touch upon numerous broader issues: 
the challenge to multiculturalism, the validity of secularism as a way of 
organising the pacific co-existence of different religions in European 
contexts, the securitisation of cultural markers and increasing 
Islamophobia, the loyalty of Muslim European citizens (converted or not) 
because of their alleged essential differences and ‘otherness’. Last but not 
least, the headscarf controversies bring back to the surface very old 
                                                           
3 With schools having been the primary arena for the explosion of clashes since the 
mid-1980s. 
4 J. Scott, (2005), “Symptomatic Politics. The Banning of Islamic Headscarves in 
French Public Schools”, French Politics, Culture & Society, Vol. 23, 3, pp. 106-127. 
5 N. M. Thomas, (2005), “On Headscarves and Heterogeneity: reflections on the 
French foulard Affair”, Dialectical Anthropology, 29, pp. 373-386. 
6 W. Schiffauer, (2006), “Enemies within the gates. The debate about the citizenship 
of Muslims in Germany”, in T. Modood, A. Triandafyllidou and R. Zapata-Barrero 
(eds), Multiculturalism, Muslims and Citizenship, London: Routledge, pp. 94-116. 
7 E. Terray, (2004), “L’hystérie politique”, in C. Nordmann (dir.), Le foulard 
islamique en questions, Paris, ed. Amsterdam. 126 | AMIRAUX 
 
conflicts resulting from the close relationship between states and the 
church in the EU.  
Twenty years after the first controversies appeared on the European 
stage, much has been written on the headscarf by scholars, journalists, 
politicians, opinion-makers, religious leaders and others. The most striking 
aspect of the recent upsurge in debate surrounding the wearing of the 
Islamic headscarf in European contexts is probably the general feeling that 
everybody has something to say about it and feels concerned by it. Talking 
about the headscarf, having something to say about it and even taking a 
position (for or against) have become an obligation for every EU citizen. An 
important advantage in writing this kind of paper now rather than ten 
years ago is that the amount of knowledge has accumulated over the last 
years, for instance on the motivation of women in wearing a headscarf and 
the many dimensions of its significance.8 Public awareness of the 
complexity of the matter is also much greater than it was twenty years ago.9 
The dominant trend emerging in EU member states, from a political 
and legal point of view, is to ban the wearing of the headscarf in public 
institutions. Beyond the ethnographic data that help to map the differences 
from one context to the other and that have largely been commented upon, 
this paper focuses on the subtexts of the European headscarf controversy. 
How did this very pragmatic issue come, in varying degrees of intensity, to 
create such passionate national confrontations? Why is it that contrasted 
regimes of citizenship and traditionally opposed models of integration 
have given rise to similar public discussions on the Islamic headscarf in the 
European Union? What do headscarves stand for? Who do they speak for? 
The following text will try to answer this set of questions by looking at the 
hidden narratives behind the headscarf controversy, focusing on three 
elements of the debates: religion, gender and national identity. 
                                                           
8 Not an exhaustive list but recent publications related to some of the contexts 
mentioned in this paper are Bowen (2006), Amir-Moazami (2007) and Mac 
Goldrick (2006). 
9 Particularly well-known is the empowering dimension of the wearing of the 
headscarf in specific contexts; see Göle (1996),  El Guindi (1999) and Mahmood 
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8.1  The diversity of European headscarf controversies 
Headscarf controversies can nowadays be found in many EU contexts. 
Most EU member states have faced a ‘headscarf episode’ with varying 
degrees of impact and types of decision. Most recently, burqas, rather than 
headscarves, have been at the centre of debate in the Netherlands10 and in 
Belgium.11 In France, the headscarf has periodically emerged as an issue 
since 1989, making the French situation a unique case for its precocity, 
longevity and intensity.12 In 2004, the French parliament easily (in the sense 
that political consensus was reached) passed a law banning the wearing of 
ostentatious religious symbols from public schools. Part of the surrounding 
public debate dealt with the way French society defines itself, the 
confrontation between customary Islamic practices and Republican values 
being a challenge for French social cohesion and the representation of itself 
and its principles.13 The European discussions on the right to wear an 
                                                           
10 “In the course of the last years the term burka has been added to the Dutch 
vocabulary, as happened previously with terms such as fatwa and jihad”. (Moors, 
2007: 5). 
11 In Belgium, following the initiative of some members of the Flemish Christian 
Democrats, some local police regulations now include articles with standard 
prohibition for burqas. It is left to the municipalities to decide whether or not this 
should be implemented. Local bans on the public wearing of the burqa exist in 
parts of Flemish cities such as Maaseik, with fines being imposed on women 
continuing to wear it. This echoes the local anti-burqa campaigning organised by 
the Northern League (Lega Nord) in Italy. 
12 For a perspective on the changing dimensions of the headscarf, see Gaspard & 
Khosrokhavar (1995) and Lorcerie (2005). 
13 Some observers have noted that the intense headscarf discussions acted as a 
substitute for other central social difficulties in France (integration, male-female 
relationships, unemployment) in explaining the abstraction of the discussion and 
its locus in the “sphère éthérée des grands principes” (ethereal sphere of grand 
principles) (Terray, 2004: 112). As a matter of fact, the female students were never 
really an issue, while the symbolic significance of their clothing was. Nor were 
they seriously interviewed by the different commissions created for the purpose of 
debating the headscarf (see the Commission created in July 2003 by the French 
President of the Republic to work on the national conditions of implementation of 
laïcité) and the mission of information on the question of religious signs, created by 
the Parliament created in May 2003).  128 | AMIRAUX 
 
Islamic headscarf generally focus on abstract principles with the exclusion 
of central questions like children’s rights.1415 In her report for the United 
Nations, Asma Jahangir, for instance, points out one of the paradoxes of the 
French March 2004 law: although its stated aim is to protect minors from 
being obliged to wear a headscarf or any other religious symbols, at the 
same time the law is an obstacle to those who choose freely to wear such a 
symbol, following their own conviction.16 In these public discussions, 
Muslim pupils wearing the headscarf ended up being criticised without 
ever having a real opportunity to speak.17 How dare French female citizens 
display their difference by wearing a sign whose meaning is not culturally 
part of the national historical trajectory? Before the passing of the March 
2004 law, the liberal reading provided by the French Council of State (the 
highest administrative tribunal) in 1989 was the frame of reference for 
articulating the neutrality of the state and individual religious freedom, 
‘public order’ being the key notion in deciding whether or not to ban an 
i n d i v i d u a l  f r o m  p u b l i c  schools (whereas, as mentioned earlier, German 
agencies would have referred to religious pluralism). The Council of State’s 
1989 decision basically stated that none of the constitutional principles 
(neutrality and freedom of conscience) could be said to take precedence 
over the other and that every case should be treated individually in a ‘case 
by case’ perspective (Conseil d’Etat, 2004). 
The passion – or, it might even be said, the hysteria – involved in the 
French 2003-04 discussion strongly contrasts with the silence, if not to say 
the indifference, of other European contexts where accommodations were 
                                                           
14 Nor are the psychological, spiritual and cultural effects of the ban as an assault 
against women reviewed: the spiritual injury, defilement, silence, denial, shame, 
guilt, fear, violence, blaming the victim, self-destructive behaviour, ‘emotional 
death’…. 
15 E. Brems, (2006), “Above Children’s Heads. The headscarf Controversy in 
European Schools from the Perspective of Children’s Rights”, The International 
Journal of Children’s Rights, 14, pp. 119-136. 
16 Jahangir, A. (2006), Droits civils et politiques, notamment la question de l’intolérance 
religieuse. (Additif mission en France), Rapport, Commission des droits de l’Homme, 
ONU, March. 
17 P. Tévanian (2005), Le voile médiatique. Un faux débat: “l’affaire du foulard”, Paris, 
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found (as in the UK until autumn 2006), or where distinctions are clearly 
drawn between users and agents of public services. For instance, in 
Germany, since 1993 pupils wearing the Islamic headscarf can ask to be 
exempted from sport lessons (Bundesverwaltungsgericht, 25/98/93; 
InfAuslR1994, 59). In a Constitutional Court decision of September 2003, 
banning the wearing of the Islamic headscarf for teachers is considered to 
be constitutional only if motivated by the protection of constitutional 
values and grounded on a precise legal basis. The central affair in the 
German context is based on a primary and secondary school teacher named 
Fereshta Ludin. The Constitutional Court does not give more weight to the 
obligation of neutrality of a public agent (in this case, respect of parents 
and children’s freedom of belief) than to individual freedom of conscience. 
Ludin defended herself by arguing that the headscarf was part of her 
personality and made visible an internal conviction. The ruling of the 
Constitutional Court overturned the decision by the Administrative 
Federal Court, which said that the headscarf should not be banned, also to 
protect religious peace in the country.18 The Constitutional Court decision 
opened the way to local legislation. For instance, in January 2007, the 
Bavarian Constitutional Court upheld a 2004 state law that bans teachers 
from wearing religious headscarves. This decision follows the initiative of 
an Islamic association suing the Bavarian state for not respecting the 
Bavarian constitution and eliminating Muslim symbols from public life. In 
the German context, headscarves can be banned only by state law, not 
following an administrative decision. By early 2007, 8 out of 16 Länder had 
already passed a law banning headscarves. 
In the French as in the German contexts, headscarves cannot be taken 
as ‘classic’ public policy objects as are the requests for the construction of a 
mosque or the opening of a private Islamic school. Wearing a headscarf is a 
private matter, the result of an individual choice. In some contexts (France), 
i t  h a s  t o  b e  r e s t r i c t e d ,  i n  o t h e r  o n e s  ( G e r m a n y ) ,  i t  h a s  t o  b e  p r o t e c t e d .  
Headscarves do not directly relate to worshipping activities, nor are they 
systematically the result of social coercion by religious authorities, 
especially in European contexts. They are mostly situated between a 
private matter (potentially indicating the faith of an individual, but not 
                                                           
18 C. Skach (2006), “Leyla Sahin v. Turkey and ‘Teacher Headscarf Case’, Case No. 
2BvR 1436/02”, American Journal of International Law, Vol. 100, No. 1, pp. 186-196. 130 | AMIRAUX 
 
only that) that apparently troubles political authorities and leads them to 
legislate, and a public issue that attracts conflicting narratives and engages 
competing public moralities. The argument that integration fails whenever 
cultural differences become visible is a strong one, in particular if the 
visible identity markers seem inconsistent with democracy and equality. 
Differences can only be visible and legitimate in the private sphere, the 
privatisation of these differences being the most diffused strategy for the 
good functioning of liberal European democracies (Barry, 2001).19 In the 
French context, the discussion about the place to be given to cultural rights 
was never properly launched as it interferes with the Republican 
representation of national cohesion through unity.20 
In the British context, addressing religious diversity in schools has 
recently become the opening to talk about culture and multiculturalism.21 
The controversy became a nationwide issue after Jack Straw (then leader of 
the House of Commons) publicly stated his disapproval of the wearing of 
the veil (i.e. covering all the face except the eyes), giving as his reason that 
it is an obstacle to good community relations. More generally in the UK, 
religion today has a similar function in race relations discussions that 
colour used to have (in the 1960s), race (in the 1970s and 1980s) or ethnicity 
in the 1990s.22 In the hijab/djilbab and dress code in public schools debate 
(2006-07), the central question remains how far schools should be required 
to go to accommodate the increasingly diverse faiths that now compose 
British society? The picture is further complicated by the introduction of 
rules imposed by the EU directives.23 In the UK, the jilbab became an issue 
                                                           
19 B. Barry (2001), Culture and Equality: An Egalitarian Critique of Multiculturalism, 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
20 V. Amiraux and P. Simon (2006), “‘There are no minorities here’: Cultures of 
Scholarship and Public Debate on Immigrants and Integration in France”, 
International Journal of Comparative Sociology, 47 (3-4), pp. 191-215. 
21 The traditional way of dealing with dress code issues in the UK context stems 
from the Mandla v. Dowell Lee affair. This case has established protection for the 
rights of religious minorities by using provisions of race discrimination legislation. 
22 C. Peach (2006), “Islam, ethnicity and South Asian Religions in the London 2001 
census”, Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, NS 31(3), pp. 353-370. 
23 In Britain, the discussion focuses very much on compulsory religious education 
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after the highly publicised case of S. Begum, defended by the lawyer Cherie 
Blair (the then Prime Minister’s wife). A pupil at a North Luton public 
school since 2000 (where 80% of the pupils are Muslims), Shabina Begum 
started wearing the jilbab in 2002, after the school year had started, 
contravening the school’s internal dress code. In a first decision, the breach 
of Begum’s freedom of religion was recognised and the school was asked to 
reconsider the decision to exclude her (2004). On appeal, the House of 
Lords took the opposite position, stating there had been no violation of the 
plaintiff’s religious freedom (Article 9 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights).24 
As underlined by Lord Bingham of Cornhill, “this case concerns a 
particular pupil and a particular school in a particular place at a particular 
time”. Like the French Council of State in 1989, the Parliament cannot be 
asked to decide whether a British school should or should not accept a 
student wearing Islamic clothes. Relying on the arguments of the ECHR, 
Lord Bingham goes on to specify that Article 9 rights are not absolute and 
may even be limited. While sustaining the authority of the head of school, 
Lord Bingham of Cornhill underlines his awareness of the school’s ethnic 
diversity: the dress code gave the possibility to many students to express 
their religious distinction by wearing specific clothes “in an inclusive, 
unthreatening and uncompetitive way” (Lord Bingham of Cornhill, 
Opinions of the Lords of Appeal, 2006, UKHL 15, §34). S. Begum was 
excluded because of the breach of the school uniform rules, with no 
violation of Article 9: the multicultural and multi-faith based school had the 
right to limit her rights in protection of others’ rights. The British decision is 
consistent with the Sahin decision in the sense that it recognises the 
interference with one’s right to manifest one’s religion, and this 
                                                           
24 Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights states: 
1.  Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this 
right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either 
alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his 
religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance. 
2.  Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such 
limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic 
society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, 
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interference of the public state authorities is considered legitimate. Her 
right to education had not been denied in the sense that she could go to 
alternative schools or be educated at home.25  
8.2  Religion in secular Europe: what is religious? What is politics? 
In secular Europe, the diminishing impact of religion on social behaviour is 
seen as related to the modernisation processes, in particular to an increased 
individualisation of religious affiliations (the ‘do-it-yourself’ perspective) 
and to its ‘privatisation’ as the solution to cultural conflicts (Barry, 2001). 
Politics, culture and social morality are supposed to remain independent of 
any religious influence. Morality has therefore become a personal concern. 
Religion is supposed to have a declining influence on society, the authority 
of the church being diminished. To summarise, the secularisation process 
goes together with the privatisation of beliefs. European citizens are 
supposed to relate to society as autonomous, responsible, reflective 
entities.26 Given that secularisation refers primarily to the idea that 
religious values and behaviours are shaped by individuals, it is no surprise 
that quantitative evidence of secularisation relies mostly on an assessment 
of personal religiosity. In that context, church attendance illustrates the 
decline of a more traditional institutional religiosity.27 But, as pointed out 
by many authors, different patterns of religious decline should be seen in 
relation to differences between denominational cultures (Protestants and 
Catholics): in the Catholic French context for instance, discussion about 
decline centred on the defence of secularism, while in the Protestant-
Catholic German one, it centred on the need to protect religious pluralism. 
The political horizon contrasts religious pluralism in Germany, the 
                                                           
25 A. Blair and Will Aps (2005), “What not to wear and other stories: Addressing 
religious diversity in schools”, Education and the Law, Vol. 17, No. 1-2, March/June, 
pp. 1-22. 
26 L. Halman and O. Riise (eds), (2003), Religion in a Secularizing Society: The 
Europeans’ Religion at the End of the 20th Century (European Values Study, 5), The 
Hague: Brill. 
27 Churches have been challenged by the emergence of religious pluralism and 
voluntarism, exposing them to competition between worldviews, relativisation of 
their regime of truth, introducing the perspective of a voluntary membership 
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secularist regime in France,28 with some German politicians explicitly 
rejecting all forms of importation of the French secular tradition into the 
German context. The central role of the Constitution in the German context, 
on the one hand, tends to restrict individual freedom of religion in the 
name of the protection of a dominant Christian tradition, and, on the other 
hand, promotes or protects cultural religious plurality. This last point 
prevents the headscarf from being perceived as a symbol of cultural 
political segregation. The principle of laïcité was used similarly in France: 
on the one hand, to motivate the banning of the headscarf; on the other, to 
defend its authorisation in public schools. 
The wearing of an Islamic headscarf is linked to personal religiosity, 
i.e. the more emotional part of religious commitment.29 It results from an 
individual choice and a rather diffuse religiosity, with no consensus from 
the religious authorities in determining whether there is an obligation or 
not to wear it. In the headscarf controversies, however, political authorities 
and grassroots citizens intervene simultaneously to determine whether a 
religiously motivated gesture can be tolerated or not in European 
democratic liberal societies. Religious beliefs cease therefore to be a matter 
of purely personal preference and again become the subject of public 
argument in political and moral terms. The discussions that took place in 
different contexts were never really about religion defined as a system of 
beliefs and practices oriented toward the sacred or supernatural, affecting 
the way of live of the individual believers. Liberal secularism (radical in its 
French version, more flexible in the British one) is based on a confessional 
freedom: people can believe what they want in the private sphere. As a 
consequence, the public space is a realm based on a cultural consensus that 
overrides individual liberty and it is based on the idea that practice can be 
reduced to preferences and choices. But can practices be dissociated from 
                                                           
28 Amir Moazami sees it differently and considers that the reading in terms of 
civilisational paradigm (‘Christian heritage’ or ‘Christian-Occidental background 
of German society’) restricts the pluralistic character of society and attributes to the 
Christian hemisphere a monopoly on the secularisation theorem. “While in France 
the notion of secularity has been interpreted in terms of a rupture from the 
Christian past, in Germany it has been regarded as implying a continuity of the 
Christian tradition”, (Amir-Moazami, 2005: 271). 
29 This supposes a variety of ways of living one’s faith on a scale from religion as a 
cultural attribute to symbolic identification or normativity guiding everyday life. 134 | AMIRAUX 
 
convictions (or, in other words, should religion be relegated to the private 
sphere to make pluralism viable)? 
At this stage, we are still left with a series of unanswered questions 
related to the issue of the “justiciability” (Skach, 2006) of religious freedom 
in secular contexts (i.e. restricting religious freedom in the name of 
religious neutrality in EU member states). If religion is a private matter, 
then why do states care about it? Is cultural distinction a threat to liberal 
European democracies? From the legal point of view, the claims for 
equality made by Muslims living in Europe are put forward in a context 
where religious freedom is no longer absolute. Religions are cultural and 
historical variables, social and cultural interpretative systems. They are 
constituents of communities and produce meanings that shape collective as 
well as individual lives of the members of the community. A belief 
referring to the personal way one relates to his/her own religion, is 
probably the easiest term to use in this reflection on ‘what is at stake when 
banning the Islamic headscarf’ as it encompasses a wide spectrum of 
differing worldviews, including non-religious ones. It seems to me, 
however, that the public controversy on the wearing of the headscarf has 
completely ignored a more intimate part of belief: that is the ‘religiosity’ of 
individuals. I use the term as a reference to the intimate and inventive way 
in which an individual performs his/her link to a corpus of dogma. In a 
secular context, the individual is indeed the only reference for the meaning 
and the justification to give to his/her actions and social behaviours. In a 
way, religiosity is what makes religion concrete and visible in society: it 
gives meaning to action, and it may help one to recognise others as well as 
helping others to recognise you. In that context, the headscarf represents 
shared identities but also conflicting ones. The idea of a believer 
performing his religion on a daily basis remains rather exogenous to the 
discussion even though it is central to the definition of collective identities 
that signify to members of a group and to the world who they are, what 
they stand for and what kind of society they hope to create. However, the 
absence of the voices of the Muslim women wearing headscarves is a 
shared European characteristic in the national public debate. This has been 
underlined by Judge Tulkens in the Sahin ECHR judgement: for instance 
the opinion of Muslim women, both those who wear headscarves and those 
who don’t wear them, is missing in the debate. 
The strengthening of public positions towards the wearing of the 
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limit religious freedom in secular contexts. In some cases, the difference 
between one system and another (established church, laicité, concordate 
type of church and state relationship) as well as the various definitions of 
‘disturbances of public order’ may become an incentive for European 
judges to plead for the limitation of the right to wear a headscarf. The 
European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) at the moment supports the 
more restrictive member states on this matter (see Dahlab c. Suisse in 2001, 
and more recently Leyla Sahin c. Turquie in 2005).30 According to the ECHR, 
religious freedom is not absolute and can even be restricted, as in the case 
of the Islamic headscarf, which does not fit into the European framework of 
the protection of human rights, public freedoms and public security. 
Restriction of religious freedom is seen as a necessity in a democratic 
context. ECHR is, however, extremely cautious in adopting the points 
made by national authorities. In the Sahin case, the European Court twice 
points out that there is no violation of freedom of thought, conscience, and 
religion under Convention article 9 (plus there is no separate question 
arising from that in conjunction with other Articles of the Convention, for 
details see Skach, 2006; Bribosia and Rorive, 2004). The ECHR expresses its 
consideration that the restriction is necessary in democratic societies on the 
basis that the wearing of the headscarf may impact on others (Blair et al., 
2005: 7). The Court adopts a contextual reading of the Turkish case in 
defending the university president’s decision to forbid the wearing of the 
headscarf on campus.31 The subsequent decisions by Turkish jurisdictions 
have since then been validated by this European support: there has been 
interference with Miss Sahin’s individual religious freedom (recognised by 
the Court), but this is justified by the protection of public order.32 To a 
certain extent, the ECHR’s position on Sahin interprets the meaning of the 
                                                           
30 C o m p l e t e  r e f e r e n c e s  a r e  D a h l a b  v .  S w itzerland, App. 42393/98, 15 February 
2001; Sahin v. Turkey, App. No. 44774/98 (Eur. Ct. H.R. November 10, 2005) Grand 
Chamber. All decisions related to religious freedom and article 9 can be found at 
http://www.echr.coe.int. 
31 The text mentions the challenge of fundamentalism, the need for religious 
pluralism, highlighting the social dimension of the problem posed by the plaintiff. 
On the contrary, there is no mention at all of gender equality, a central topic in the 
equivalent European discussion.  
32 E. Bribosia and I. Rorive (2004), “Le voile à l’école: Une Europe divisée”, Revue 
trimestrielle des droits de l’homme, 60, pp. 951-983. 136 | AMIRAUX 
 
headscarf as political, which is highly arguable in a non-Muslim context.33 
As stated by Baroness Hale of Richmond on S. Begum’s jilbab, none of the 
arguments of the Western feminists describing the Islamic headscarf as a 
symbol of oppression of whoever chooses to wear it, can be considered as 
justification for its ban. (Baroness Hale of Richmond, Opinions of the Lords 
of Appeal, 2006, UKHL 15, §96). 
The headscarf controversies in a post 9/11 context are characterised 
by the culturalisation of socially sensitive issues related to risk and security. 
Different frames (migration, security, terrorism, secularism) overlap in the 
public discussion so that Muslim women with headscarves have become 
new icons in the landscape of enemies of European values. In EU 
controversies, their headscarf stands for political threat, gender oppression, 
religious fanaticism, terrorism, political incorrectness, poor socio-economic 
conditions and illiteracy. The real motivations of young women in wearing 
the veil are practically irrelevant. For Muslims living in non-Muslim 
contexts, this specific stigmatisation has increased the social cost of 
presenting oneself, as Muslim cultural racism is no longer only a discourse, 
but also leads to acts of discrimination in several areas of social life 
(employment, education, housing, health). Thus, headscarf controversies 
do not only operate as a public discussion of symbols, they also imply 
practices of exclusion of particular bodies performing and speaking from 
within national societies. A headscarf is not exotic since it is worn within 
European societies, by European citizens. Women wearing headscarves 
make things concrete and have confronted public opinion with visible 
practices as opposed to abstract principles. Moreover, these women have 
contributed to the awareness of the gendered dimension of national models 
of cohesion, merging issues of public morality and national unity.  
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8.3  Gendered practices and real bodies 
Headscarf controversies are complex issues referring to intricate situations 
in which it is not easy to identify the motives of discrimination and map the 
boundaries. What is indeed really at stake? Race, ethnicity, religion, 
gender? Headscarf controversies mix, for instance, gender, race and 
religious issues (not to mention in some cases the place of residence, and 
other socio-economic factors). Wearing the headscarf, women become 
visible twice, first as members of a religious minority (the Muslim 
believers), second as gendered social actors (women). Women wearing the 
headscarf therefore experience double discrimination as a result of the 
combination of their gender and race/religion characteristics. Moreover, 
women and girls are more subject to dress restrictions than men.34 
Headscarf controversies and related public debates are intricate situations 
in which nobody knows where the boundaries are, how to classify the 
discourses and actions or what categories to use to better describe the 
situation. The category of gender is only partially useful to the 
understanding of headscarf controversies and it is only recently that 
specialists of gender issues and feminist theories have entered the 
discussions on the Islamic headscarf in European societies. The gender 
perspective is often absent or marginalised. “Where gender is raised, it 
most often takes the form of a distinction and an opposition between ‘the 
Western/European woman’ and ‘the other Oriental/migrant woman’”.35 
At the European level, the Dahlab v. Switzerland was the first case in 
which the ECHR explicitly referred to the gender dimension issue, 
invoking the principle of gender equality as a further justification to ask the 
Muslim convert teacher to remove her headscarf.  
Dress is not only about culture, but is mostly about politics, in 
religious as well as in secular societies (Mahmood, 2005). “Through the 
medium of the veil therefore, Muslim women’s bodies are gender-coded 
and form a “cultural text” for the expression of social, political, and 
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authorities in the case of women, while men’s clothing is largely ignored. 
35 D. Lyon and D. Spini (2004), “Unveiling the headscarf debate”, Feminist Legal 
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religious meanings”.36 In the EU context, headscarves are not the only 
controversial garments inside public schools and universities. In the Dutch 
context, for example, dress codes ban the headscarf, belly shirt and bomber 
jacket together, thus addressing and requesting regulation on behalf of the 
offence some clothes cause to a certain group of the population, to the 
discrimination of others (Duits and van Zoonen, 2006).3738 ‘Porno chic’ is 
considered an offence to decency. But decency is never an issue when 
debating publicly about the Islamic headscarf. Rather, the young woman in 
a headscarf inside public schools is s e e n  a s  r e p r e s s e d .  H o w e v e r ,  t h e  
discussion on the way certain students dress inappropriately at school is 
never, as is the case of the headscarf, explicitly mentioning the sexual 
practices that are associated with it. Clearly, what “holds the two 
seemingly separate debates about headscarves and porno-chic together is 
the regulation of girls’ sexuality”. (Duits, Van Zoonen, 2006: 111, see also 
105-108). Thus, maybe debates on such apparently opposite issues (the 
headscarf on the one hand, porno chic on the other) should be analysed 
together as “part of a single hegemonic discourse about women’s sexuality 
that transcend this partition”. (Duits, van Zoonen, 2006, 104) Indeed, the 
headscarf is often identified by people who do not wear it (Muslims as well 
as non-Muslims) as part of a broad-scale system of domination that affects 
women as a class. 
Muslim women with a headscarf living in Europe operate a double 
detachment: first towards tradition in a double perspective (distance from 
previous generations, distance towards cultural interpretations of dogma); 
second, towards European expectations of how they should behave 
(politically, culturally and sexually). The conformity to a norm of sexual 
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Veiling among Muslim Girls in a Canadian Islamic School”, Equity & Excellence in 
Education, 39, pp. 239-252. 
37 The connection between decent dress and headscarf is not a newcomer to the 
debate. I remember the interviews I conducted with followers of Milli Görüs in 
Germany from 1992 to 1996 and the connection between being authorised to wear 
a headscarf if others wear a miniskirt was often made by my Muslim interviewees. 
(Amiraux, 2001). 
38 L. Duits and L. van Zoonen (2006), “Headscarves and Porno-Chic: Disciplining 
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behaviour ends up being central in the agenda of the public discussion on 
the legitimacy or not of wearing a headscarf in public schools;39 as is the 
corollary stigmatisation of deviant sexual behaviours by young male of 
North African origin. “In order to mask new forms of social and economic 
domination experienced by working-class young people of non-European 
origin (i.e. Black and Arab), it has become necessary and sufficient to 
stigmatise the ‘sexual deviance’ of Arab boys and thereby invoke the need 
to impose a ‘civilised’ sexual norm, the quintessential and most recent 
expression of an integrationist imperative”.40 This illustrates the spread of 
racism “through the belief, which is gaining currency in France, that there 
is an ongoing war between the sexes in the disadvantaged suburbs” 
(Guénif, 2006: 23). In the French context, the suburbs represent the threat to 
security and communal existence. Muslim women not wearing the 
headscarf have played a central part in this process and definitely 
contributed to the call for the regulation of the appearance and bodies of 
other women. Through the controversies and the active participation of 
women from all sides in the condemnation of the headscarf, Islamophobia 
became gendered. The various public discourses on the headscarf (and on 
its ban) deny the Muslim female subjects their agency and autonomy by 
denying them ex ante the right to speak up through their headscarf, and 
participate in a discussion on the meaning of their dress code.  
8.4  Promoting equality in religiously and culturally plural societies 
In all European member states, headscarf controversies included the issue 
of personal choice and individual freedom of choice, the protection of the 
freedom of religion, gender equality, and secularism. Just as there is no 
European policy on religious matters, there is no consensus concerning the 
way national states should cooperate on the policy towards Islam and 
Muslims. Wearing the headscarf in public schools is therefore still an issue 
on which there is no convergence between EU member states. The absence 
of a common attitude on this specific subject is no surprise as there are 
                                                           
39 N. Guenif-Souilmas and E. Macé (2004), Les féministes et le garçon arabe, Paris: De 
l’Aube. 
40 N. Guénif-Souilamas (2006), “The Other French exception. Virtuous Racism and 
the War of the Sexes in Postcolonial France”, French Politics, Culture and Society, 
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different patterns of secularisation coexisting in Europe. Secularisation was 
either implemented as a consequence of political confrontation, or as an 
outcome of the differentiation of roles amongst institutions. This brings us 
back to the validity of the contextual approach: general principles need to 
be looked at in their interpretation and application in very specific 
contexts.41 
Two main positions can be identified in the EU member states’ 
domestic discussion of the legitimacy of wearing a headscarf as a female 
Muslim European citizen. First, the accommodating position (dominant in 
the ’80s but decreasing since the ’90s) of public authorities towards the 
request by Muslim women to wear a headscarf in their lives as European 
citizens,42 and second, the position adopted by those who wish to ban this 
behaviour from certain parts of the public sphere. Theoretically, European 
legal receptiveness to religious and cultural diversity would be grounded 
in the public neutrality of liberal states. This does not fit with the current 
tendency of national models that move back towards more restrictive 
definitions of cohesive citizenship. In a culturally plural society, the fight 
against discrimination is a central element of the organisation of pacified 
coexistence between competing interpretative systems (as in the case of 
religions) or between conflicting values (as in neutrality of the state versus 
individual freedom of religion). For instance, in the Dutch case, prohibiting 
the wearing of the headscarf cannot be justified in the sense that it would 
contravene anti-discrimination law and such a move would constitute a 
case for direct discrimination.43 This Commission on Equal Treatment view 
was exceptionally not respected when the safety of the individuals was at 
                                                           
41 J. Carens (2004), The weight of context: Headscarfs in Holland, Journal of Ethical 
Theory and Moral Practice, Springer Netherlands, Volume 7, No. 2, April. 
42 The situation of Muslim police officers is well known. For instance, in January 
2000, a discussion took place in the Netherlands about whether or not to maintain 
the accommodation making it possible to wear a headscarf in all police 
departments except in the mobile force for reasons of security. In 2001, the new 
police uniform did not include ‘blue police’ headscarf. Here accommodation of 
religious and ethnic specific requests was motivated by practical, pragmatic 
motivations and awareness of the impact of such a decision on public opinion. 
(Verhaar & Saharso, 2004). 
43 S. Saharso and O. Verhaar (2006), “Headscarves in the Police force and the Court: 
Does Context Matter?”, Acta Politica, 41, pp. 68-86. THE HEADSCARF QUESTION| 141 
 
stake. For similar ‘no discrimination’ motives, the French decision on the 
banning of the headscarf in public schools (March 2004 Law) does not 
mention any specific item but refers to “ostentatious signs of religious 
belonging”. In the British context, until December 2003 it was somehow 
‘lawful’ to discriminate against Muslims as Muslims because the courts did 
not accept that Muslims are an ethnic group. Then an offence of religious 
discrimination was created but confined to employment (in respect of the 
EU’s Equality in Employment Directive), and Muslims are now protected 
as members of an ethnic group.  
From one context to another in the European Union, similar 
fundamental rights are being challenged (freedom of expression, freedom 
of religion versus neutrality, freedom of ‘the other’ and public order), but 
the reactions of member states range from a complete ban (French law 
2004-228 of March, 2004) to public discussion with no legal decision (as in 
Italy). There is no consensus on the way to approach the meaning of the 
headscarf: is it an individual free choice? Is it a religious obligation related 
to specific circumstances? In the German context, the headscarf was 
qualified as a sign of ‘cultural segregation’.44 Discussions are accelerating in 
the Netherlands in the sense of a ban of the burqa (facial veil) worn by a tiny 
minority of women, mostly Dutch converts, even if the new Integration 
Minister, Ella Vogelaar, recently declared that such a ban would be 
stigmatising and counter-productive.45 One of the claims made by the 
supporters of a ban in the UK suggested this practice has consequences on 
the integration of women (access to the job market). This claim seems to be 
quite popular in other contexts: in a poll by IPSOS Mori for ITV (October, 
2006), 61% of the British interviewees declared that Muslim women are 
segregating themselves by wearing a headscarf. Different forms of anti-
discrimination legislation are, however, insufficient. Equality before the 
                                                           
44 S. Amir-Moazami (2005), “Muslim Challenges to the Secular Consensus: A 
German Case Study”, Journal of Contemporary European Studies, Vol. 13, No. 3, pp. 
267-286. 
45 Face covering is also a problem in Muslim contexts. See, for instance, the 
declaration in January 2007 by the Egyptian Minister of Culture qualifying the 
wearing of the headscarf of obscurantism. Full face cover (the niqab) is denied for 
public officers. 
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law is a major but insufficient achievement and deep-seated discriminatory 
structures survive.  
What do school authorities aim to prevent by regulating the wearing 
of the headscarf or, more broadly as in the French law, the wearing of 
symbols that express religious belonging? The answer includes peace 
inside schools, the emancipation of girls not wearing the headscarf and 
protection of them vis-à-vis more ‘orthodox’ members of the same 
community of belief. What dominates in the European contexts is 
deductive reasoning setting up hierarchies between values as a result of the 
confrontation of competing principles. Almost no space is left for proper 
consideration of the context, or for the cultural norms eventually framing 
them. The problem in deciding whether or not an agent of any public 
institution (police, education, hospital, prisons) could be seen with a 
specific religious symbol (headscarf) is related to the fact that these 
individuals represent the public face of authority and thus must be must be 
impartial and neutral and recognised as such. The classification of the 
different values/principles that are said to be brought into discussion by 
the fact that women living in Europe still wish to wear a headscarf varies 
from one country to the other. Usually, the principle of freedom of religion 
is assessed as non-absolute. This is reflected in the body of European case-
law governing the freedom of religion (and the right to manifest one’s own 
religion).  
Concluding remarks and questions 
The exclusion of Muslim women wearing the headscarf from specific 
public functions and institutions seems likely to become an increasingly 
general rule. Given both the intensity (sometimes almost hysteria) and 
confusion surrounding these issues in many European countries, I 
conclude with some suggestions as to how to calm public discussion about 
Islamic headscarves. 
Firstly, most of the political and legal reasoning related to the headscarf 
affairs adopts a deductive approach that confronts normative principles 
explaining the opposition of the parties (in most cases, the neutrality of the 
state, sexual equality versus freedom of religion and non-discrimination). 
Considering the different constitutional court (or equivalent) decisions 
when they were asked to give their opinion on this matter, it seems 
impossible to make a final decision on the basis of pure abstract reasoning 
principles (see Conseil d’Etat or Bundesverfassungsgsericht). It seems therefore THE HEADSCARF QUESTION| 143 
 
essential to insist on the need to understand principles systematically in 
relation to local and individual situations. Any case is specific and needs to 
be considered in relation to the context of its emergence. 
Secondly, less politicisation and more ‘juridicisation’ of the headscarf 
controversies may be a provisional solution to solve conflict. By 
‘juridicisation’ I hereby refer to the use, by individuals, of juridical tools 
and arenas (courts) to seek satisfaction of their needs and answers to their 
complaints. This would of course give principles, norms and values a 
central place, but it would also give importance to the narratives brought 
by the victims (the Muslim women). National decisions in the headscarf 
controversies lack accountability. A better and more systematic use of legal 
resources would constitute a step towards accountability in the equal 
treatment of Muslim citizens in the enlarged EU. 
Thirdly, the role of international bodies is central in this search for 
accountability. ECHR’s decisions and suggestions have stated that religious 
freedom is not an absolute value. It can be restricted on conditions that 
these restrictions are motivated and argued. Considering the passionate 
nature of national discussions, the ECHR can be seen as a central arbiter of 
citizens and state interactions. More precisely, in the European context of 
promotion of equality, neutrality should not disproportionately 
disadvantage minority groups and non-national institutions could be the 
guarantors of the respect for different principles and fundamental rights 
framing the lives of individual citizens. 
Fourthly, headscarf controversies reveal the porosity of borders that have 
been taken for granted, the border between private and public as well as of 
that between religious and secular spheres of social activities. While some 
theories of secularisation have claimed that religion would disappear from 
public life through the individual emancipation of citizens, the religious 
part of the political functioning of society returns to the domestic agenda 
by addressing the issues of national cohesion and unity. Policy-makers and 
decision-makers should elaborate more on what is unsaid about religion in 
European liberal democracies, as a priority at the local level, on the basis of 
deliberation and public discussion with citizens.  
Fifthly and finally, new maps of inequality and experiences of injustice are 
becoming visible, in particular for individuals embedded in the complex 
and intersectional context of oppression and discrimination. The headscarf 
is not only about symbols. It is not only the headscarf that is being 
excluded; it is individuals and their bodies too.  144 | 
 
 
9.  ISLAMOPHOBIA AND ITS 
CONSEQUENCES 
CHRIS ALLEN 
Introduction 
“Islamophobia is the shorthand way of referring to dread or hatred of Islam – and, 
therefore, to fear or dislike of all or most Muslims”,1 wrote the Commission on 
British Muslims and Islamophobia in the Runnymede report a decade ago. 
Widely accepted as the definition of Islamophobia, and given the report’s 
impact, it might come as some surprise that only five years ago, the term 
and concept of Islamophobia had little discursive relevance or value 
beyond the UK.  
Today, the situation is completely changed. Nowadays, Islamophobia 
emerges from many bi-polar extremes: from those who denounce any 
criticism of Muslims or Islam whatsoever as Islamophobic, to those who 
actively and openly espouse a vitriolic hatred of Islam and Muslims 
founded upon various ideological justifications. Consequently, little clear 
thinking or expression rarely – if indeed ever – comes into the equation as 
regards its usage or understanding. From the high-profile murder of Theo 
van Gogh in the Netherlands and the ensuing backlash against Muslims, to 
complaints about irresponsible parking during Friday prayers, these 
disparate and myriad events are indiscriminately incorporated into the 
discourse of Islamophobia. Islamophobia in many ways therefore remains 
an undifferentiated and bland term, employed to satisfy or appease in 
numerous and to various degrees. 
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With the term now being much more widely used, Islamophobia has 
since found a resonance or presence in the increasingly mediatised societies 
that we inhabit. At the same time the media is being earmarked as one of 
the most virulent producers of those stereotypical misunderstandings of 
Muslims and Islam that allegedly underpin such discourses and 
understandings. In the political sphere, remarks that continue to invoke 
Huntington’s ‘clash of civilisations’ thesis abound, from Berlusconi’s now 
infamous remarks about Islam being a backward ‘civilisation’ to the wide- 
ranging debates currently raging in France, the UK and the Netherlands 
surrounding the wearing of the hijab, niqab and burqa respectively. In each 
setting, allegations also abound that such apparel constitute a barrier to 
integration and in some ways, a barrier to being French, British and Dutch 
respectively. It is not only in those countries where large Muslim 
communities are present but so too in Belgium, where headscarves and 
other forms of Muslim dress have been banned at the local level in many 
schools.2 And so, quite irrespective of geographical or national settings, it 
would be unlikely that in the past five years some claim or counter-claim 
regarding Islamophobia had not been played out through the media, 
political or public spaces in most parts of Europe. Few would have been 
able to avoid the allegations of the growing menace that either Islam or 
Muslims are said to present or, from an alternative perspective, the 
growing prevalence of Europe’s Islamophobia. Either way, one’s 
perspective remains always subjective and open to disagreement. 
One possible consequence of this has been the intense scrutiny and 
interrogation of the roles and responsibilities of Europe’s Muslim 
communities. Beyond the mainstream political spaces – and in some 
circumstances even within them – this has been the catalyst for a more 
virulent and open discourse about Muslims and Islam to emerge. At the 
same time, evidence might also point towards a more willing and receptive 
audience to such a discourse. The rise of the British National Party (BNP) in 
the UK is an example of the type of protagonists promoting such a 
discourse, the ever-widening concerns about ‘security’ and ‘anti-terror’ 
forming the backdrop against which a greater receptivity is grounded. At 
the same time, numerous legislative measures, political debates, policy 
recommendations and cultural awareness programmes have sought to 
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challenge and potentially halt what is seen by some to be a downward 
spiralling acceptance of such discourses. The situation is therefore far from 
one-sided and one cannot apportion blame against all Europeans and their 
governments, as indeed some commentators and agitators have attempted. 
From within some Muslim communities themselves also, a two-pronged 
response has also begun to emerge. If security sources are to be believed, a 
shift towards a greater radicalisation of Muslim youth has occurred; in the 
opposite direction some Muslim communities have begun to respond much 
more positively and directly to Islamophobia. In the UK, an annual awards 
ceremony for the ‘Islamophobe of the Year’3 has been initiated to increase 
awareness of Islamophobia through satire and comedy, whilst the Forum 
against Islamophobia & Racism (FAIR) was established to tackle 
Islamophobia and its consequences.4 In the past five years therefore, the 
situation affecting and informing the European landscape has undoubtedly 
changed.  
Yet despite or maybe even because of these changes, Islamophobia 
remains a contested concept.5 Underpinning all of the various discourses – 
both for and against Islamophobia - has been a highly protean and largely 
inconsistent phenomenon. As Marcel Maussen puts it:6 
‘Islamophobia’ groups together all kinds of different forms of 
discourse, speech and acts, by suggesting that they all emanate 
from an identical ideological core, which is an “irrational fear” 
(a phobia) of Islam.7 
Encompassing so many varied events, activities, actions and 
attitudes, the simplified terminologies and definitions have failed to 
                                                           
3 The Annual Islamophobia Awards have been recently established by the Islamic 
Human Rights Commission. For more information see http://www.ihrc.org.uk. 
4 The Forum against Islamophobia and Racism (FAIR). See http://www.fairuk.org 
for further information about the organisation and its activities. 
5 Christopher Allen (2006), “Islamophobia: contested concept in the public space”, 
Ph.D dissertation, University of Birmingham. 
6 M. Maussen, “Anti-Muslim sentiments and mobilization in the Netherlands: 
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7 Jocelyne Cesari (2006), Securitization and religious divides in Europe: Muslims in 
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understand or explain a phenomenon that has had such a dramatic impact 
in such a relatively short space of time. At the same time, it might also be 
argued that the same failings have not convinced a largely sceptical 
audience of the reality of Islamophobia, given that the past five years have 
been one of unprecedented and undeniably eventful history. So despite 
there being signs of anti-Muslim, anti-Islamic phenomena, there also 
appears to be some contestation about what it is, where it is and where it 
comes from. 
A lack of clear meaning, interpretation and ownership first became 
apparent with the researches of the European Monitoring Centre for 
Racism and Xenophobia’s (EUMC) Summary report into Islamophobia in the 
EU following 11 September 2001.8 Despite having asked each of the then 
fifteen national focus points employed by the EUMC to define 
‘Islamophobia’, for many it was something that was seriously problematic, 
meaning that the end result was inconclusive. This is brought into context 
by the findings of a defining exercise undertaken by the EUMC prior to 
9/11.9 In attempting to establish operable EU-wide definitions for racism, 
anti-Semitism and Islamophobia, Clayton sought a range of definitions that 
could be codified into a universally accepted standard to be employed 
primarily politically and legislatively but also socially. The project found 
that in seven of the fifteen member states, no clear or known definition of 
Islamophobia was operable.10 Of the rest, two noted that the term was non-
                                                           
8 Christopher Allen and Jorgen Nielsen (2002), Summary report on Islamophobia in the 
EU after 11 September 2001, European Monitoring Centre on Racism and 
Xenophobia (EUMC), Vienna. 
9 Named the RAREN 3 data collection project, this project was undertaken in late 
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those participants of the RAXEN NFP meeting held in Vienna on 24-25 June 2002. 
Further developments of this project and the problems experienced in trying to 
establish a universally accepted definition w e r e  e x p l o r e d  i n  D i m i t r i a  C l a y t o n ,  
“Data comparability, definitions and the challenges for data collection on the 
phenomenon of racism, xenophobia, anti-Semitism and Islamophobia in the 
European Union”, European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia Colloque, 
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Clayton’s paper were published. 
10 Denmark, Finland, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg and Portugal. 148 | ALLEN 
 
operational but were able to provide a definition;11 three referenced the 
UK’s Runnymede model (something we will come onto shortly);12 whilst 
the others offered different if sometimes correlative definitions.13 So whilst 
‘Islamophobia’ had been afforded United Nations recognition at the World 
Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related 
Intolerance  in Durban – an event ‘lost’ in the aftermath of 9/11 – little 
clarity or consensus existed about exactly what this was.  
9.1  Context 
The word Islamophobia appears to have been coined as an analogy to 
xenophobia, but exactly when, where and by whom, remains uncertain.14 
The French word Islamophobie was recorded in print in the 1920s and again 
in the 1970s, but in both instances, it referred to disputes and differences 
within Islam rather than as a phenomenon against Muslims. More 
specifically, it referred to the rejection of aspects of the tradition by people 
born into the Islamic faith especially in the late 1970s by those feminists and 
liberals who were ‘fearful’ of the adoption of a more traditional way of life 
following the revolution in Iran. It is possible, though highly unlikely, that 
whoever first used the word in English was simply translating a French 
word that was already in existence, merely applying it to the hostile 
attitudes and actions of non-Muslims towards Muslims. There is some 
evidence to suggest that certain British Muslim organisations translated the 
term into a much more overtly ‘anti-Muslim’ and ‘anti-Islam’ context. 
Nonetheless, it would seem more likely that the English word was a new 
coining. 
As regards its first use in print contemporarily, there is some debate 
about whether it was in an edition of the December 1991 American journal 
Insight or in a book review by Tariq Modood in The Independent newspaper 
around the same time.15 Whilst Modood used the term twice, on neither 
occasion was there the slightest indication that it needed explanation or 
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definition, or that it was a word that he himself had coined. It is clear 
though that it did not appear in the book he was reviewing, Sacrilege and 
Civility: Muslim perspectives on The Satanic Verses affair.16 The word was 
again used without explanation in the 1993 report of the Runnymede Trust 
Commission on Anti-Semitism,17 which led to the establishment of the 
Commission on British Muslims and Islamophobia three years later. Whilst 
the Commission published a number of reports and pamphlets between 
1997 and 2004 about Islamophobia, it was its 1997 report Islamophobia: a 
challenge for us all18 that was most influential. As with the RAREN 3 exercise 
referred to previously, its model – definition and concept – of Islamophobia 
has helped shape the wider definitions and conceptualisations of the 
phenomenon, informing what we allege to know about Islamophobia as 
well as how it manifests itself. Islamophobia is therefore typically 
understood to be (as quoted at the beginning) the “shorthand way of 
referring to dread or hatred of Islam – and, by extension, to fear or dislike 
of all or most Muslims”.19 
However both the report and its model have failed to stand the test of 
time and a detailed analysis highlights a number of serious flaws.20 The 
m o s t  o b v i o u s  d i s a d v a n t a g e  o f  t h e  t e r m  i s  t h a t  i t  i s  u n d e r s t o o d  t o  b e  a  
‘phobia’. As phobias are irrational, such an accusation makes people 
defensive and defiant, in turn making reflective dialogue all but 
impossible. Likewise, Islamophobia as a separate and stand-alone concept 
implies that prejudice against Muslims is unrelated to other forms of 
prejudice, for example prejudice based around physical appearance and 
skin colour; prejudice against immigrants; prejudice against military, 
religious or economic rivals; and prejudices around class, power and status. 
The separateness of the concept can also imply that Muslims themselves 
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want to be ‘separate’ or ‘different’ even, thereby failing to recognise or 
accept the ‘similarities’ and ‘overlaps’ that also exist. Relevant to the 
contemporary climate in particular is that the continued use or over-use of 
the term prevents – either inadvertently or deliberately, depending upon 
the sources in question, legitimate criticisms of Muslims being voiced, let 
alone attended to. Elsewhere it has been used far too indiscriminately and 
inappropriately, failing to differentiate between opinions that are anti-
religion per se from those that are specifically anti-Islam. For example, ‘I 
am an Islamophobe, yes,’ said Polly Toynbee in the Guardian newspaper, 
‘But I am a Christophobe and Judeophobe too’.21 As Halliday has argued, 
the key phenomenon to be addressed is an anti-Muslim hostility directed at 
an ethno-religious identity rather than the tenets of a religion.22 In terms of 
the Runnymede model and Rokeach’s Dogmatism Scale upon which it was 
based therefore, “the instrument does not measure up to the theory”.23 
As regards Islamophobia per se, the same is blatantly true: the 
instruments we have to define, identify and explain it neither measure up 
to the theory nor are they entirely bias-free. Despite being able to identify 
incidents, events and expressions of what we might simplistically suggest 
as being ‘Islamophobia’, as the EUMC 9/11 report noted, “these were not 
necessarily in themselves the reason for any attacks…”. Islamophobia 
seemed to be the “…stimulant” underpinning them.24 Consequently, what 
was thought to be known about Islamophobia failed to provide any insight 
or explanation as to why Islamophobic retaliatory acts ensued or why such 
a phenomenon exists. Consequently, we are trying to locate something that 
we maybe do not adequately understand, hence Maussen’s comments. 
Nonetheless, the EUMC’s 9/11 report does offer some respite from this lack 
of clarity. As it stated: 
[N]either exhaustive nor conclusive…[it did] clarify some of the 
common trends and themes that were apparent in the wake of 
September 11. No single explanation can completely account for 
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the events that followed those in the US, but this does allow an 
insight into a certain identifiable phenomenon…25 
Most important therefore is the report’s categorical and justifiable 
conclusion that a “certain identifiable phenomenon” was evident.26 In 
doing so, and in contrast to the Runnymede model, the report 
differentiated the manifestations – the ‘common trends and themes’ – from 
what it saw as the phenomenon of Islamophobia itself, neither concluding 
nor making the assumption that the manifestations or forms of that ‘certain 
identifiable phenomenon’ were either that which constituted it or defined 
it.  
9.2  Conditions 
Whether or not it is clear what this ‘certain identifiable phenomenon’ is, it 
is this very phenomenon that impacts upon real people in their everyday 
lives and has also spread as a conceptual and/or social construct. The 
question to ask therefore is what are, or indeed have been, the conditions 
upon which this spread of Islamophobia occurred. To do so we must 
consider the backdrop of the past five years, punctuated as they have been 
by various terrorist atrocities, the mediatisation of knowledge and 
understanding, and the burgeoning hyper-reality of the ‘war on terror’. It 
has been a backdrop of hyperbolic overstatement, where mythological 
intent and evidential reality become both obscured and distorted as in 
Baudrillard’s ‘close-up photography’ analogy: 
[W]hen we get ‘too close’ to an object, we sometimes have 
trouble even distinguishing what the object is. In that sense, we 
cannot say that we have a grasp on the ‘real’ object in front of 
us. The hyperreal, in relation to this analogy, is like the extreme 
close-up and an extreme long-distance photograph at the same 
time. That is to say, there is no longer a third, normative 
position of realistic perspective. The notion of total involvement 
or immersion combined with alienating detachment is also 
perceived”.27 
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To some extent, the condition for this emergent and developing 
Islamophobia has been one where there has been a collapse of perspectival 
space, contextualised and informed by an eventful history and a climate of 
fear but without the necessary focus. Historically, Muslims and Islam have 
appeared as external, distant and essentially ‘out there’, both physically 
and conceptually. In recent years this critical – and possibly safe – distance 
has been eradicated. In such conditions, Muslims are no longer the enemy 
‘other’ but much more contemporarily, the enemy ‘within’. This of course 
does not explain why some EU citizens felt the need to exact revenge or 
engage in some retaliatory act but given the contemporary context with 
international tensions and uncertainties relating to the ongoing ‘war on 
terrorism’ being high in the consciousness of many in the West, it is clearly 
a possible catalyst. In fact, these feelings have continued and arguably 
intensified for a further five years, such that the conditions – a seedbed for 
Islamophobia perhaps – can begin to be seen to be taking shape. Because of 
these factors, “Islamophobia and anti-Muslim sentiments will continue to 
be founded for the foreseeable future”.28  
It is also worth noting how these are the same conditions governing 
the response to Islamophobia. If one considers this response at the pan-
European level, these conditions have prompted various reports and 
monitoring projects, such as those produced by the EUMC following 9/11 
and 7/7. This is not an entirely negative process however because it is these 
reports that have helped generalise and attribute both the term and concept 
of Islamophobia at the European level with some much needed legitimacy 
and credibility. It is also worth noting the flipside, however and 
acknowledge how – at the pan-European level at least – activities that have 
been proactive towards overcoming Islamophobia have been almost non-
existent. To compound the problem, rarely, whether socially or politically, 
has the concept of Islamophobia been dealt with in such a way as to allow 
the emergence of a critical analysis, a criticism that might – to some degree 
– also be levelled against academia. 
9.3  Consequences 
Having begun to identify the contexts and conditions pertaining to 
Islamophobia it is essential to consider some of the consequences: the 
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events and incidents that impinge upon the lives of real people in real 
ways. Such consequences range from verbal abuse and being spat on in the 
street, through to firebombs and hate-crimes, from politicians stoking the 
fears already directed towards isolated and excluded communities, 
through to racial profiling and the tightening of security measures to 
contain, restrain and at times, ban. To better highlight the breadth of these 
consequences, it is necessary to offer some differentiation. In this way, a 
better panoramic landscape is set out at the European level. It is important 
to stress however that these consequences are in themselves Islamophobic 
but more importantly that that they are possibly informed or initiated by 
ideological meanings or motivations. For example, the act of spitting on 
someone is far from Islamophobic in itself but spitting on someone because 
they are Muslim would be more than likely based on some anti-Muslim 
ideological premise. It is therefore the recognition of ‘Muslim-ness’ or 
‘Islamic-ness’ and a response to that which is Islamophobic and nothing 
more. This distinction is necessary as it offers the required differentiation 
that the more literalist Runnymede model fails to provide. 
Erosion of the multicultural model 
The growing presence, or more importantly, the recognition of the presence 
of Muslims has meant that the issue of integration has become a recurrent 
feature of the discourse surrounding Muslims and Islam. This has led to 
questions being asked about the ‘place’ of Muslims in Europe, or the 
Muslims of Europe. Besides Muslims themselves, the most significant 
victim of these debates has been the previously upheld social model of 
multiculturalism, something that is particularly relevant in the British and 
Dutch contexts. Broadly speaking, arguments against the ongoing validity 
of the multiculturalism model have suggested that its continuation will 
dilute or even eradicate notions of European identity, something 
increasingly framed in terms of being white and Christian. This can be seen 
in the rhetoric of both the Austrian Freedom Party leader, Jorg Haider and 
the Flemish separatist Vlaams Blok (now Vlaams Belang) and might also 
underlie the rhetoric surrounding Turkey’s accession into the EU.  
In the UK, the recognition of the perpetrators of 7/7 being 
‘homegrown bombers’ – not incidentally a new phenomenon in the UK 
given decades of ‘homegrown’ Northern Irish-born individuals 
participating in terrorist activities both in the province and on the mainland 
– has resulted in a complete overhaul of thinking about multiculturalism. 154 | ALLEN 
 
One consequence is the rhetorical question of whether it is possible to be 
both ‘British’ and ‘Muslim’. In some ways, many of the recent attacks on 
multiculturalism have been little more than a thinly veiled attack on 
Muslims and their identity. In the Netherlands – a model of liberal 
multiculturalism that until recently was routinely touted as an exemplar for 
the UK to emulate – the focus has seen a much greater emphasis being 
placed on cultural assimilation where ‘good citizenship’ and ‘civic 
integration’ have become key policy goals.29 The fears, anxieties and 
perceived threats that have been associated with this discourse have 
nowhere been as articulately voiced as by the assassinated Pim Fortuyn. 
Being vociferous about the need to maintain the liberal values and ethics of 
the Netherlands, Fortuyn directed much of his rhetoric towards Muslims 
and the religion of Islam. As he put it, “if it were legally possible, I’d say no 
more Muslims will get in here”. For Fortuyn, Islam both theologically and 
culturally had failed to undergo the necessary process of modernisation 
that was required if Muslims were to ever be fully Dutch. For him, this 
meant that both lacked either the ability or possibly even the willingness to 
accept certain tenets of a Western society. Regarding multiculturalism, his 
position was possibly most persuasively put when in a 2002 televised 
debate an imam taunted him for his homosexuality. As the imam 
eventually exploded in a rage of homophobia, Fortuyn calmly turned to the 
camera and addressing viewers directly, told them “this is the kind of 
Trojan horse of intolerance the Dutch are inviting into their society in the 
name of multiculturalism”.30 Having been posthumously voted the greatest 
ever Dutch man in 2004, his words and views have had a resonance across 
Europe and in many ways, encapsulate many of the debates which have 
and indeed continue to rage about the presence of Muslims.  
Anti-terrorism and security laws 
The tightening and implementation of anti-terror and security legislation 
has thrown a long shadow of suspicion over Muslims across Europe. In this 
context, issues relating to anti-terror and security have far too often been 
equated with issues relating to immigration where internal and external 
security policies have become conflated or even interchangeable with each 
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other. Because of this, Muslims have become understood in frames that 
both acknowledge and perpetuate an ongoing ‘otherness’; one that is 
inherently foreign, alien, enemy and regularly interchanged with populist 
notions of Muslims as ‘terrorists’ and ‘fifth columnists’, amongst others. 
Since 9/11, the nations of the EU have arrested more than twenty times the 
number of terrorist suspects as the US (but maybe because Europe has 
more of them).31 In the UK, two high profile shooting incidents can offer 
some insight. The first resulted in the death of the innocent Jean Charles de 
Menezes, a Brazilian national who was shot in the head seven times at 
point blank range on the basis that Metropolitan Police officers thought he 
might have been a suicide bomber. There has been much debate since 
about how he possibly ‘looked’ Muslim and what impact this had. Yet 
despite his killing, justifications have been put forward by the police, 
politicians and members of the general public to suggest that such mistakes 
are necessary and unavoidable if security and safety are to be priorities. 
The second shooting resulted in the innocent Mohammed Abdul Kahar, a 
British Muslim living in London, being shot in his home following a 
security raid that it is alleged involved up to 250 police officers, many of 
whom were wearing chemical warfare outfits. Despite such a large-scale 
operation and another shooting – Kahar was only wounded – the same 
justifications were aired, including some that seemingly blamed the 
innocent victims. Increasingly mediatised ‘terror raids’ have since become 
something of a recurrent feature in Britain. Similar events have occurred in 
both Germany and Italy also. Interestingly, despite populist attitudes to the 
contrary, terrorism in much of Europe since 9/11 has had a much less 
‘Islamic’ persona. In France and Spain for example, many more Basque 
nationalists have been arrested than Islamists: of 358 inmates accused of 
terrorism in France, only 94 are Muslim.32  
Under increased legislation that is on one level identified as being 
vital to increase security and protect the homeland and its people, other 
impacting consequences have also ensued. In Britain, legislation has made 
indirect incitement and the glorification of terrorism criminal offences, 
whilst the length of time terror suspects can be held without charge or trial 
has also increased. Similarly in Germany, where not only a number of 
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organisations have been banned but mosques are also searched with little 
justification and new data-mining techniques have been introduced to 
identify the ‘quiet’ radicals.33 Three significant consequences therefore 
a p p e a r  t o  h a v e  e m e r g e d  f r o m  t h i s  s i tuation; first, increased surveillance 
and police activity; second, the banning of various Muslim/Islamic groups; 
and finally, the growing deportation of those deemed radical or extremist. 
Each of these has affected Muslim communities more than any other 
community. 
Immigration policies 
Likewise, it has also been commonplace for immigration procedures to be 
tightened, sometimes where the overlap with security issues has not 
always been fully distinguishable. In Germany and France for example, the 
prospect of high numbers of low skill migrants is highly politicised and 
socially untenable. In response, they have sought to address this ‘problem’ 
by putting policies in place that make it easier for highly skilled immigrants 
to enter the countries at the same time as reducing this possibility by 
making immigration more difficult for others. Nicolas Sarkozy’s call for a 
more selective immigration policy has since been followed up with policies 
and legislation being introduced in May 2005. In highlighting the blurring 
of boundaries that exists between immigration and security, Sarkozy has 
quite openly referred to Muslims in his rhetorical justifications, arguing 
that any new migrants to France must, for example, be willing to accept the 
publication of religious cartoons in newspapers and women should have 
identity photographs taken without wearing the hijab or niqab. Similarly, he 
also referred to the riots of 2005 as part of his arguments about the roles 
and responsibilities of Muslims.34 
It has also been noted how the gap between the right and left of the 
political spectrum has shifted markedly closer since the events of 9/11 in 
their views and discourse about Islam.35 In France it has been noted how 
those from the left have contributed to the debates about Islam, especially 
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the issue of gender, as with the ex-president of the anti-racism organisation 
SOS-Racisme and prominent member of the Socialist Party Malek Boutih, 
who defended a policy of immigration with ‘laïcité’ and the acceptance of 
gender equality as a precondition for migration.36 From an equally liberal 
perspective, the Dutch Ministry of Aliens Affairs and Integration recently 
produced a film which is intended to assist with the screening of suitable 
immigrants by showing them the ‘norms’ of Dutch gender relations and 
sexuality, including images of naked beachgoers, public homosexuality and 
assertive female characters.37 Citizenship tests have also become de rigueur 
if somewhat less controversial. So in the German state of Baden-
Wurttemberg for example, moral questions have been raised to ensure that 
all children participate in swimming lessons. In the UK, questions have 
been devised as part of a ‘British-ness’ test that is aimed at providing 
immigrants with the opportunity to respect and share in Britain’s values 
and traditions.38 As Spain and Italy have only recently introduced newly 
developed immigration policies, it is too early to determine whether or 
indeed how these might affect Muslims as opposed to all immigrants. In 
Spain the spokesman of the Association of Moroccan Immigrant Workers 
(ATIME), Mustafa Mrabet, highlighted the apparent disparity between the 
52% acceptance of citizenship applications from Moroccans compared to 
more than 80% of Latin Americans.39 It is important to point out that in 
many settings, changes to immigration legislation and the perceptions 
associated with this should be understood in the wider context, where 
perceptions and attitudes to immigration are rapidly changing. This change 
is not Muslim-exclusive and in the UK for example, much recent debate has 
been about the widening of the EU and the influx of migrants from 
Bulgaria, Poland and Romania.  
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Physical and material abuses and attacks 
In 2002, the EUMC noted how “across the entire spectrum of the EU 
member states, incidents were identified where a negative or 
discriminatory act was perpetrated against Muslims or an entity that was 
associated with Islam”.40 However, due to the lack of reliable and effective 
national and Europe-wide monitoring systems, it is difficult to determine 
the actual scale or nature of the violence, damage and discrimination that 
was or has since been directed against Muslims. This is a problem that is 
further compounded by the fact that it is not only difficult to determine the 
motivation for such acts but that there is a widespread unwillingness 
amongst Muslim communities – seemingly irrespective of location – to 
report such crimes. Consequently, evidence tends to be largely anecdotal 
and thus easily refuted. Because of this, there is little value in detailing long 
lists of those attacks and abuses as they may not accurately reflect the true 
depth and breadth of the situation. 
However as noted after 9/11, events or incidents identified as 
‘Muslim’ or ‘Islamic’ do seem to act as a catalyst for a rise in retaliatory 
attacks and responses. Following 9/11 for example, Muslim women in 
Austria and Ireland became targets of verbal and physical abuse whilst in 
Denmark, a Muslim woman was thrown from a moving taxi for being 
nothing more than ‘Muslim’. Similar incidents – though varying in number 
and intensity – have also been recorded in other less obvious locations 
including Belgium, Finland and Luxembourg, among others. Likewise, 
following the death of Theo van Gogh in 2004, more than eighty incidents 
against Muslims were recorded in the Netherlands, including a bomb being 
placed at a Muslim school, an arson attack on a place of worship in Helden, 
started by neo-Nazis.41 Following the atrocities of 7/7, similar events were 
seen in the UK, apparent from police records in the northern city of 
Sheffield. Note that from the beginning of the year to 6 July 2005 only one 
‘Islamophobic’ incident was reported, in the two weeks following 7/7 more 
than 30 were recorded.42 Figures have since returned to ‘normal’ despite 
‘street’ tensions remaining. 
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Role of political leaders and political parties 
Possibly as a consequence of the political pressure applied by such issues as 
terrorism, immigration and the widening of the EU’s boundaries, a 
growing incidence of right-wing and nationalistic rhetoric and discourse 
has also emerged. An Austrian source has noted, “resentments, fears and 
constructions of the enemy … [have] now come to the surface” where the 
attacks of 9/11 and the ongoing ‘war on terror’ “confirm old prejudices”.43 
It is not only Islamophobia that has ensued as a result of this shift, but so 
too other forms of discrimination and hate-speech including racism by 
colour and anti-Semitism.44 
Numerous examples of this can be seen, for example, in Italy, where 
representatives of Forza Nuova have laid claim to the fact that Italy is, by 
history and nature, essentially Catholic. The argument continues, as 
Muslims are not Catholic, then Muslims cannot either be or indeed ever be 
Italian. Consequently, Muslims should not be allowed to be citizens as they 
will never be ‘good’ citizens.45 Elsewhere the Lega Nord has switched its 
rhetoric to take advantage of the current climate, deploying slightly 
modified versions of traditional anti-Semitism against Islam. In Denmark – 
a country placed under the spotlight by the publication of cartoons of the 
Prophet Muhammad – a similar shift can also be seen. With its Prime 
Minister having publicly criticised Muslims for unnecessarily taking up to 
' f o u r '  [ s i c ]  p r a y e r  b r e a k s  a t  w o r k  each day, Denmark was also the first 
European country to have governmental elections following the 9/11 
attacks. Maybe unsurprisingly, political capital was sought by focusing on 
the presence and role of Muslims in Denmark via debates about 
immigration, terrorism, security and the role of ‘foreigners’, a term that has 
become increasingly equated in the Danish vernacular with ‘Muslims’. 
With the Dansk Folkeparti being reported to the police for hate speech 
crimes, the Danish political spaces were dominated by tests of loyalty, the 
requirement for Muslims to pledge their allegiance to the Danish 
constitution over and above the Koran, the legal restrictions on Danish 
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citizens or residents to bring spouses into the country from elsewhere, and 
the need for all immigrants to pursue a strong cultural connection to 
Denmark rather than anywhere else. Without exploring debates about the 
cartoons issue at this particular juncture, what is interesting is that one year 
after the original publication of the cartoons, members of the Dansk 
Folkeparti’s youth movement were shown in a secret video taking part in a 
competition to draw insulting pictures of Muhammad.  
A shift towards populist right wing politics, albeit localised, can be 
seen in the growing popularity of the British National Party (BNP) and its 
Islamophobic campaigns. Emerging from the 2001 Bradford disturbances - 
originally presented as being racial rather than religious, ‘Asian’ as 
opposed to ‘Muslim’ – the BNP and indeed others began to re-interpret and 
re-evaluate who those ‘Asians’ were, subsequently substituting ‘Asian’ 
with ‘Muslim-ness’ and the ‘problems’ of Islam.46 Through a variety of 
campaigns including ‘I.S.L.A.M.: Intolerance, Slaughter, Looting, Arson 
and Molestation of Women’, ‘Islam out of Britain’ and ‘Islam Referendum 
Day’, so the BNP has in just five years gone from an extremely marginal 
far-right movement to a minor political party that has been able to make 
significant gains in a number of areas. Targeting those areas where poverty 
is high amongst white communities, the BNP have made in-roads in 
municipal elections where they currently hold 43 council seats including 
Barking and Dagenham in London, where it won 11 out of the 13 seats it 
contested in May 2006. With growing localised support and the intention to 
stand in future European Parliamentary elections they have enlisted fringe 
Sikh and Hindu allies in their anti-Muslim campaign, exacerbating the 
intra-Asian tensions that exist: a uniquely dramatic shift away from 
traditional racist and xenophobic strategies.  
Such examples are indicative of the profound changes that have 
occurred across Europe in the past few years. Without a doubt, it is now 
possible to make anti-Muslim, anti-Islamic and anti-immigrant statements 
and put forward associated ideas which five years ago would have been 
entirely inappropriate and unacceptable. Politically however, two other 
trends are worthy of note. The first is the increasing differentiation between 
‘good’ and ‘bad’ Islam increasingly couched in terms of ‘mainstream’ or 
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‘moderate’ and ‘extremist’ or ‘radical’ respectively.47 Rarely in any political 
setting are the terms Islam or Muslim used neutrally. Given that the 
distinctions of ‘good’, ‘moderate’, ‘mainstream’, ‘true’ and others are 
regularly made, underlying this is the assumption that Muslims and Islam 
are inherently and normatively problematic and that stressing their ‘good’, 
‘moderate’ or other similar characteristics is therefore a necessity. The 
second is the increasing deployment of Muslim voices to air criticisms of 
Islam and Muslims. Reflecting the BNP’s employment of Sikhs and Hindus 
as ‘Asians’ to denounce other types of ‘Asians’, the deployment of Muslim 
voices also provides a similar justification by speaking from the ‘inside’. 
Possibly the most notorious of these is Ayaan Hirsi Ali. Questionably 
established as an ‘expert’ on Islam, she has moved her political leanings 
from left to right as her prominence has increased. Throughout she has 
decried moderate expressions of Islam as fundamentally incompatible with 
liberal democracies and most controversially, the Prophet Muhammad ‘a 
paedophile’ and ‘perverse tyrant’.48 
Media coverage of Islam 
As with much of the underlying meaning in political spheres, the same 
applies in the media where Muslims and Islam are without doubt 
increasingly problematised, framed in discourses of violence, terrorism and 
misogyny, amongst others.49 To illustrate this, Geisser’s study of the French 
media notes how it typically prefers to adopt populist public attitudes and 
prejudices rather than trying to be informative and balanced. Similarly, 
Tévanian shows how the media helped construct the ‘problem of the hijab’ 
by deciding which voices should be included in the debate: all social 
scientists, feminists, teachers, and civil actors not opposed to the hijab 
being excluded, thus leaving the ensuing debate to be played out between 
stereotypically bearded foreign Muslim men on the one side and secular 
male intellectuals on the other.50 In Spain, a similar climate exists where the 
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media recurrently constructs Muslims as an “internal enemy”,51 whilst in 
Italy those such as Gritti have noted how the vast majority of the country’s 
media coverage is built around “the myth of Islamic martyrdom and 
national fanatics”.52 
Two incidents in particular best highlight the role of the media. The 
first is the decision by the British Daily Star to run a spoof of itself entitled 
the  Daily Fatwa that included an editorial column that was blank and 
stamped ‘censored’ alongside semi-nude female models as part of its 
‘Burqa Babes’ special. The Daily Fatwa also ran under the headline “How 
your favourite paper would look under Muslim law”.53 Before printing 
however, the National Union of Journalists blocked its publication. Yet 
within a few days, men’s magazine – or ‘lad’s mag’ – Zoo had taken up the 
mantle and printed a double-page spread featuring headlines such as 
“Public stonings!”, “Beheadings!” and “Absolutely nobody having any fun 
whatsoever”. It also featured a full-page picture of a woman in a niqab 
alongside the headline, “A girl! As you’ve never seen her before…Pending 
approval under shariah law”. The article went on: 
[M]aybe sharia law isn’t so controversial after all…Muslims 
who practise it to the letter are able to divorce their wives (up to 
four allowed) by text message. Wives are banned from being in 
a car with a man who is not a blood relative. And - common 
sense a-go-go - women aren’t allowed to drive cars anyway! 
And hey, maybe the stricter Muslim woman is happy to hide 
her face and fleshy bits from public view? Been getting it all 
wrong with bikini-wearing babes, all-seeing Sex-Ray Specs and 
the pro-flesh Hot List? So for one week only, we proudly 
present your all-new, veil-friendly Zoo…54 
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The second is the decision by the Jyllands Posten to print cartoons of 
the Prophet Muhammad. Whilst various conspiracy stories are circulating 
about why the cartoons were published, it was the ensuing debates about 
freedom of speech that spread across Europe and indeed the world that 
were important. With the newspaper being accused of abusing freedom of 
speech by various Muslim groups and certain non-Muslim Danes, many 
also sought to defend the newspaper. For many, this epitomised the ‘clash 
of civilisations’ thesis: an unavoidable clash of values, practices, beliefs, 
ethics and most importantly, a clash of Muslims against the secular West. 
Beyond the confines of Europe, the controversy resulted in the withdrawal 
of the ambassadors of Libya, Saudi Arabia and Syria from Denmark, as 
well as consumer boycotts by Muslims of Danish products. Various Danish 
embassies were firebombed and numerous violent protests worldwide 
became international news. Despite apologising to Muslims, the newspaper 
maintained its right to print the cartoons, arguing that Islamic 
‘fundamentalism’ must not be able to dictate what newspapers can and 
cannot print. An interesting development however emerged in April 2003, 
when a different editor of the newspaper rejected a set of unsolicited Jesus 
cartoons on the grounds that they might provoke a public outcry. For many 
who opposed the printing of the Prophet cartoons, this was merely 
evidence that the newspaper – and indeed for many, the West – applied 
double-standards when it came to Islam. 
These examples are useful in that they reinforce the observation set 
out in the EUMC 9/11 report. In the first instance, whilst distasteful to 
Muslims, it is unclear whether such incidents in reality initiate or promote 
Islamophobia in their audience. In the second, whilst the number of 
incidents against Muslims rose in Denmark, it is again difficult to establish 
whether these were as a result of the cartoons being printed or whether 
because this was another ‘Muslim’ incident that merely reinforced views 
and attitudes already in circulation. The EUMC report therefore remains 
pertinent: 
To try and explain the media's role therefore remains difficult. 
None of the reports suggested that the media directly caused 
or, indeed, were responsible for any reported or identified act 
of aggression or significant change in attitude. However, this is 
not to dismiss their impact in any way, and despite there being 
no direct evidence to suggest otherwise, the media continue to 
play a major role in the formulation and establishment of 
popular perceptions in the public sphere. So when certain 164 | ALLEN 
 
media were identified as representing Muslims both negatively 
and stereotypically – sometimes as an almost necessary part of 
the reporting process – in a situation that was volatile, a greater 
willingness to be responsible and accountable would have been 
welcomed. However, some media sectors were responsible and 
accountable, while others sought to remain balanced and 
objective, and for this those sources should be congratulated. So 
whilst no evidence exists to suggest that media are influentially 
causal, they also cannot be completely dismissed either.55 
9.4  Anti-Islamophobia initiatives 
The conditions that have initiated a greater receptivity towards 
Islamophobia and anti-Muslim attitudes have also been the same 
conditions that have informed efforts to tackle Islamophobia. At the 
political level therefore, various politicians have at some time or another 
called for people to clearly differentiate between Muslims and Islam and 
what might in some settings be referred to as ‘Islamism’, ‘fundamentalism’ 
and so on. For those such as former British Prime Minister Tony Blair and 
the Irish Taoiseach Bertie Ahern amongst others, some political leaders 
have tried to make ‘goodwill’ gestures towards Muslims within their 
national contexts.56 Whether this has been successful, however, remains 
open to debate, especially when derogatory or negative comments about 
Islam and Muslims – for example Berlusconi’s comments – have been 
reported as frames that are of European concern and importance, cutting 
across national borders. Maybe this says more about the media though than 
it does about politicians.  
Other efforts to combat Islamophobia have begun to emerge across a 
number of European countries, albeit locally focused and largely exempted 
from state or other governmental influence. This is not so in the UK where 
the state has acknowledged in varying degrees the need for the 
misconceptions and misunderstandings about Islam and Muslims to be 
challenged by both Muslims and non-Muslims. This has taken numerous 
forms, from how different police forces have begun trying to prevent any 
backlash or retaliatory attacks on Muslims at the same time as trying to 
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reduce the sense of threat felt by many Muslims themselves. In various 
locations, police patrols have been stepped up around mosques and Islamic 
centres, and senior officers have sought to liaise with community leaders. 
One such project has been the collaboration between the London 
Metropolitan Police and the Muslim communities in the London borough 
of Southwark. Here 58 different Muslim voluntary and community 
organisations participated in meetings to establish a dedicated telephone 
line to record crimes against Muslims and indeed any other community 
that is targeted or attacked. In Scotland, Lothian and Borders Police Chief 
Constable, Sir Roy Cameron, called upon all communities to root out 
racism following a fire attack on a mosque in Edinburgh whilst the Scottish 
Executive gave mosques and other places of ‘ethnic community worship’ 
£1 million to improve security.  
As for Muslim communities, the response has been equally as wide-
ranging in the UK. These have included the Muslim Council of Britain 
(MCB),57 meeting regularly with different governmental offices including 
both the Foreign Minister and Prime Minister, with the backing of around 
250 affiliate organisations. A year after 9/11 it also published a collection of 
reflective writings by both Muslims and non-Muslims entitled, The quest for 
sanity: reflections on September 11 and its aftermath.58 Shortly after the Madrid 
train bombing atrocities, it also sent a letter to more than a thousand 
mosques urging imams to promote peace and harmony. Other 
organisations have included the Islamic Human Rights Commission 
(IHRC), which issued safety tips for the Muslim community and FAIR, 
which, amongst other things, organised a University of Westminster 
conference entitled: Exploring Islamophobia: Deepening Our 
Understanding of Islam and Muslims.59 Elsewhere the Islamic Foundation60 
has provided cultural awareness and diversity training for non-Muslim 
professionals whilst the Islamic Society of Britain (ISB) has been organising 
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its annual Islam Awareness Week since 1994, albeit with more vigour since 
9/11.61 
Outside the UK, Muslim communities have been strengthening their 
organisations not only to monitor and keep records of Islamophobic 
incidents but to also aid their push towards official recognition. One such 
example has been the establishment of the Islamic Anti-Defamation League 
of Italy in 2005.62 Most notable have been the many different initiatives that 
have emanated from within other faith groups and communities, 
identifiable particularly in the growth and development of inter-faith 
dialogue initiatives between Muslims and Christians. These have been both 
important and influential, as in Greece where Archbishop Christodoulos, 
the head of the Church of Greece, quickly brought together leading figures 
from the Abrahamic traditions as a show of solidarity soon after 9/11. 
Similarly, the Orthodox Ecumenical Patriarchate organised an inter-faith 
summit in Brussels to challenge the legacy of historical enmity in shaping 
the way in which people view each other contemporarily.63 Many other 
initiatives include those such as the multi-faith prayer events held in 
Senate’s Square, Helsinki and the oration for peace organised by the Pax 
Christi in Lisbon.64 
Inter-faith initiatives have provided invaluable opportunities for 
communities to come together and challenge misconceptions. The 
Christlich-Islamische Gesellschaft in Germany is a national organisation that 
sponsors such dialogue and has established groups in various cities across 
Germany.65 Likewise, the Deutsches Islamforum has begun to mediate 
between Muslims and non-Muslims whilst the Central Council of German 
Muslims has declared 3 October – German reunification day – as Open 
Mosque Day also, thereby providing people the opportunity to visit a 
mosque and speak with Muslims. A similar initiative also occurs in Austria 
at the same time.66 What with the overlap between ‘Muslims’ and 
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‘immigrants’, in Spain a council has been established to give advice to the 
Spanish government about questions of integration, whilst the Spanish 
Observatory on Racism and Xenophobia was set up to monitor and report 
on a range of issues including Islamophobia, albeit not explicitly.67 In the 
Netherlands, a Commission on Equal Treatment has been established to 
help implement the 1994 Equal Treatment Law whilst a National Bureau 
Against Racial Discrimination provides the expertise to prevent the growth 
of racial – and by default, religious – discrimination.68 
Conclusions 
Understanding Islamophobia is neither easy nor straightforward. Whilst a 
decade might have passed since the Runnymede report noted how 
Islamophobia was becoming ‘more explicit’, it may be that since then, the 
reverse has occurred, with links to debates, events, and incidents that are 
seemingly unconnected to earlier concepts of Islamophobia. Many of the 
examples set out here may not therefore be overtly Islamophobic. But 
underpinning them – sometimes in a relatively invisible way – there seem 
to be an anti-Muslim, anti-Islamic ideology that informs, explains and 
causes these and many other consequences to ensue. Despite the failings of 
the term and the lack of clarity about the phenomenon, Islamophobia is 
without doubt here to stay and can no longer be discarded from the 
European lexicon. The task now is to set out more clearly what 
Islamophobia is and importantly, what it is not – about which there is little 
consensus at present. Nonetheless, a ‘certain identifiable phenomenon’ 
does continue to exist and further research is needed. Despite being 
something of an unknown term less than five years ago, the spread of 
Islamophobia both discursively and conceptually in the public and political 
arena has meant that Islamophobia is now a social reality. It has been 
transformed into an increasingly important and urgent issue, demanding 
our attention and action. This paper has attempted to identify the 
significant changes that have occurred in Europe and to show how far-
reaching these have been. At this particular juncture, however, it is 
impossible to even begin to speculate on where Europe and its 
Islamophobia will be at the end of its second decade in 2017. 
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10. MUSLIM INSTITUTIONS AND 
POLITICAL MOBILISATION  
SARA SILVESTRI 
Introduction 
In Europe, and most of the Western world, Muslim presence in the public 
sphere is a recent phenomenon that characterised the last decade of the 20th 
century and has deeply marked the beginning of the 21st. This visible 
presence, which amounts to something between 15 and 20 million 
individuals, can best be analysed if dissected into a number of components. 
The first part of this chapter illustrates where, when and why organised 
Muslim voices and institutions have emerged in Europe, and which actors 
have been involved. The second part is more schematic and analytical, in 
that it seeks to identify from these dynamics the process through which 
Muslims become political actors and how they relate to other, often in 
competing political forces and priorities. It does so by observing the 
objectives and the variety of strategies that Muslims have adopted in order 
to articulate their concerns vis-à-vis different contexts and interlocutors. 
The conclusions offer an initial evaluation of the impact and of the 
consequences of Muslim mobilisation and institution-formation for 
European society and policy-making.  
10.1  Background1 
We are witnessing the increasingly assertive emergence of a universal and 
transnational religion – Islam – in the European public sphere. And yet, this 
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is happening in a rather disorganised way and across an umma (the global 
community of the faithful) that is fra c t u r e d .  T h i s  i s  b e c a u s e ,  a s  w i t h  
Protestantism, Islam is a faith focused on the direct relationship between 
the believer and God, and without significant intermediary figures and 
hierarchical structures comparable to those of the Catholic or Orthodox 
churches. Moreover, the Prophet Muhammad left no instructions as to how 
to select his successor to lead Muslims after his death.2 
In the absence of Muslim institutions with a wide recognition and 
legitimacy from across the variety of Muslim communities, European 
governments have experienced considerable difficulty in relating to and 
addressing the needs of their Muslim populations. The nature of these 
difficulties is rooted in a combination of legal, structural and political 
issues, as well as perceptions. The socio-political dominance exercised by 
the Church in Europe throughout the centuries, combined with 
Enlightenment-driven notions of secularism, has also shaped the way 
bureaucracies, public authorities and legal systems all over the continent 
have dealt with, and still relate to, religion in general and with Islam more 
specifically. On the one hand, European states enthusiastically support 
equality and religious freedom whilst operating within the framework of 
the separation between private and public sphere. On the other hand, the 
way states have developed their relations with religious groups is still 
shaped by corporatist models and by the traditional pattern of church-state 
relations, which still reflects, if anything in this very terminology, the 
privileged position enjoyed until recently by the Christian churches in this 
part of the world.3 
The lack of formal Muslim leaders and institutions in Europe has led 
European governments and EU institutions to push for an ‘artificial’ 
creation of Muslim councils that would fit into the standard pattern of 
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religion-state relations. But before looking at the implications of the process 
of ‘institutionalisation of Islam’ in the sense of ‘official recognition by state 
agencies’, it is important to provide an overview of the evolution of Muslim 
political mobilisation in Europe. 
The first instances of Muslim mobilisation in the European public 
sphere appeared in the 1970s – with a couple of earlier exceptions – and 
coincided with the establishment of places of worship, and of religious, 
cultural and educational associations.4 In the mid 1970s there were already 
examples of grassroots mobilisation to create basic points of reference and 
institutions for the Muslim communities of Europe. Mosques and cultural 
centres were often established by and/or controlled by Muslim states or by 
Muslim transnational networks such as the Muslim Brotherhood or the 
Jamaat-i-Islami. Originating respectively in South Asia and North Africa 
and the Middle East, these two movements are known for having an 
Islamist agenda, i.e. they actively want to bring Islamic values and interests 
(and eventually sharia law) into the political sphere. In Europe they are 
organised by diasporas and political exiles that often antagonise the 
governments of their own countries. Although the Islamists’ politico-
religious project has provoked a great deal of suspicion and fear on the part 
of the establishments (especially but not only the secular ones), both in 
Europe and in the Muslim world, de facto these movements do not offer 
any exact picture, in practical terms, of what society and political process 
would look like in the event of them obtaining power. Most of the Islamist 
movements are focused on agenda of political reform rooted in social 
justice, which explains, on the one hand, their success amongst the masses 
and lower classes and, on the other hand, the hostility of the establishments 
that feel threatened by these ‘revolutionary’ forces. From the outset, the 
scenario of Muslim political mobilisation in the European public sphere is 
marked by competing forces: the ‘Islam of the states’, Islamist and diaspora 
networks, and more informal and more local groupings. The expression 
‘Islam of the states’ refers to attempts on the part of the governments and 
diplomatic seats of prominent Muslim countries such as Saudi Arabia, 
Algeria, Morocco and Turkey to organise religious and cultural activities, 
language courses and to sponsor the creation of Islamic institutions for 
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Muslims living in Europe, ‘in line’ with the official version of Islam that 
these states support. 
Muslim activism took on a more independent and political nature at 
the time of and after the ‘Rushdie affair’ and the ‘veil affair’ (which 
exploded in the UK and France respectively in 1989) and intensified 
exponentially throughout the 1990s. The close of the century saw a 
considerable growth and diversification of Muslim mobilisation in Europe; 
this was the consequence of the gradual settlement of Muslims here, first as 
long-term residents and then as citizens. 
Increasing political awareness was provoked inter alia by the first 
Gulf War against Saddam Hussein in 1991. Communication and 
mobilisation were also facilitated by the spread of the internet. A number of 
Muslim associations providing counselling and social services (and 
primarily concerned with health, housing, English language and vocational 
training) also appeared in the same period, together with Muslim 
professional networks, advocacy groups, and Muslim print and broadcast 
media. Muslims became more and more vocal in their claims concerning 
religious practices and freedom in the public domain, religious education, 
discrimination and Islamophobia.5 As this ‘civil society Islam’ spread, the 
‘Islam of the states’ gradually lost influence over the Muslim population of 
Europe. 
Before the presence of an increasingly strong, and yet multiform, 
unstructured and acephalous Islam in the public sphere, European states 
became faced with two choices. Either they had to rethink the way they 
relate (through their legal and administrative provisions) to this growing 
minority religion or they had to demand the establishment of Muslim 
institutions. There is an expectation that such institutions should be created 
if Muslims want to ‘earn’ a place in the complex mechanisms of governance 
in EU institutions and member states. This is primarily because Muslims 
are perceived – and often tend to present themselves – as a bloc, as a 
                                                           
5 See also the chapter by Chris Allen for a detailed treatment of Islamophobia. A 
good study of Muslim claims in Europe has been conducted by Ruud Koopmans 
and Paul Statham and their colleagues. See P. Statham, R. Koopmans, M. Giugni 
and F. Passy (2005), “Resilient or Adaptable Islam? Multiculturalism, Religion and 
Migrants’ Claims-making for Group Demands in Britain, the Netherlands and 
France”, Ethnicities, 5/4, pp. 427-459.  MUSLIM INSTITUTIONS & POLITICAL MOBILISATION| 173 
 
community sharing fundamental values, sensitivities, and perspectives 
which are often discriminated against or ignored. Second, a structural 
problem comes into play when we talk of Muslim engagement and 
representation with European states and societies; that is, the idea that 
Islam should ‘fit in’ with the criteria that regulate relations with the 
dominant faith groups. Such criteria are rooted in at least three basic 
expectations: 1) that Islam should behave like an ‘organised’ belief, with 
mechanisms of representation and religious leaders in clear positions of 
power. This is based on the assumption that the traditional church-state 
model within the secular framework of the separation between public and 
private sphere would work for Islam too, 2) there is a somewhat abstract 
notion of ‘integration’ which de facto differs between various multicultural, 
‘assimilationist’ or mixed practices adopted by European states, 3) Muslim 
organisations should be representative both of the demographic and of the 
doctrinal characteristics of the Muslim populations of Europe.  
In short, Muslim communities are implicitly expected to adapt to and 
to adopt the existing pattern of relations between the state and ethnic and 
religious communities in order to engage with the social and political 
context in which they live. As a consequence, new forms of 
institutionalisation of Islam (other than mosques and Islamic schools) have 
begun to appear in Europe, often through the direct intervention of 
European governments. Elsewhere I have illustrated the emergence of a 
particular instance, ‘national Muslim councils’.6 These bodies are created 
with the expectation that they constitute official interlocutors available for 
consultation and capable of representing the Muslim community and 
acting as bridges between the grassroots level and the state. This process 
inaugurates a ‘domestication’ or ‘normalisation’ of a European version of 
Islam shaped around the idea that a ‘moderate’ (and artificial) form of 
Islam should be supported in order to do justice to Muslim minorities, but 
also to stem radicalisation.7  
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The two decades bridging the 20th and 21st centuries have witnessed 
the establishment and spreading of this common pattern of 
institutionalisation of Islam within the borders of the EU. As described in 
more detail in the chapter by Bernard Godard, this has been mainly a top-
down, state-driven dynamic, although a mutual interest in formalising 
relations is clearly visible among many Muslim groups and individuals 
living in Europe too.8 There are various motivations behind this move and 
security concerns are certainly top of the list. However, beside the necessity 
to maintain law and order and to counter terrorism (i.e. to ‘control’ specific 
social, ethnic and religious groups at risk of ‘radicalisation’), there is also a 
genuine intention to facilitate communication between state institutions 
and Muslim individuals in order to do justice to the principles of freedom 
of religion and non-discrimination. In this way, the state seeks – or at least 
claims to be able – to respond better to the needs of European Muslims and 
to ‘protect’ them from abuse and discrimination. Muslim individuals and 
organisations, for their part, though critical of the security aspect of this 
exercise and of the continuous use of the words ‘moderate’ and ‘Islamic 
extremism’ and ‘Islamic terrorism’ seem to welcome the prospect of a 
platform (with money and public visibility attached to it) to channel their 
concerns.  
Whereas the motivations for becoming involved in the 
institutionalisation of Islam are pretty similar across the various EU 
member states, in practical terms the strategies adopted by each country 
present certain differences.9 Factors that determine these differences 
include: the variety of versions of Islam that exist across Europe, ideologies, 
the socio-economic circumstances of the local Muslim population, cultural 
and historical features that characterise specific European countries and 
their approach to secularisation, national and EU provisions concerning 
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immigration and citizenship, church-state relations and attitudes towards 
foreigners and minorities in individual countries. 
10.2  The EU, Islam, Muslim networks and institutions 
As far as the EU is concerned, there are a number of policy dimensions 
connected to Islam and Muslim communities.10 Social affairs is the policy 
area concerned with social cohesion and which, in 2000, put forth 
legislation condemning discrimination in the work place on religious 
grounds. Initiatives around immigration are also very likely to have an 
impact on the Muslim populations of Europe because many Muslims are 
still immigrants, not citizens, of the EU. Since 2000, when the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights was signed at Nice, the EU has also stressed its 
commitment to protect fundamental rights, including religious freedom 
and the rights of minorities. At least since 1999, when at the Council in 
Tampere the EU member states announced their determination to go ahead 
with the development of common immigration and asylum policies and 
stressed the importance of integration, the EU has also prioritised the need 
to accompany immigration control with measures to facilitate the 
integration of migrants. The fight against terrorism and radicalisation 
conducted in the field of Justice, Security and Freedom has also to deal with 
thorny issues of Islamic principles being monopolised by terrorists for 
violent purposes. One aspect of EU external relations, the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership, also places considerable emphasis on the 
importance of establishing social and cultural exchanges across the two 
shores of the Mediterranean, and includes intercultural relations and 
interfaith relations. Moreover we cannot leave out the EU’s ambivalent 
relations with Turkey and with other Muslim political actors across the 
Mediterranean. More than the religious identity of the majority of the 
country’s population, it is perhaps the recent re-Islamisation of Turkey’s 
politics – first with the Refah party and now with Erdogan’s Justice and 
Development Party, and the prominent role that Turkey is playing in the 
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Organisation of the Islamic Conference – that constitutes a cause for 
concern for at least some parts of the EU. Finally, the EU has initiated an 
internal process of institutionalisation of Islam which seems to fit the same 
framework of the national Muslim councils described above. In the mid 
1990s the Commission set up the Muslim Council of Cooperation in Europe 
(MCCE), whose story I have told elsewhere.11 Even if the MCCE were not 
successful, the idea of creating a supranational Muslim interlocutor, for and 
promoted by the EU institutions, remained alive. So, the 2004 
Constitutional Treaty contains article I-52 which spells out the important 
contributions that the Churches and other religious and philosophical 
groups could make to the Union and outlines a flexible form of regular and 
transparent consultation between the religious groups of Europe and the 
EU institutions. As a matter of fact such a consultation has only happened a 
couple of times since the summer of 2005, when Commission President 
Barroso convened an emergency meeting in the aftermath of the London 
bombings.12 This shows that the way the European Union (EU) has 
explicitly conceptualised and made space for engagement with religious 
groups is in the context of civil society. This approach, which falls under 
the corporatist mentality described above for the national level, indicates a 
preference for dialogue with formal, organised groups rather than with 
individual citizens. It has been criticised for being elitist, restricting 
democratic participation and missing out the real contribution of 
individual citizens or organisations that do not have the resources to 
coordinate their interests very effectively.13 The origin and mobilisation 
strategies of the only two pan-European Muslim pressure groups that were 
established in the mid 1990s and based in Brussels (the Federation of 
European Muslim Youth Organisations, FEMYSO, and the Federation of 
Islamic Organisations in Europe, FIOE) proves that this criticism is not 
unfounded. As with any lobby group, the conditions upon which these 
organisations can subsist and be successful are a combination of factors: 
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motivation, availability of economic and human resources and some form 
of institutional structure. Perhaps in this case the motivation is the crucial 
factor that triggers the rest. They are staffed mainly by volunteers, who are 
moderately to highly educated, extremely mobile and confident 
individuals, often university students and professionals, who have at some 
point been involved in grassroots work. FEMYSO and FIOE appear to be 
the EU branches of two networks of local associations, mosques and 
cultural centres across the EU with some remote ties to the Islamist 
discourse of the Jamaat-i-Islami and the Muslim Brotherhood.14  
10.3  Analysing the dynamics 
The points made above show that Muslim mobilisation has taken place on 
two levels, the national and the transnational, i.e. either locally, inside the 
individual nation states of the EU or across and beyond the EU member 
states. It is mainly directed towards the articulation of identity politics and 
can take more or less organised – or even institutionalised – forms. 
Sometimes the objective of the mobilisation itself is the creation of Muslim 
authorities and institutions. In order to simplify the picture and to grasp 
the relationship between its components, this mobilisation can be reduced 
to three broad typologies:  
1.  Religious institutions in a traditional sense, such as mosques and 
schools. 
2.  Grassroots and civil society organisations, which in turn can be 
divided into a) community associations devoted to cultural and 
educational projects, support networks and the provision of aid and 
social services, and b) advocacy and pressure groups, which tend to 
be of a more political nature.  
3.  Muslim states trying to help (‘interfere with’ would perhaps be a 
more accurate term) their own diasporas by providing moral 
guidance and economic support through the funding of mosques and 
cultural centres or by appointing imams and teachers of Arabic.  
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These three ‘formats’ of Muslim assertiveness and engagement with 
the public sphere seem to be ‘spontaneous’ in character, i.e. to originate 
from within a Muslim context. The main differences are that 1) and 2) tend 
to be instances coming from ‘inside’ Europe, whereas 3) comes from 
outside, and 2) is more informal than 1) and 3). Both 1) and 2) though, are 
often exposed to external influences, not directly of states but of 
transnational movements – for instance the missionary movement Tablighi 
Jamaat or the Islamist Jamaat-i-Islami and Muslim Brotherhood – if not 
established Islamic parties.  
Even if the involvement of elite groups were crucial to the 
establishment of associations and institutions such as those described 
under 1) and 2), these forms of mobilisation could be regarded as ‘bottom-
up’ because they are part of the variegated world of civil society. On the 
other hand, even if 3) supposedly includes ‘genuinely Muslim’ initiatives, it 
should still be classified as ‘top-down’ because in this case governments, 
not civil society groups, take the initiative to impose-propose the 
establishment of religious, cultural and educational institutions with a 
specific and restrictive agenda concerning Muslim articulation of identity 
and political participation in Europe. 
As far as the dynamics between and among Muslim organisations in 
Europe and their relationship with European states are concerned, more 
often than not we see competition between Muslim organisations for access 
to resources, visibility and power. The search for authority and 
legitimisation happens on two levels: on the one hand, those individuals 
and groups that are involved in the articulation of a Muslim voice and in 
the establishment of Muslim institutions seek the support of the largest 
number of fellow Muslims; on the other hand, they keep a constant eye on 
the priorities and attitudes of the state and government where they reside 
and which they try to please.15 Fragmentation and rivalries within the 
umma are perceived and lived as real problems by Muslims all over the 
world. This is especially so in the European context when they hinder the 
interaction of Muslim communities with the rest of European society, thus 
creating obstacles to the development of a public policy that takes into 
account the needs and claims of this conspicuous religious minority.  
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When it comes to the motivations behind Muslim engagement in 
identity politics and institution-building, we can detect several reasons that 
are at times separate and at other times are combined. First there can be the 
genuine desire to give a voice to and improve the plight of Muslim 
individuals, alongside the pursuit of personal gain and political 
opportunism. Secondly, political structures and culture, and the juridical 
context of each country, as well as varying notions of the relationship 
between citizens and the state that Muslim individuals might have 
inherited from their place of origin, also determine how, if at all, Muslim 
political participation can materialise in Europe. For instance, in many 
European countries, the legal status of ‘immigrant’ versus that of ‘citizen’ 
can make a lot of a difference when translated into civil and political rights 
exercised by any individual, from the right to vote in national elections to 
the right to establish legally recognised associations. Finally, Muslim 
mobilisation is often a response to a country’s attitude to religion and 
secularism, as well as to its internal and external policies.  
This latter point has raised considerable concern among several 
academic and policy circles. There is almost an obsession with ‘Muslim 
attitudes’ to British and American foreign policy. To a certain degree this 
concern is justified since one of the bombers of 7 July 2005 left a statement 
explicitly telling that he was fighting because he disapproved of British 
foreign policy. But reducing Muslim claims, feelings and concerns to their 
views of Western foreign policy is too much of a reductive exercise. Their 
political opinions and changing modes of political participation and 
association should not be observed in isolation, but seen in light of the 
changing attitudes, the dissatisfaction, the frustrations and the changing 
modes of participation in democratic politics of the wider European 
population. While participation in traditional party politics and voting are 
in decline, transnational social movements and interest groups of any sort – 
not just Muslim – are thriving. 
Conclusions  
Any discussion of the prospect of systematising Muslim political 
participation into the creation of Muslim representative bodies – as 
something in-between a church, an interest group and a corporatist model 
that brings together the stakeholders in a particular field – ought to be 
conducted with caution. More importantly, the question of whether and 
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should be thought through very carefully. States have an interest in 
maintaining peace and stability within their borders and for this reason 
provide the ‘rules of the game’ that will enable their inhabitants to coexist 
peacefully and respectfully of each other. From a certain point of view one 
could consider the attempts to regulate and institutionalise relations with 
Muslim communities as merely another application and extension of these 
rules to a relatively new community. This process would be acceptable if it 
were limited to providing the framework for creating a dynamic 
representative body. The fear is that it constrains free expression into an 
institution, paradoxically at a time when individuals are reclaiming their 
independence, and that its representative members are cherry-picked from 
above, rather than agreed upon by the community. Indeed the few 
examples of state-promoted Muslim consultative bodies that exist in 
France, Belgium and Great Britain have gone through legitimacy crises, 
confrontations and fierce criticism from within their own Muslim 
communities. Often, and this is perhaps more explicit in the case of Spain 
and Italy, the creation of these institutions seems reduced to a PR exercise 
on the part of the government. 
In general, political participation in Western democracies can take 
place at the level of the individual and/or can be articulated through a 
group (e.g. a political party, a community association, a social movement, a 
lobbying organisation). In order to examine Muslim attitudes to political 
participation and patterns of mobilisation in the public sphere, we should 
therefore treat them as ordinary individuals, and not isolate them from the 
rest of the picture, as if ‘Muslim’ was a special new socio-political category. 
There are, indeed, Muslim individuals who prefer to articulate their 
identity primarily as ‘Muslim’, and there are also people who have 
voluntarily decided to be active in political life as ‘Muslims’. From the 
examples mentioned above, though, we ought to be cautious and not jump 
to the conclusion that the Muslims of Europe ‘need’ expressly ‘Muslim’ 
institutions in order to be active citizens, or simply to convey their 
concerns. Furthermore, channelling Muslim voices into the formation of 
institutions that are shaped around the structure of the Christian churches 
(what scholars including Roy have called the ‘churchification’ of Islam)16 
seems not only a constraint on a religion that has no hierarchy, but is also 
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rather anachronistic at a time when people’s connection to and trust in 
institutions is declining. They prefer to ‘believe’ without belonging.17 
Humankind is very diverse and, regardless of the legal status of a 
person (i.e. whether s/he is a national citizen or an immigrant), individuals 
range from apathetic types to people with a discreet degree of interest in 
political affairs, to others who are more passionate and willing to engage 
with – and perhaps have the ambition to impact on – the political process. 
Among those persons of Islamic faith who feel that they ought to engage in 
public life, it is not automatic that they would opt for ‘Muslim’ channels in 
order to voice their concerns. Some might find it more appropriate to 
express their political choices simply through casting a vote, or maybe by 
becoming actively involved with a political party, or with a non-
denominational NGO… People might regularly go to a mosque and even 
financially support it, without nevertheless wishing to be represented in 
public life by its director or by the imam. 
So, faced with the vocal presence of Islam in the public sphere, 
European states are compelled to rethink the way they relate to minority 
religious communities such as Islam. Muslim communities, for their part, 
can decide whether to adapt to the existing pattern of religion-state 
relations in order to engage with the social and political context where they 
live, or whether to adopt the more market-driven and perhaps more 
effective path of remaining ‘disestablished’ actors in the world of pressure 
groups, which is perhaps the option that would give them more leeway. 
We should also always remember that Islam in Europe is a plural entity, 
and that the possibility of disagreement between the Muslim actors is high. 
Hence the scenario of Muslims splitting into two or more strands, some 
working through the state, some remaining independent associations, and 
both claiming and fighting for authority and recognition, is not 
unthinkable. 
Should the preferred path be that of institutionalising Islam through 
the state, both the state and the Muslim communities involved should be 
aware of the following considerations: 1) evaluate the feasibility of the 
enterprise, in terms of economic and human resources; 2) be aware of and 
reflect on the complex variety of interpretations that exist in Islam within 
and outside Europe and the influence of transnational movements; 3) 
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remember that governments and coalitions wax and wane and that the 
priorities and approaches (including towards Islam) of political parties can 
also change. But, above all, the short and long term benefits as well as the 
consequences of establishing such an institution should be taken into 
consideration. To summarise, the crucial questions are: what is the ultimate 
purpose of these Muslim institutions? What are the consequences of 
establishing them? Once governments have created these institutions and 
raised expectations among Muslims to be able to influence the political 
process, will governments be able to listen to and to stand the weight of the 
empowered Muslim bodies that they have produced?  
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11. OFFICIAL RECOGNITION OF ISLAM  
BERNARD GODARD  
Introduction 
The establishment of Islam in European countries came about in a variety 
of ways, giving rise initially to quite contrasting policies, in particular with 
respect to the setting up of representative bodies of this faith. Furthermore, 
in the European Union the status of churches has always been the exclusive 
domain of the member states (as was confirmed by article I-52 of the (non-
ratified) Constitution. 
Those countries with a colonial tradition, such as France and the UK, 
or with an imperial tradition, such as Austria with Bosnia, or Greece or 
Bulgaria within the Ottoman empire, have policies of recognition that are 
closely linked to their history and to the manner in which they have 
nurtured ties to the populations they have known over a long period of 
time. A second category of country, such as Spain, Italy or Germany has 
only known this migratory phenomenon relatively recently. In the case of 
Italy and Germany, the recognition of a Muslim representation has been 
linked to the ‘non-domestic’ character of this new religious actor. Other 
countries, notably Denmark and Sweden, are mostly dealing with Muslim 
populations who have fled their countries as a result of pressure or political 
problems. The overall proportion of Muslims also plays a decisive role: the 
greater the number of Muslims, the greater the recognition by the state of a 
representative body.  
Geographical origins, as we will see, also determine a certain 
relational modus operandi with the state: the mosaic of populations of 
diverse origins (mainly Maghrebi, African, and Turk) in France has 
influenced state intervention over the last twenty years, resulting in a 
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homogeneity of the immigrant community, with a majority of associations 
and mosques falling under the authority of the Turkish state and other 
Turkish associations, meant a rather delayed interest in promoting the 
emergence of a representative body.  
The particular history of relations between the state and religions, 
and the juridical arrangements governing the life of these religions over the 
centuries, constitute a third element determining the make-up of the 
institutional representation of Islam. Conceptions range from the very 
secular, as in France, to a view that accords a great deal of space to religious 
bodies for their participation in the life of society. The reinforcement of the 
process of secularisation, however, is what characterises recent trends in 
Europe the most, especially compared to the rest of the world. And no 
matter what legislative forms these relations between the state and 
religions take, this drive towards secularisation touches the countries with 
state religions such as Denmark, Greece or the UK as much as the 
‘concordat’ countries, namely Spain and Italy. Those countries that had 
developed a clearly ‘culturalist’ vision, like the Netherlands, in particular 
through the policy ‘pillars’ of Catholic, Protestant and humanistic 
doctrines, now seem to be returning to a more distanced policy with regard 
to different faiths. One could even advance the view that the presence of 
Islam has necessitated this distance, and some people now consider that 
this new religion cannot be too closely associated with public life. Policies 
that favour the expression of the Muslim faith could appear to contradict 
the declared neutrality of the state. For example, the very active support of 
the state for the establishment of the French Muslim Council was 
vehemently attacked in France as being contrary to Republican principles.  
And finally, the concerns engendered by radicalisation, in particular 
terrorism, have certainly accelerated the processes of recognising official 
bodies representing the Muslim faith. The British example is indicative of 
this, with the government shifting in 2005 from a very neutral, distant 
position to a desire to almost manage these bodies. 
In order to illustrate these points, we will examine the different 
processes that have been tried out to provide Muslims with a 
representative structure in France, Germany, Belgium, Netherlands, Spain, 
Italy, UK, Austria, Greece and Bulgaria and, secondarily, the public policies 
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France 
France has the largest Muslim population in Europe. People of Algerian 
origin make up more than a third of the five million Muslims in France 
today. People of Moroccan origin are the second and more recent 
community. The Turkish community, along with those of Senegalese and 
Mali origin, make up the other main communities.  
The law of December 1905, which settled the scission of the Catholic 
Church from the state, was not applied in Algeria. This exception to the law 
weighed heavily on subsequent relations between the state and Islam. The 
Mosque of Paris was long considered to be the centre of institutional Islam 
and, since 1926, the symbol of French Islam’s presence in Paris. It 
represented the repatriated Algerians in 1962, but the state waited until 
1989 to begin dialogue with all the representatives of the Muslim 
community. The specificity of France’s secularism forbad the evocation of 
any questions other than those directly relating to worship. Indeed, all 
questions concerning the integration of Muslims at the social, cultural or 
political level could on no account be brought up as a religious subject. 
Otherwise Muslims could use the common law to constitute associations.  
In view of the tense international climate, and with the increasing 
presence of a more marked Islamic activism, in 1989 the Minister for the 
Interior proposed the creation of an official study group (Conseil de 
Reflexion) on Islam. This was to be a strictly consultative organ that studied 
particular dossiers, including mosques, imams and halal food. Fifteen 
renowned individuals were invited as either representatives of 
organisations or of mosques. But this process failed.  
It was only in 1999, following an attempt to restore the Mosque of 
Paris to a central role in the organisation of the Islam of France, that a new 
initiative was launched, that was to lead to the Conseil Français du Culte 
Musulman (CFCM - French Council of the Muslim Faith).  This initiative 
came about in a calmer context than in the previous decade. France had 
known two terrorists waves, in 1985 and in 1995, which delayed the 
recognition of the Muslim faith in acceptable forms. The necessity of 
satisfying the aspirations of Muslims at the religious level had become 
evident. From the year 2000 onwards, France began to disconnect the 
notion of Islam as a source of international tension from the need to 
recognise the full citizenship of Muslims. As all over Europe, the most 
significant level of intervention to facilitate the practice of the Muslim faith 
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gave way to a very active indirect assistance on the part of municipalities to 
build mosques and arrange for Muslim cemeteries.  
But, as the main organisations of traditional Islam and the reformists 
agreed to deal with the state, organisations close to young Muslims refused 
any such masked ‘allegiance’. This was illustrated in 2000 when the 
signature by participating organisations of a kind of charter was sought. 
The principle of this ‘charter’, which features the main points of the 1905 
law on secularism, was rejected by young Muslims, mainly those born in 
France and of French nationality, whereas most of the participants in the 
consultative process were born abroad and later naturalised.  
However, after three years of talks, agreement was reached on the 
charter creating the CFCM in 2003, following considerable efforts on the 
part of the Ministry of Interior. The mosques still lack organisational unity 
and are often autonomous and divided by national and doctrinal 
differences, which in turn hinder the functioning of the CFCM. 
Nevertheless, there continues to be headway in the recognition of Muslim 
practices, in particular at the local level.  
On a more polemical issue, in 2003 the government tried to find a 
negotiated solution at the statutory level to limit the wearing of the ‘voile’ 
(headscarf)1 in schools. Considerable pressure from the political class and 
the conclusions of a report (the Stasi report) resulted in the law of March 
2004 banning religious symbols in public places (a de facto ban on the 
headscarf). From then on, organisations present in the CFCM, while 
regretting this decision, did not urge refusal to respect the law, but turned 
instead to the opening of private schools. 
Despite the fact that the government does not provide support for 
imam training courses in France, it has been concerned with this issue for 
more than fifty years. There was a failed attempt to create a curriculum in 
which the French universities would provide certain courses, especially 
history, law, social sciences and French, with the Mosque of Paris. 
Professors refused to give specific courses to imams. There are no curricula 
defined by CFCM, though the government has asked to it to agree on an 
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official definition of the imam and its training. Attempts to give courses on 
teaching the French language, on a regional basis, failed too. The FASILD, a 
public organisation in charge of this curriculum, claimed that the regional 
offices of CFCM were not able to mobilise the imams. 
Germany 
Since the Weimar constitution of 1919, freedom of conscience and religion 
has been definitively established. The social function of religion is widely 
recognised and support for religious instruction is compulsory for the 
different Länder. Religious institutions are organised at least as associations 
or, going one step further, as corporations under public law. The major 
religions and others more recently seen in Germany enjoy the legal capacity 
granted to these corporations, in particular that of tax-raising powers (8-
10% depending on the Land, deducted at source), to appoint prison 
chaplains or teachers of the Muslim faith within the Länder education 
systems. However German Islam and Muslim groups are still evolving in a 
rather precarious legal context, and has so far not attained the status of 
corporation under public law. 
The 3.5 million Muslims in Germany are for the most part of Turkish 
origin, then to a lesser degree of Bosnian, Iranian and Moroccan origin. 
This Turkish omnipresence, the legacy of traditional links between Turkey 
and Germany without post-colonial condescension, is combined with the 
notion of gästarbeiter, or guests. However the increasing acquisition of 
German nationality, only made legally possible in 2000, has brought to the 
fore the recurring issues we see in the rest of Europe, such as 
unemployment and discrimination, in particular for young people.  
The federal system leaves to the Länder the main task of relations with 
Muslims. Moreover the strong German sense of religious identity, 
essentially to the Catholic and Protestant faiths, made it quite natural to 
virtually ‘delegate’ religious affairs to the Diyanet Işleri Türk-Islam Birliği 
(DİTİB), (Turkish Islamic Union for Religious Affairs), which is one of the 
largest Islamic organisations in Germany, and the German branch of the 
Turkish government’s Diyanet  İşleri Başkanlığı  (Presidency of Religious 
Affairs). The situation has evolved in recent years with several cases 
concerning the veil in certain Länder, in particular involving teachers and 
civil servants, taken to the constitutional court in Karlsruhe, and which 
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If the federal state cannot take a position on the theological 
foundations of a faith, the Bundesamt für Verfassungschutz (Federal Office for 
the Protection of the Constitution) is allowed a certain margin of operation 
to limit the activities of certain religious organisations. Interest in Islam has 
remained essentially at the level of the Länder. The majority tendencies of 
each  Land  – the Bavarian conservative Catholicism, the Rheinish more 
social Catholicism, the Protestantism of the northern Länder, or the lesser 
religious inclinations of the new eastern Länder – have generated different 
approaches towards relations with Islam. The policy of integration of 
Muslims in Rhineland-Westphalia, where more than a third of all Muslims 
in Germany live, is exemplary in this respect. Four of the most important 
Muslim organisations, the Islamrat, the Suleymanci, the DITIB and the 
Zentralrat reside in this region. The government of the Land  is keen to 
ensure the education of Islam in schools as it does for the other religions, to 
allow Islam to enjoy advantages of the corporations of public law, in 
particular for tax collection, to train imams and to allow the building of 
mosques. In Duisburg and Cologne it has launched a pilot project to define 
religious instruction curricula in agreement with a representative body. A 
sort of Turkish and German ‘joint management’ seems to be the rule.  
In the middle of 2006 the federal government took the initiative of 
organising a meeting with the Deutsche Islam Konferenz (DIK), which is 
expected to bring about changes in a comprehensive attempt to resolve 
outstanding issues. In addressing the German parliament on the subject of 
the DIK in September 2006, Wolfgang Schaüble, Minister for the Interior, 
argued that Muslims needed the framework of an appropriate process in 
order to gain the same advantages as the other religions. Defined as a 
meeting intended for the "Muslims in Germany and German Muslims", it is 
a project of high ambition. It was proposed that the DIK be based on the 
five main Muslim organisations (five of them, among which four Turkish) 
and ten individuals from civil society. The five organisations are: the 
Council of Islam (Islamrat) held by Milli Görüs; the Union of the Islamic 
Cultural Centres of Suleymanci; the official DITIB of Ankara; the Alévie 
community and the Muslim Central Council (Zentralrat). The Zentralrat is 
more multi-ethnic, and the only one that indicates its respect for the 
German Constitution in its charter of 2002, and the freedom to change 
religion, or to have none. The ten individuals, three women of Turkish 
origin committed to the defence of the rights of the Muslim women, and 
seven men of Turkish, Iranian, Lebanese and Afghan origins, are all 
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be a significant counterweight to traditionalist or Islamist organisations, 
(the exception here being the Alevi community, known for its liberal vision 
of the Muslim faith).  
The question of the compatibility of Islam with the constitution 
(Grundgesetz) was presented by the German Minister as the core of 
forthcoming conversations, as the choice of four working topics shows: 
The German social order and the consensus on its values: equality of 
human rights and women’s rights, training in political representation, the 
family, education, self-determination of youth, the acceptance of the variety 
of the democratic cultures, secularisation. 
Questions of religion within the framework of the constitution: basic 
principle of the separation of the church and the state, the use of religious 
symbols, the building of mosques, the education of Islam in German under 
the control of the Länder, learning the German language, equal rights for 
girls and boys, joint education in sports, sex education, training of the 
imams and the study of Islam in higher education.  
The media and the economy as a bridge: the question of young people on 
the labour market, upgrading qualifications, policy to remove the 
prejudices in the Turkish and German media.  
Security and Islam: this group, more closed and secretive, should 
tackle questions of internal security, in particular to warn against and 
prevent violent acts against the democratic order. 
The subject matters here far exceed a strictly religious context. The 
main Muslim organisations were surprised at first. However in September 
2006, following the invitation, they issued a joint statement agreeing to 
participate, in spite of certain reservations. The next two years will reveal if 
this exhaustive approach to the question of citizenship for German 
Muslims will prove successful. 
Belgium 
The migratory streams of the 1960s brought mainly Moroccan and Turkish 
populations to Belgium. Today there are over 400,000 foreigners or Belgians 
of Muslim culture. The Belgian state maintains neutrality with regard to the 
faiths and the organisation of worship. It nevertheless recognises the public 
utility of churches, which leads to a certain interventionism. The Muslim 
faith was recognised in 1974. The state finances the confessional 
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of religion and their accommodation. Buildings dedicated to worship are 
tax-exempt. Subsidies for the maintenance of places of worship are within 
the competence of three regions: Flanders, Wallonia and Brussels.  
As elsewhere in Europe the question of the recognition of the 
leadership of the Muslim faith has proved extremely difficult to 
accommodate in the traditional legal framework. However, at the end of 
the 1990s Belgium initiated a highly original process. The state co-
organised elections in mosques to the Assemblée générale des Musulmans de 
Belgique (AGMB - General Assembly of Muslims of Belgium), which in turn 
elects the Executif des Musulmans de Belgique (EMB - Executive of Belgian 
Muslims). This has led to the creation of elected colleges with ethnic 
character, differentiating Turks, Moroccans and converts, and then also 
between Flemish and French speakers. The officials of this body were 
elected in 1998 and again in 2005. Nevertheless, various difficulties, 
including the obligatory ‘screening’ of the elected members by the security 
services, have partly compromised the credibility of the EMB. A royal order 
of October 2005 recognised 17 new members of the EMB as proposed by 
the AGMB. Turkish activism resulted in the presidency going to a Turk, 
although the Moroccans are superior in number in Belgian society. Many 
Moroccans were incited to boycott the elections. As a result the state 
withheld certain advantages granted to a recognised religion, in particular 
that of the payment for the Ministers of the faith. The Flemish region seems 
more advanced that the two others in the approval of religious 
communities. For the training of the imams, the region has planned 
curricula at a high level, where instruction on the knowledge of Belgian 
society has been included. 
Netherlands 
The Muslim population totals almost 1 million, with the largest 
communities coming from Turkey, Morocco and Surinam. In the past five 
years, Islam has become a subject of intense controversy in the 
Netherlands, as dramatically symbolised by the murder of the film director 
Theo van Gogh. This and other events have prompted intense debate over 
the question of compatibility of Islam with democratic values in the 
Netherlands. A recent inquiry of June 2006,2 revealed a disturbing account 
                                                           
2 Radicalen democraten, Institute of Migrations and entitled Ethnic Studies (IMES).  RECOGNITION OF ISLAM| 191 
 
of the views of young people of Moroccan origin. 40% reject the values of 
Western democracy and 6-7% says they are ready to resort to violence to 
defend their religion. The development of racism and the recent obligation 
to follow lessons in Dutch civilisation and language also contribute to a 
climate of insecurity among immigrants of Muslim origin. This tension, 
also illustrated also by the segregation into ethnic districts, contradicts the 
Dutch tradition of liberal tolerance. The birth of an Islamic party – the 
Muslim Democratic Party (MDP) - based in Belgium, contributes to the 
tension. 
Until the end of the sixties the principle of ‘pillarisation’ prevailed, 
allowing for the real organisation of communities. A recent project 
proposed in this vein was for the construction of an Islamic hospital in 
Rotterdam, where the food would be halal, where men would be separated 
from women, and where an imam would live permanently, but this was 
rejected by right-wing officials within the municipal council.  
People from immigrant communities have easy access to Dutch 
citizenship. As a result there are now more than 200 elected members of 
Muslim origin in municipalities, numerous elected members in the 
provincial advisory bodies, and ten members in the lower chamber of the 
parliament. 
Since 1983 subsidies to churches have been cut, in particular the 
salaries and pensions of the clergy. However tax advantages remain, for 
example for the repair of mosques and the financing of chaplains in the 
army. But various subsidies of a cultural and social character are allocated 
to Muslim communities more as ethnic than religious minorities. Public 
funds allow the financing of private schools (bizondere scholen): 37 primary 
schools and three Muslim secondary schools have been established. But as 
in all other European states, it is the local level that is most involved. The 
municipality of Rotterdam finances Islamic education in its public schools, 
while Utrecht opposes this.  
It is only at the end of 2004 and the beginning of 2005 that the 
government gave official recognition to organisations already widely 
implanted in the Netherlands. The Contactorgaan Moslims in Overheid 
(CMO) represents the majority of sunnis, with all the Turkish tendencies 
(DITIB, Milli Görüs and Suleymanci) except Alévis, and also the Moroccans 
close to the authorities in Rabat. The Contactgroep Islam (CGI) includes the 
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alevis. This recognition was preceded by a close examination of their real 
representativeness. 
The major preoccupation of the Dutch authorities remains the 
prevention of Islamic radicalisation. A debate within the lower chamber of 
the parliament in April 2005 gave way to a government plan entitled 
Prevention of radicalisation in the context of integration policy. The conclusions 
of this memorandum proposed actions to promote citizenship, social 
cohesion and integration (intensification of the values of the Dutch society 
and the means to combat discrimination). It recommended that practising 
Muslims be assisted to convince young people not to give in to radical 
Islamist temptations. Educational activities for Muslim populations were 
also proposed, including discussion forums, a sort of positive action for 
young people to get into university, and help to young Muslims to become 
emancipated.  
There has also been an active policy for the training of imams and the 
leaders of mosques. The University of Amsterdam (VU) opened its doors in 
September 2005 with 40 students, receiving an annual grant of €250,000 for 
six years for this special course. Leiden University was chosen for a course 
on Islamic theology, with a grant of €2.35 million for 2006-10. Both 
universities plan to develop masters courses. Further training for imams, 
spiritual advisors and chaplains is undertaken by the Hogeschool 
Inholland, and in November 2005 received declarations of intent from five 
organisations of the CMO. Apart from theology, these initiatives teach 
knowledge of Dutch Islam and pastoral care. A central question remains 
over the legitimacy of a Protestant university to teach Muslim religious 
staff. Neither the VU nor Leiden received an explicit mandate from the 
Muslim organisations. The Hogeschool has had a programme in Islamic 
studies since 1995 for Islamic teachers in secondary schools. While the Milli 
Görüs accepted this programme, the DITIB was more reticent and 
continues to send imams from Turkey. Overall this is a unique experiment 
in Europe, as an attempt to provide Muslim theological education in a 
western university with Muslim and non-Muslim teachers. 
Spain 
Islam has been present in Spain since the Moorish invasion of the 8th 
century. There is a clear consciousness on the part of the Spanish people 
that the Muslim religion is one of the spiritual faiths that is rooted in 
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presence of Muslims in Spain has increased to around 600-800,000 in a 
relatively short space of time. They are first and foremost of Moroccan 
origin, with many working in the big farming exploitations in the south 
east. Other communities, namely Algerian and Syrian, are less numerous 
but complete the ethnic landscape.  
The first institutional appearance of the Muslims in Spain was with 
the Asociacion Muslmana de Espana in 1971, whose first president was Ryay 
Tatari from Syria. By 1968 Islamic associations had been created in the 
Spanish enclaves in Morocco, Ceuta and Melilla. In June 1968 the first law 
on the freedom of religion was adopted, which opened the way for 
Muslims to establish themselves as religious entities. From the 1980s 
onwards, more than forty entities had appeared. The first association 
participated actively in the preparation of the Organic Law on the freedom 
of religion of July 1980, aimed at Islam and other religions.  
In 1992 the Spanish government signed agreements with 
organisations representing Muslims, Jews and Protestants. And so the 
Comision Islamica de Espana (CIE) was born, comprising two unions, the 
Federacion Espanola de Entitades Religiosas Islamicas (FEERI) and the Union of 
Communidades Islamicas of Espana (UCIDE). The CIE signed its agreement of 
cooperation in April 1992. Among dossiers opened with the Spanish 
government appear religious education in schools, the registration regime 
of imams with the social security system, and the appointment of clergy in 
prisons. As regards financing, a foundation, Fundacion Pluralismo y 
Convivencia, was created in 2005. This foundation aims to help the poorest 
minority faiths with grant subsidies, but not for religious activities. In 2007, 
its budget of €4.5 million is allocated by the state. 
In March 2006, the president of the CIE, Ryay Tatari, made a very 
critical assessment of relations between his organisation and the state3 on 
all accounts. The CIE criticised difficulties in opening and maintaining 
mosques. Responsibility for mosques is held first and foremost by the 
municipalities, and their decisions can be very diverse. The pervading 
Islamophobia, according to the CIE, tends to limit the building of mosques. 
No new cemeteries have been opened. In spite of the registrations of certain 
associations as religious entities, the tax authorities refuse to grant them the 
exemptions to which they are entitled. The appointment of the clergy in 
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prisons and hospitals has only been ‘exceptional’. Only 35 professors of 
religion have been appointed; despite the best efforts of the government, 
they were obstructed by the provincial educational services. It has been 
difficult to clarify the programme for Muslim religious education in 
schools. In 2006 however, a book Descubrir el Islam was edited with the help 
of a Catholic editor and the funds of the foundation Pluralismo convivencia. 
There are difficulties in the application of the law for religious holidays. 
Although it is stated in the agreement of 1992 that Muslims would be 
actively involved in the management of the Spanish-Muslim heritage, the 
CIE complains that it is excluded from this management.  
 Concerning the wearing of the headscarf, the only recorded case of 
refusal was at a private school. In this case a public school welcomed the 
pupil.  
Italy 
The presence of Muslims in Italy is relatively recent, in spite of the history 
of Sicily and the South of Italy with its rich exchanges with Islam during 
the Middle Ages. The precise number of Muslims in Italy now is difficult to 
gauge, but is believed to be around 700,000. The great ethnic variety of 
immigrants, albeit with numerous Moroccan and Albanian communities, 
has impeded the constitution of representative entities capable of dialogue 
with the Italian government. As in Spain and France, the Catholic influence 
prevails, with a trend towards secularisation. The legal Italian regime for 
relations with the faiths is driven, according to the Constitution of 1948, by 
agreements (intesas) between churches and the Italian state, which settles 
the terms for the practice of each faith. If a certain number of religions have 
sealed such agreements, it was not the case for the Muslims until 2005, 
when the Italian authorities began discussions with a group of Muslim 
individuals. As all over Europe, the lack of dialogue between the state 
authorities and the myriad Muslim associations was often compensated by 
local policies. As a result about 200 mosques were built over the last fifteen 
years. Nevertheless, certain tensions persist. Certain intellectuals and even 
the Catholic church take a critical view of the presence of Muslims, and 
feelings of rejection on the part of the immigrants, of which Islam is 
supposed to be the symbol, also remain. 
In spite of these obstacles, a ‘Consulta’, between Muslim individuals 
and the Ministry of the Interior, was organised by a decree of September 
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functioning of France’s Consultation with its Muslim communities. 
Throughout the declarations and the reports of the activities of the 
Consulta, the ‘immigrant’ character of the Muslim religion is asserted. This 
consultation is placed under the presidency of the Minister of Interior. The 
secretariat is assured by a civil servant of the Ministry of Interior and the 
agenda fixed in advance by the Minister. Participants are individual 
personalities rather than organisations, selected by virtue of their support 
for republican values and principles. Contrary to the other European 
countries, Italy refrained from dealing with organisations, but nonetheless 
includes representatives of the Ismailia community, the converts of the 
Religious Community of Italy, the World Islamic League and the World 
Islamic Mission. The inclusion of Mohamed Nour Dahan, president of the 
Union of the Community and the Islamic Organisations in Italy (UCOII) 
was the object of debates because of his closeness to the Muslim 
Brotherhood, although his organisation is the biggest in Italy. Among the 
16 Muslim members of the Consulta, all the communities are represented, 
with three Moroccans, four women and two journalists. Working groups 
are constituted around different subjects, including the status of mosques, 
religious holidays, programmes in koranic schools, the Islamic veil, the 
training of imams, marriage and halal, among others. 
In March 2006, at the conclusion of the second meeting of the 
Consulta, 11 of the 16 Muslim members presented a "Manifesto of Islam of 
Italy". This manifesto emphasises the desire to integrate into Italian society. 
They underline their wish to respect the constitution, condemn 
fundamentalism and terrorism, and to live together within the framework 
of a secular and pluralistic society. They reject radical ideologies; condemn 
anti-Christian and anti-Western preaching and evoke the right of Israel to 
security and the Palestinians to a state. They propose that imams deliver 
their sermons in Italian in places of worship, favouring integration into 
Italian society. They propose the posting by the mosques of their annual 
balance sheet and accounts. The necessity of knowing Italian, its culture 
and its fundamental values, is reaffirmed for all Muslims. Concerning 
schooling, the manifesto speaks of the superiority of public schools in 
advancing integration, with a possibility of optional education in Islam. It 
goes as far as cautioning against the creation of "Islamic school ghettos" by 
authorising Muslim private schools. Moreover it requests control over the 
curricula taught in koranic schools, to verify their compliance with the law. 
In the university field, it asks for the creation of exchanges between Italian 
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programme in religion for imams. Finally, family values and the equality of 
the sexes are reaffirmed.  
UCOII and its president, alone with an Algerian imam of Salerno, 
refused the manifesto, and presented a counter-proposal. Closer to the 
demands of the religious order, this counter-proposal asks inter alia for 
halal on the menus of schools and companies, for the implementation of 
chaplaincies, for the control of school curricula in their presentation of 
Islam, tax allowances for the building and maintenance of mosques and a 
whole swathe of measures to improve the integration of immigrants. As we 
can see this more ‘militant’ Islam, as elsewhere in Europe, has the 
advantage of being closer to the strictly religious demands of Muslims, 
whereas the Muslims disconnected from the practice of their faith are more 
concerned with promoting their harmonious integration into the society in 
which they live. Overall, dialogue in the Consulta appears to advance very 
slowly. 
United Kingdom 
In the British system the practice of worship is placed under the regime of 
freedom. Some official assistance for religion exists, however, as in other 
European countries, with tax exemption for places of worship and 
remuneration of the clergy. Subsidies for social, cultural, educational or 
charitable activities are widely used. The status of charitable activities 
allows for the promotion of religion. Registration is required with the 
Charity Commission, directed by a nominee of the Home Secretary. The 
d i v e r s e  a c t i v i t i e s  o f  a  m o s q u e  c a n  b e  s u p p o r t e d  i n  t h i s  w a y  b y  p u b l i c  
funds. The role of the state in dealings with religions is organised via the 
Ministerial Department of Communities and Local Government, but only 
recently were these accorded a full office. Previously, it was the 
responsibility of the Office of Race Relations. A technical guide, called 
Working together: consultation between government and faith communities, 
published in October 2003, describes the approach of central government 
towards consultation arrangements.  
A real umbrella for the Muslim community, the Muslim Council of 
Britain (MCB), appeared only in 1997 in the UK, following the election to 
power of the Labour government and the fact that many constituencies had 
large Muslim populations. This was eight years after the publication of 
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society to the separate development of the Muslim community. 1997 was 
also the year when state funds were awarded to private Muslim schools.  
The terrorist attacks of 9/11 in New York and Washington, and of 
7/7 in London contributed in a short space of time to radically change the 
approach towards Islam by the government. Today, they are seven state 
Muslim schools in England and five more are recommended for public 
funding. The then Prime Minister seemed to want to bring more of the 150 
private Muslim schools into the state sector. By comparison with other 
religions the Catholics have 2,041 state supported schools and the Church 
of England 4,646. However there are now complaints that faith schools 
divide society rather than promote social cohesion. And the obligation for 
these faith schools to reserve a quarter of their places for non-believers or 
children of other faiths is seen by Muslims as an unjust measure. 
Concerning the Islamic veil, several MPs, and specially Shahid Malik, the 
Labour MP of Dewsbury, expressed disapproval of a Muslim teaching 
assistant who refused to remove her veil in school. This case came after 
Jack Straw, the former foreign minister, asked Muslim women visiting his 
constituency surgery to remove their veils. 
There are other initiatives to help the Muslim community. The 
involvement of the public authority in banking is an example, where the 
Financial Services Authority (FSA) responsible for banking regulation 
fosters the development of Islamic finance in the UK with an invitation to 
bankers from the Middle East to create an Islamic bank. This led to the 
Islamic Bank of Britain. The government has created a working group with 
members of the Muslim community, the banks and the FSA to discuss how 
the regulatory system could oversee new Islamic financial products. And 
UK banking and taxation laws have been modified to promote this new 
system.  
Shortly after the 7/7 attacks in 2005 the British authorities organised 
consultations, called Preventing Extremism Together (PET), which for the first 
time drew up a comprehensive review of the state of Muslim worship. This 
was the first step in a longer term partnership between the government and 
the Muslim communities, resulting in several important initiatives, and 
notably the creation of the Mosques and Imams National Advisory Board 
(MINAB). A steering group of Muslim leaders is working, consulting 
mosques and imams, on matters such as the accreditation of imams, better 
governance of mosques and interfaith activity. The affair of the Finsbury 
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networks, is cited as an example of the inadequate governance in mosques. 
Concerning imams, MINAB provides guidelines on the accreditation of 
imams and to ensure that the profession of imam attracts young English-
born Muslims. As elsewhere in Europe, the issue of foreign imams is 
always present, despite the 22 seminaries in UK that are supposed to train 
imams. There are Muslim universities like the Leicester Institute and the 
Markfield Institute of Higher Education also has a module for the 
management of mosques.  
The government asked MINAB to ensure that mosques and imams 
play a role in community cohesion and combating extremism. An attempt 
to directly involve MCB with denouncing suspects of terrorism, however, 
was rejected by all Muslim leaders. Muslim forums against extremism and 
islamophobia have been created with 6 regional forums. Country-wide 
‘road shows’ of influential and popular personalities have been organised, 
with influential international Muslim scholars and thinkers to speak to 
audiences of 18-30 years old British Muslims. 
Nobody knows if this ‘voluntarist’ policy will succeed. But very 
substantial means have been devoted to it. 
And on the international level, the UK also wants to play a role. An 
international conference was organised in 2006 in Istanbul by the Foreign 
Office and the British Council together with the Turkish government. This 
was led by 12 individuals living in Europe (seven from the UK, including 
Tariq Ramadan, two from Turkey, the general secretary of French UOIF, 
one for Germany and the Mufti of Bosnia, Mustafa Ceric). The conference 
addressed issues of identity and citizenship, and resistance of the European 
Muslim community to extremism. 200 individuals attended this conference, 
most of them having been contacted by the European Muslim Brotherhood. 
The final declaration presented some recommendations – one can find the 
same elements presented in other forums, such as work for the full 
application of EU legislation on positive migration, freedom to practise 
religion, recognition of existing establishments and the creation of new 
academic institutions, to ensure that imams are educated appropriately and 
are familiar with European culture and support the development of 
European fatwa bodies.  
Austria 
Religious communities are treated as public law corporations. But, unlike 
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Religious Community (Islamische Glaubengemeinschaft in Österreich – IGGÖ). 
Islam is one of the thirteen religions recognised. This formal recognition 
came about in 1912, after the recognition of the Muslim majority of Bosnia, 
which was annexed in 1898. The originality, if compared with the other EU 
member states, is that membership of this official body is limited to the 
individual; organisations are not represented. Hence, Turkish DITIB and 
Milli Görüs are not supposed to participate. Conditions of membership are 
three years of residence, Austrian citizenship and payment of membership 
fees. Members vote in four voting districts to elect a leader and a board. 
They send representatives to a Shira Council, which in turn elects the 
Supreme Council and there is a Grand Mufti. 
The biggest communities are those of Turkish origin followed by the 
Bosnians. The president of IGGÖ, Anas Shakfe, is a Syrian-born Austrian. 
The long-established recognition of Islamic worship in Austria has also 
resulted in the establishment of an institute in Vienna (Islamisches Religion 
pädagogisches Akademie – IRPA), to train teachers who know the 
fundamentals of Islam, are German speakers and are supposed to be able to 
explain and enter into discussion about Islam in the context of life in 
Austria. The IGGÖ and the IRPA are the official partners of the 
government and leaders of both bodies are proud to train teachers to use 
theological arguments against extremism. Nevertheless, if Islamic 
education is provided in public schools by teachers under the control of 
IRPA and IGGÖ, a large number of Muslim students avoid religious 
education. Parents, especially of Turkish origin, prefer to send their 
children to the school’s mosque. For the moment, students finish with a 
technical school diploma in the IRPA, but this will be changed to a BA; 
IRPA will be established as an Urschule  (founding school) in Islamic 
Education in 2007. And efforts continue to strengthen the Centre of 
Research into Islamic Pedagogy of Vienna, situated inside the Faculty of 
Philosophy and of Sciences of Education and providing a masters diploma. 
There are no special training courses for imams. The majority come, as in 
the other countries, from the Turkish universities, under the control of 
DITIB (Turkish Islamic Union for Religious Affairs).  
The Austrian foreign ministry twice helped IGGÖ to hold an 
international meeting of imams in Vienna. The first time was in 2003 and 
the second in April 2006, under the Austrian presidency of Europe. 
Chancellor Schüssel welcomed the second session where more than 200 
imams and Muslim religious leaders attended. The final declaration, like 200 | GODARD 
 
three months later in Istanbul at another conference (see above in the 
chapter on the UK) claimed: “Islam is a real component of the European 
identity through the accomplishments of its grand scientific and cultural 
heritage”. To thank the guest country the conference concluded: 
“Consequently, the model of the status of recognition for Islam, as it exists 
in Austria, is actually especially suitable, because it brings with it, beyond 
the emotional level of belonging, an institutionalised dialogue”.  
During this meeting, the idea emerged for a sort of European Council 
of Fatwa, which can prevent “having t o  f a l l  b a c k  o n  f o r e i g n  e x p e r t s ’  
opinions” because it will “grow from the local Muslim community”. This 
was interesting considering that this body is supposed to exist already: 
there is a European Council of the Fatwa and Research, located in Dublin 
and directed by Muslim Brotherhood leaders. As we can see, Austria, like 
the UK, wishes to play a role in promoting European Islam. 
Greece 
The particular history of Greece, given the weight of the Orthodox Church 
and the old conflicts with Turkey, leads to a rather problematic recognition 
of the rights of Muslims. According to the Treaty of Lausanne, a 
community of 120,000 Turkish-speakers lives in Thrace under a special 
arrangement. Three Muftis have the power to control family affairs 
according to Muslim legislation (but since 1991 decisions have to be 
confirmed by a civil court) and the freedom to practise and teach the 
Turkish language. Immigration, mostly from Albania and then from Arab 
countries (200,000 in Athens), incites Greece to consider Muslims as full 
citizens, not as a local minority. Even for the Turkish minority, problems 
still remain. As in Bulgaria, the government does not let the Muslim 
community elect their Muftis. The Greek government was twice sentenced 
by the European Court of Human Rights (1999 and 2006) for having chosen 
a Mufti. Another conflict concerns the identity of the Thracian Muslims. Yet 
in 1990, the first independent Turkish Member of Parliament, Ahmet Sadiq, 
was elected. But he was then disqualified and sentenced to 18 months in jail 
because he said that the Muslims of Thrace were Turkish instead of, 
according to Greek law, Greek Muslim. 
This complicates matters for other Muslims. The affair of the Athens 
mosque has been outstanding for years. Greek citizens and the Orthodox 
church, which can give advice on the state management of religion, were 
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problem will be solved. Other problems persist like cemeteries 
encountering opposition from local authorities to let Muslims and other 
non-orthodox religions practise their faiths. 
Bulgaria 
One legacy of the Ottoman Empire is that most of the more than one 
million Muslims in Bulgaria (Muslims claim a higher number) are ethnic 
Turks, followed by ethnic Roma and then ethnic Slavs (Pomaks). They are 
mostly Bulgarian born and live in particular areas. The Muslims have seen 
their situation change progressively since 1990, when the communist 
system fell. Before this date, from 1946 to 1989, a tough campaign of 
assimilation was imposed. In 2002 a religious Act was passed requiring 
religious groups to register with the state, which included Muslims. 
However the Orthodox Church, as the only traditional religion, was not 
obliged to register. An official directorate plays a role as a kind of religious 
police force. As in Greece, they have a sort of minority status, but are not 
defined by any treaty with Turkey. With 1,150 mosques, 150 built since 
1989, three Muslim primary and secondary schools and a higher education 
institute in Sofia, the representation of Muslim interests has been 
progressing. Muslims are influential with a party, the Movement for Rights 
and Freedom, which is the third party in the country. 
The National Muslim Conference represents the community. But 
problems have appeared since the return to democracy. As in Greece, the 
state has imposed a mufti against the will of the Muslim community, and 
has been also been condemned by the European Court of Human rights for 
intervening in the religious affairs of the community. Another issue 
concerns the return of properties confiscated by the communist regime. 
Refusals to build new mosques are also a symbol of the resistance on the 
part of the local authorities to admit Muslim worship. Tensions have 
increased since 9/11 and fear of radicalisation has exacerbated the 
situation, (Ayman Al Zawahiri, al Qaeda operative ‘No. 2’, was said to be a 
resident in Sofia in the 1990s).  
Conclusions 
This paper has described how the governments of some European 
countries have been trying to resolve issues surrounding the recognition of 
Muslims in their respective societies. There is no European Union policy on 
matters of religion. Yet the comparison of these various experiences, for 202 | GODARD 
 
example on questions of Islamic education or institutionalisation, can be 
helpful.  
It is clear that the situation has changed over the last five years. If the 
international context has become increasingly difficult, new trends can be 
observed towards a greater control by the state over the organisation of the 
Muslim community. In fact all European countries seem to be moving in 
the same direction here. Even France, considered as the most secular of 
European countries, has begun an active policy of a kind of ‘recognition’ of 
the Islamic religion. All countries’ policies tend towards more inclusive 
citizenship as an antidote to the dangers of racism and Islamophobia.  
Religious affairs are not still European affairs, but a competence 
reserved for the member states. The European Court of Human Rights 
remains very prudent, each President of the Commission has his own 
project, and each country has its point of view on how to arrange the place 
of religion in our societies. There are nonetheless common themes and 
concerns.4 Islam can no longer be considered as another ethnic or cultural 
system that has nothing to do with European culture. It is necessary to 
consider that Muslims have the same rights and the same duties as people 
of other religions.  
It is also necessary to disconnect the inclusion of the Muslim religion 
within European countries from European policy towards the wider 
Muslim world. Policies towards the Euro-Mediterranean dialogue or the 
entry of Turkey into the European Union cannot replace or cancel progress 
in relations with European Muslim communities. Even if radicalism and 
terrorism are very weighty problems that have to be confronted, they 
cannot justify not allowing Muslims the liberty to practise their faith. The 
obligation to denounce ‘extremists’ to security services is not appropriate. 
But, on the contrary, asking to them to form their own ‘police’ is necessary.  
What is called ‘islamophobia’ is not the rejection of a religion, but a 
refusal to include people whose skins and names are not ‘European’. 
Discrimination at the level of religious identity merely gives support to 
extremist Muslim groups. Before being Muslim, they are citizens, with their 
political opinions, and every element constituting their personality. 
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The issues of worship are mostly local. Each state has to improve 
communications between local and national levels to help the Muslim 
community. 
Supervision of youngsters and the creation of training centres for 
imams, teachers of religion or chaplains appear to be urgent. Delays over 
the control of teaching materials used in the koranic schools are dangerous. 
Muslim religious education has to be considered as the first challenge. 
It could be useful to create a steering group at the European level to 
study all the means to create a European dynamic for concerted policies 
towards the Muslim community. It is difficult for the moment to unify a 
policy, Islam being a religion like any other religion. But reflection about 
religions in general and the ways in which non-traditional religions can be 
allowed to establish themselves in Europe could begin with the Muslim 
case.  
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